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"Punitive damages have replaced baseball as our national sport."( 
- Theodore B. Olson 
"The public gets anecdotal glimpses of atypical cases without a sense of 
their overall significance. Simplistic sound bites have displaced 
systematic analysis.,,2 
- Deborah L. Rhode 
"[Civil jury trial] data suppl[y] a crucial empirical dimension to an array 
of key research questions that remain the subject of intense, on-going 
theoretical and public debates.,,3 
- Michael Heise 
Defendant Navarette, a professional boxer, abducted, brutally beat, 
assaulted, raped, and sodomized plaintiff Ofisa, a waitress. The state court 
jury awarded $40,000 in general damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. 
- Ofisa v. Navarette, 
Case S3 (see Appendix B, infra) 
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Whether extreme sport or war, the national polemic4 over punitive 
damages continues to rage, with no obvious winner or resolution in sight.5 
Splashy media coverage of large punitive damages awards has captured 
popular attention6 and fueled public outrage over cases that have become the 
4 Marc Galanter used the tenn "polemical" to describe the "power" of the "war stories" of the tort 
refonn movement in 1983. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't 
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
4, II (1983) [hereinafter Galanter, Landscape of Disputes]. 
S The public debate about punitive damages is only one part of the larger national controversy about 
the tort law system that began in the 1970s, see Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of 
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. I, II [hereinafter Galanter, Shadow Play]; see also Galanter, 
Landscape of Disputes, supra note 4, at 6-11 (describing the "'hyperlexis' explosion"), although it has 
become a predominant theme. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punilive Damages and 
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1409 (1993)(quoting the Wall Street Journal as observing that 
punitive damages are "the major fuel of the litigation explosion"); Jerry J. Phillips, To Be Or Not To Be: 
Reflections on Changing Our Tort System, 46 MD. L. REV. 55, 56 (1986) (naming punitive damages as first 
among the "common current litany of complaints against the tort system"). 
6 William Glaberson, When the Verdict is Just Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,1999, at 4 ("For years, 
across the country, accounts of bizarre jury verdicts and huge damage awards (like the $2.9 million 
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notorious poster children of the nationwide tort refonn movement.7 Tort 
refonn proponents have lobbied vigorously for controls on punitive damages 
at the nationallevel8 and exerted unrelenting pressure on state legislatures to 
pass new laws to control "runaway" awards.9 
collected by the McDonald's customer who spilled coffee on herself) have been used to prove that the 
courts are wacky or worse."). Recently, large punitive damages awards in precedent-setting tobacco 
smoker cases have grabbed the headlines, e.g.. (I) the August 200 I Los Angeles Boeken verdict, "the 
largest award in an individual lawsuit against a tobacco company," ajury verdict of$3 billion in punitive 
damages reduced to $100 million by the state court judge (see Associated Press. Smoker Accepts $100 
Million Award ill Los Angeles Tobacco Case, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Aug. 21,200 I), available 
at http://www.signonsandiego.comlnewslstate/20010821-2058-tobaccotrial.html) (last accessed June 20, 
2004); (2) the Oregon Schwarz case in March 2002, a $150 million punitive damages award by a jury 
reduced by the state court judge to $100 million (see. e.g., Henry Weinstein (LA Times), Philip Morris 
must pay $150M, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 23, 2002, at A3 (reporting on the "second-largest verdict 
ever awarded in an individual smoker case"); and (3) the 1999 award in the Florida smoker class action 
case, Engle, where the jury issued a "record-shattering verdict" of$145 billion in punitive damages against 
the nation's five largest cigarette makers, overturned on appeal in 2003 (see Florida Appeals Court Throws 
Out $145 Billion Tobacco Verdict, CNN.COM, May 27, 2003, available at 
http://edition.cnn.coml2003/LAW/05121/tobacco.ruling.overtumed). 
1 See. e.g .. Associated Press, Judge cuts GM Liability by $3.7 billion: Punitive Damages called 
'excessive, ' HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 27, 1999, at A3 (reporting that a Los Angeles trial judge 
"slashed $3.7 billion yesterday from a $4.9 billion judgment against General Motors in a lawsuit over the 
explosion of a Chevrolet Malibu gas tank, saying the punitive damages were 'excessive."'); see also 
American Tort Reform Association, Looney Lawsuits, available at http://www.atra.orgldisplay/l3 (last 
accessed June 20, 2004); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOAN MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 
5 (1995) (discussing "horror stories"); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. 
L. REV. 1093 (1996) [hereinafter Galanter, Antidote]; Michael J. Saks, Malpractice Misconceptions and 
Other Lessons About the Tort Litigation System, 16 JUST. SYS. 1. 7 (1993). 
S Congressional interest in tort reform arose in the mid-I 980s. In 1986, Senator Mitch McConnell 
introduced the Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986, asserting that America suffered from "too much 
litigation." Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 3 (1986) [hereinafter 
Galanter, The Day After]. For the past decade, Congress has repeatedly considered a host oflimitations on 
punitive damages proposed by advocates of tort reform. On July 30, 2002, the Senate considered but then 
tabled 57 to 42 the "McConnell amendment" to S. 812 (a prescription drug bill, which would have enacted 
limitations on medical malpractice suits, products liability, and nursing home claims). S.A. 4326, proposed 
to amend S.A. 4299, proposed to amend S. 812, I 07,h Congo (2002). CONGo REC. § 7435 (daily ed. July 26, 
2002) (amendment submitted and proposed by Senator McConnell, R-Kentucky). The amendment would 
have adopted new restrictions on punitive damages such as: a clear and convincing standard of proof, § 
15(a); a substantive standard of intent to injure or substantial certainty of unnecessary injury and failure to 
avoid injury, or conscious flagrant disregard ofa substantial and unjustifiable risk of unnecessary injury, § 
15(a); a bar on punitive damages in cases where there was no compensatory award (including nominal 
damages under $500), § 15(b); at defendant's request, a bifurcated proceeding on punitive damages liability 
and the amount of the award, § 15(c); a limited set of eight factors that a trier of fact could consider in 
setting the award amount, § 15(d); a cap of two times the compensatory award, § 15(e); and the elimination 
of any joint and several liability for punitive damages, § 17. Similarly restrictive provisions on punitive 
damages resurfaced with recent success in the House, H.R. 5,108lh Cong., § 7 (Feb. 5, 2003), the "Help 
Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTHY' Actof2003 (passed on March 13,2003), 
but then were once again stalled in the Senate. S.607, I08'h Cong., § 8 (Mar. 12,2003). See Kevin 
O'Reilly, Tort Reform Advocates Strike While Iron is Hot, INSURANCE JOURNAL.COM, May 5, 2003, 
available at http://www.insurancejoumal.comlmagazineslwestl2003/05105/featuresl28729.htm (last 
accessed June 20, 2004) (noting Senate bill "still awaiting action"). 
• See Tanya Albert, Tort Reform Clears House, Moves Forward ill States, AMEDNEWS.COM. Apr. 7, 
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Views among the public, bench, bar, and legislators about the wisdom of 
punitive damages in American tort law as a remedy for injured individuals 
have long been polarized. 10 In 1872, Judge Foster criticized punitive damages 
as a "monstrous heresy ... an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, 
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.,,11 Modem critics focus less 
on the jurisprudential oddity of punitive damages-which are uniquely 
designed to punish and deter defendants, rather than compensate victims, 12 
and are therefore decried as an anomaly among traditional tort remedies l3-
and more on what they perceive to be the unfair results of jury application of 
the doctrine: excessive awards, runaway verdicts, and a chilling effect on 
businesses, product innovation, and the medical profession. On the other 
hand, plaintiffs' advocates contend that punitive awards are a well-established 
historical remedy for that small category of outrageous torts that cross the line 
from private to public wrongs. On the practical level, they see punitive 
damages as integral and "paramount" to individual victims' rights,14 effective 
2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.orglamednewsl2003/04/07/gvII0407.htm (last accessed June 20, 
2004) ("rallies, protests and old-fashioned lobbying seem to be paying off as tort reform action at the 
federal and state level takes full bloom this spring"). Reformers now have a powerful ally in President 
George w. Bush, who championed limiting tort lawsuits when he was Governor of Texas. George Lardner. 
Jr., Tort Reform: Mixed Verdict: Bush's First Priority in Office Pleased Business. Spurred Donations, alld 
Cut Public's Remedies, WASHINGTON POST. Feb. 10. 2000, at A06 (noting that Bush signed seven major 
tort reform bills, including a cap on punitive damages). Once in office. President Bush personally rallied 
tort refoml proponents like the American Medical Association. Joel B. Finkelstein. Bush to AMA: Tort 
Reform a must. AMEDNEWS.COM, Mar. 17,2003, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.orglamednewsl2003/03/17/gvII0317.htm (last accessed June 20, 2004). Bush 
furthermore appealed for tort reform in his 2003 State of the Union address, Associated Press, House 
Passes Medical Malpractice Bill. Mar. 13, 2003, available at 
http://www.edition.cnn.coml2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/13/medical.malpractice (last accessed June 20, 2004) 
and publicly celebrated the passage of the HEALTH Act by the House in March 2003 (see supra note 8). 
10 See Galanter, Antidote. supra note 7, passim (discussing the origins, breadth, and depth of the tort 
reform debate). 
II Fay v. Parker. 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (Foster, J.) ("Is not punishment out of place, irregular, 
anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous. when classed among civil 
remedies'!" [d. at 382). 
12 See, e.g .. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (5 'h ed. 1984) 
("Such damages are given to the plaintiff over and above the full compensation for the injuries. for the 
purpose of punishing the defendant, or teaching the defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others 
from following the defendant's example."). 
Il But see Galanter & Luban, Poetic Jllstice. supra note 5, at 1394 (suggesting that punitive damages 
might be an anomaly when "viewed against the background of ... conventional taxonomy," but "are no 
anomaly" when viewed in the pluralistic context of various forms of social punishment). 
14 Mothers Against Drunk Driving, MADD's Victim-Related Position Statements. available at 
http://www.madd.orglvictimslO.1056.249I.OO.html#tort (last accessed June 20, 2004) ("MADD opposes 
any measures which will restrict or in any way limit the rights of victims of impaired driving crashes to 
seek and recover punitive damages in any cause of action arising out of impaired driving crashes."); Center 
for Justice and Democracy, Glossary of "Tort Reforms," available at 
http://www.ccntcrjd.orglfree/lllythbusters-free/MB glossmy.hllll (praising the value of punitive damages 
and calling tort reform proposals "cruel laws that reduce the protections and rights our country provides to 
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at protecting the public from defective products and unsafe services, and "the 
only way that large corporations can be punished and deterred from future 
egregious misconduct.,,15 
The national punitive damages polemic reached a crescendo in 1994, after 
the record-breaking $5 billion punitive damages award in the Exxon Valdez 
case. 16 Responding to the news of the award, now-U.S. Solicitor General Ted 
Olson proclaimed punitive damages as "our national sport," calling the award 
a "pure windfall" resulting from "America's capricious and whimsical 
punitive damages system ... running amok.,,17 He expressed outrage that 
half-million dollar punitive damages verdicts "used to be a rarity" but were 
now "commonplace.,,18 The new national sport of punitive damages awards 
was, he said, "a perverse combination of lottery and bullfighting, selecting 
beneficiaries and targets almost at random and inflicting brutal punishment.,,19 
The "game" could be won by those claiming even "remote or speculative 
injury" allegedly caused by "wealthy and distant corporation[s].,,2o 
Defenders of the Exxon Valdez punitive damages verdict included the 
venerable New York Times. which editorialized that the verdict was the 
product of a "keenly attentive" and not "runaway" jury, and solemnly 
concluded that the verdict "deserve[d] to stand.,,21 Emphasizing that the 
Exxon Valdez spill was the largest oil spill in U.S. history,22 the plaintiffs 
those who are injured") (last accessed June 20, 2004). 
15 Leo v. Boyle, President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Punitive Damage Award in 
ExxOIl Valdez Case Should Be Measured by Exxon's Behavior. Not Ratio (Nov. 8, 200 I), available at 
http://www.atla.org/consumermediaresourcesltier3/press _ roomlpresidentlboy le-exxon .aspx (last accessed 
June 20, 2004). 
I. See III re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9'" Cir. 200 I )(remanding the question of punitive 
damages for consideration under the due process clause). See also Caleb Solomon Exxon Is Told To Pay $5 
Billionfor Valdez Spill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at A3. The punitive damages award was to be paid to 
the class of 10,000 fishers, a class of Alaska Native fishers, and others, totaling 34,000, averaging about 
$150,000 per plaintiff before deductions for attorneys' fees. Theodore B. Olson, Rule of Law: The 
Dangerous National Sport of Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at A 17. During trial, plaintiffs' 
counsel sought a total of $15 billion in punitive damages, Caleb Solomon, Jury Finds £u:on Reckless in 
Oil Spill; Damages of$16.5 Billion May Be Sought, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994, at A3, stating, "We want 
to take a big enough bite out of their butt to change their behavior." Allanna Sullivan, Exxon Begins Final 
Defense in Valdez Spill, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1994, at B I (quoting Brian O'Neill, lead attorney for 
plainti ffs). 
17 Olson, Rule of Law, supra note 16, at A 17 (stating also that the award served "no constructive 
societal function and is actually quite harmful and counterproductive" given that Exxon had already spent 




21 Editorial Desk, Lang Shadow of the Exxon Valdez, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at A22 ("Despite its 
size, the penalty is appropriate to the scale of the ecological havoc wrought by the spill and the reckless 
behavior that caused it. "). 
22 Ken Wells, Hazelwood Is Acquiued of Most Charges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1990, at A3 (plaintiffs 
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argued that "misdeed[ s] of historic proportions deserver d] a penalty of historic 
proportions."n The Sierra Club called the award "necessary ... to set an 
example that not even Exxon can run amok and get away with it.,,24 
According to Riki Ott, an Alaskan fisher and scientist, "Even $5 billion won't 
bring justice, but it will go a long way toward bringing closure to this sorry 
event.,,25 After the United States Supreme Court in October 2000 denied 
Exxon's attempt to overturn the award for jury misconduct,26 consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader decried Exxon's failure to pay the award more than a 
decade after the verdict, calling the company's response to the award "a legal 
war of attrition, while thousands of Alaskans and others suffered.,,27 The 
reversal of the Exxon Valdez punitive damages verdict by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in November 2001, based on constitutionality concerns of 
excessiveness,28 did not quiet the long-running controversy. 
called the spill the "biggest environmental disaster in the U.S. this century"). See also Ron Engstrom, 
Courl: Exxon bill 100 high, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 200 I, at A I ("When an Anchorage jury 
handed down the award in 1994, it was the biggest punitive damages award in U.S. history .... "). 
23 Opinion, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 10,2001, at B6. 
24 Carl Pope (Executive Director, Sierra Club), Statement a/Sierra Cillb Executive Direclor Carl Pope 
Regarding Courl Ruling $5 Billion Exxon Valdez Award Excessive, TRUTHOUT (Nov. 7,200 I) available al 
http://www.truthout.org/docs_011l1.08D.Valdez.htm (last accessed June 20, 2004) ("This disaster became 
an icon for corporate irresponsibility. It won't send a strong message for our future if they are only given a 
slap on the wrist. "). 
25 Riki Ott, Why Exxon Owes Alaska $5 Billion. ANCHORAGE DAIL Y NEWS, June 25, 2002, at B6: 
"Exxon's spill harmed thousands of people and dozens of communities. This spill continues to 
haunt our lives to this day in the f0l111 of socioeconomic trauma from lingering damages to our 
environment and fisheries; physical trauma from injured health; and emotional trauma from 
Exxon's ridiculous court delays and misleading public statements." 
26 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Baker, 531 U.S. 919 (2000). 
21 Ralph Nader, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied. Common Dreams.org, available al 
http://www.commondreams.org/viewslI01000-109.htm (last accessed June 20, 2004) (originally publ ished 
in S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 2000) ("Exxon media Oaks and other corporate 'spin masters' often call 
litigation 'frivolous' when they are defendants. What is truly frivolous is Exxon's legal foot-dragging in this 
case."). 
28 Exxon, 270 F.3d 1215. The Ninth Circuit found the award excessive under the expanded judicial 
review of punitive damages required by BMW 0/ North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) 
(establishing three "guideposts" for reviewing such awards) and Cooper Industries. Inc. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (200 I )(reaffirming the BMW guideposts), both of which were decided after 
the Exxon trial court had approved the jury's verdict. Exxon. 270 F.3d at 1241. On remand, the District 
Court reluctantly reduced the award to $4 billion. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (2002). In 
light ofthe U.S. Supreme Court's major ruling in April 2003 on the appropriate ratio of punitive damages, 
stating "We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed ... 
however ... few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 
(2003), the Ninth Circuit once again vacated and remanded the Exxon punitive damages award. David 
Koenig, Appeals Panel Sends Exxon Valdez Case Back To Alaska COllrt, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Aug. 24, 2003, 
web posted, available at http://www.juneauempire.comlstoriesl082403/sta_exxoncase.shtml (last accessed 
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The polemic continued to crescendo after the Exxon Valdez award with 
every new large punitive damages verdict. The Exxon Valdez record was 
shattered in July 2000 when a Florida jury awarded $145 billion in punitive 
damages in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds, a landmark class action suit involving up 
to 700,000 Florida smokers.29 Engle further incensed critics of the American 
tort law system.30 Walter Olson, a leading critic of "over-litigation,,,31 
proclaimed that "'The Runaway Jury' Is No Myth" and called the award 
"plunder.,,32 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce criticized the Engle verdict as 
"an obscene symptom of a court system that is out of control.,,33 Others 
called the trial "a circus" and a "kangaroo court. ,,34 At the other end of the 
spectrum, anti-smoking advocates hailed the Engle verdict as "the Day of 
Reckoning ... for Big Tobacco['s] despicable and illegal behavior over the 
past halfcentury.,,35 More large punitive damages verdicts are inevitable and 
will inevitably refuel the debate. 
The extreme rhetoric36 and strong passions that characterize the popular 
discourse over punitive damages have spilled over into legal academia, 
generating lively symposia37 and rich research, as well as nasty feuds, 
June 20, 2004). 
29 See Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-
08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), 2000 WL 33534572. See also Myron Levin, Jury Awards $145 
Billion in Landmark Tobacco Case, L.A. TIMES, July 15,2000, at A I. In comparison, the forty states that 
settled their Medicaid case against the tobacco companies in 1997-98 were to receive $246 million over 
twenty-five years. Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Taking a Hit: Yes, $145 Billion Deals Tobacco a 
Huge Blow, But Not a Killing One, WALL ST. 1, July 17,2000, at A I. In 2003, the Engle punitive damages 
verdict was reversed on appeal. Matthew Haggman and Laurie Cunningham, A Giant Win Jor Tobacco 
Industry, LAW.COM, May 22, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1052440772000. 
30 See, e.g., Voice oJthe Times, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 2001, at B9 (calling the award 
"ridiculously large and lawyer-driven," "bloated," and "pie-in-the-sky"). 
3. Walter Olson, Profile, at http://walterolson.com/bio.html. 
32 Walter Olson, The Runaway Jury' Is No Myth, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2000, at A22 [hereinafter 
Olson, Myth]. 
33 Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: $145 Billion; Fla. Jury Hands Industry Major Setback, 
WASH. POST, July 15, 2000, at AO I . 
• \4 Id. (quoting Tom Humber, President, National Smokers Alliance, and Gordon Smith, lead attorney 
for Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., respectively). 
35 Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, TPLP: EI/gle Verdict Unlikely To Be Reversed on 
Appeal (July 14, 2000), available at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu.litigation/caseslpressreleasesl 
ENGLEVICTORY2000.htm (last accessed June 20, 2004). 
36 This article uses the term "rhetoric" in the sense of"[a]ffectation or exaggeration in prose or verse .. 
. [u]nsupported or inflated discourse," NEW COLLEGE EDITION, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 114 
(1976), rather than the classical definition of "rhetoric," which is the "the study of the elements used in 
literature and public speaking." Id. For a thorough discussion of the rhetoric of the punitive damages 
debate, see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the Politics oj Ideas: 
. Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71. 
37 See, e.g., Robert A. Klinck, Symposium: ReJorming Punitive Damages: The Punitive Damages 
Debate, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469,469 (200 I) (describing the Journal's March 200 I symposium as a 
response to the "controversy surrounding punitive damages"); see also Special Issue: The Future oj 
150 Journal of Law & Politics [VoI.XX: 143 
tumultuous fora, and claims of corrupt scholarship.38 During the 1980s39 and 
1990s, in response to the vociferous criticism of tort verdicts generally,40 and 
punitive damages in particular, a host of major empirical studies were 
42 
published.41 Studies by the Department of Justice, RAND Institute,43 
« ~ 
Theodore Eisenberg, and other leading scholars responded to the 
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. I, 1-462 (presenting thirteen articles by leading scholars on punitive 
damages resulting from a controversial conference held at the University of Wisconsin Law School in 
1996); Galanter, Shadow Play, supra note 5, at I (describing the conference and contributors). 
38 For example, claiming bias, tort reform leaders staged a partial boycott of the 1996 Wisconsin 
punitive damages conference. ATLA, Late Boycoll by Tort "Reform" Group Leaves ABA TIPS Section 
Leadership Dismayed at www.atla.orglfoundationslpoundlcjdigestl9701/c97woyc.html(last accessed June 
20,2004). Galanter discusses the history of the conference, its participants, and his disappointment with 
the controversy, in his Introduction to the papers. Galanter, Shadow Play, supra note 5, at I. 
39 The 1978 punitive damages verdict of $125 million in the Ford Pinto case marked a watershed in 
punitive damages history and scholarship. See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages 
Against Manufacturers of Defective Products. 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,3 (1982) (discussing Ford Pinto case, 
"The recent affirmance of the verdict in Grimshaw demonstrates that the [changing judicial environment 
for punitive damages] is now in full swing .... There has been considerable ferment in this field in the last 
few years. "). 
40 Under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. Department of Justice formed a Tort Policy Working 
Group, which ultimately made a strong recommendation for tort refoml. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON 
THE CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OFTHE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY 
AND AFFORDABILITY (1986). See also Thomas B. Marvell, Tort Caseload Trends alld the Impact of Tort 
Reforms, 17 JUST. SYS. J. 193, 193 (1994) ("The mid-1980s saw considerable debate about an alleged 
litigation explosion in tort cases.") (citing Alice I. Youmans, Research Guide to the Litigation Explosion, 
79 LAW LIB. R. J. 707 (1987». See also id. (noting that "the U.S. Justice Department and insurance 
companies, who advocated tort refomls that would limit claims, argued that tort caseloads were rising 
greatly, and they supported research reaching that conclusion .... "). The American Medical Association 
took "the lead in a 'crusade' for tort reform." S. Y. Tan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault 
Cure the Disease?, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 241, 257 (1987). 
41 See. e.g. Galanter, Shadow Play. supra note 5, at I ("Over the past dozen years a band ofdedicated 
researchers has gradually assembled a picture of punitive damages activity along a number of 
dimensions."); Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, PUllitive Damages: 011 the Path to a Principled Approach?, 
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1001 (1999) (commenting that, since their 1980 article was published, "In fact, 
judicial, legislative, and scholarly interest in punitive damages has surged in the intervening period.") 
(citing Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
639 (1980». For a thorough discussion of the response of scholarship to the perceived crisis in the medical 
malpractice area, see Neil Vidmar, Maps. Gaps. Sociolegal Scholarship. and the Tort Reform Debate, ill 
SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 170-209 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds. 1999). For a thorough 
review of results of the nine major empirical studies, see Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: 
Current Data alld Further Inquiry, 1998 WISe. L. REV. 15, 17-56 [hereinafter Rustad, Unraveling). 
42 
See. e.g .. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AI.., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS 
IN LARGE COUNTIES (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ-154346 1995); CAROLlo DEFRANCES & 
MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 
1996 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ-173426 1999). 
43 E.g .. ERIK MOLLER, RAND CORP., TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985 (1996); Erik Moller 
et aI., Punitive Damages in Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1999). 
44 See. e.g .. Theodore Eisenberg et al.,Juries. Judges. and Punitive Damages: An Empirical SlIIdy. 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-
Grabbing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg 
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accusations that the tort system was "wacky,,46 and tried to keep apace of the 
various state and national tort reform proposals.47 Trial lawyers seized on 
these studies as proof that the tort reformers' calls for caps and other limits on 
punitive damages were based on purely political agendas and not empirical 
evidence,48 while tort critic Ted Olson dismissed the plaintiffs' bar's touting 
of the studies as "hype.'.49 
Major corporations hit with large punitive damages awards, including 
Texaco, Exxon, and Honda, responded by funding studies by sympathetic 
scholars.50 A much publicized new book-partially funded by Exxon and 
et aI., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
Predictability]; Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages Awards in 
Published Opinions. the Impact of BMW v. Gore 011 Punitive Damages Awards. and Forecasting Which 
Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 59 (1999); and Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring 
the Deterrence Effect of PUllitive Damages, 87 GEO. L. J. 347 (1998). 
45 
See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 7, at 29-59 alld Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of 
Punitive Damages on Selliements, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 169 [hereinafter Koenig, Shadow Effect]. In 2001, 
leading empirical scholars Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad published In Defense of Tort Law. THOMAS 
H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (200 I), a book with the "primary goal [] to 
cut through the rhetoric surrounding American tort law by presenting the best empirical research on the 
social functions of civil litigation." Thomas Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Book Review: III DefellseofTort 
Law, available at http://consumerlawpage.com!article/tort-Iaw.htm (last accessed June 20, 2004) (also 
stating that their book "is the first book to provide a systematic study ofthe positive functions oftort law in 
contrast to the anti-tort message of commentators such as Peter Huber, Victor Schwartz, and Walter 
Olson"). 
46 Glaberson, supra note 6, at Section 4, I ("increasingly, some political scientists, legal scholars[,] and 
consumer advocates are suggesting that outlandish examples have created a distorted picture of the legal 
system"). 
47 See. e.g .. Thomas A. Eaton et aI., Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort 
Litigation in the I 990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1096 (2000) [hereinafter Eaton et aI., Georgia II] (empirical 
study of tort litigation in Georgia, concluding that their study was "another brick in a wall of information 
that suggests that the tort system in practice is very different from the one depicted in popular and political 
rhetoric" and "[t]here is no explosion of tort filings," id.); see also Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, 
A Profile of Tort Litigation ill Georgia alld Reflectiolls 011 Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627 (1996) 
[hereinafter Eaton & Talarico, Georgia I] (predecessor study, reaching similar conclusions); Deborah Jones 
Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
315,398 (1999) (concluding in an empirical study of twelve years of Ohio products liability and medical 
malpractices cases in a major county that "[ c]urrent tort reform is a blunderbuss[, b lased on anecdote and 
designed to favor defendants," and that "[i]n the face of this evidence[ of] exaggerated anecdotes and wild 
stories ... [r]ather than heed ... those fictions, legislators and voters should tum their attention to our 
growing knowledge of how the tort system truly operates"). 
48 See. e.g .. The Results Are In: When it Comes To PUllitive Damages. Juries Award Less, Association 
ofTrial Lawyers of America, available at http://www.atJa.orglhomepage/pd0616.html(last accessed June 
20,2004) (discussing the 1996 Justice Department study, prepared by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and 
the National Center for State Courts and led by Eisenberg, that looked at 10,278 state court injury trials in 
the 75 largest counties in America). 
49 Olson, Myth, supra note 32, at A22 (noting with disdain that the "Web site of the Association of 
Trial Lawyers of America was 'still hyping recent studies that, it says, refute the "claim that punitive 
awards are out of control," and "reveal the 'runaway jury' claim to be a complete myth.""'). 
50 Rustad, Unraveling. supra note 41, at 57-65 (discussing the Texaco, EXllon, and Honda studies). 
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other major corporations and conservative foundations-called Punitive 
Damages: How Juries Decide was published in 2002 by Cass Sunstein, W. 
Kip Viscusi, and other leading scholars, who criticized punitive damages for 
imposing high social costs on corporations and characterized the behavior of 
juries as erratic and unfair.51 This new line of research was quickly 
championed by Exxon, among others, and urged upon the courts in ongoing 
litigation.52 Viscusi's work also engendered a new round of provocative 
scholarly commentary53 and ignited a larger debate about the growing trend of 
corporate funding for academic scholarship. 54 The controversy continues at 
51 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP VISCUSI, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE passim (2002). In the preface of Punitive Damages, the authors 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Exxon Mobil Corporation, the National Science Foundation, 
the Law and Economics Program at the University of Chicago, and the Olin Foundation. Id. at ix. They 
state that the funders did not interfere explicitly or implicitly with the content or conclusions of their 
studies, id. at ix-x, yet this unusual funding of the book has itselfgenerated a new debate about academic 
bias. The book was warmly received by advocates of tort reform. See Bruce Fein, All Rise. The Jury Is 
Deciding; Citizen Panels Arbitrarily Mete Out Punishments, WASHINGTON TiMES, July 23, 2002, at A21 
(reviewing the book and commenting that: "Their findings generally confirm the intuitive or anecdotal: 
that jury awards are erratic, hitting like lightening [sic] bolts; that juries favor local plaintiffs over 
carpetbaggers; that jurors routinely ignore the legal standards for punitive damages; that when injuries 
appear, no matter how serendipitous, jurors are inclined to find predictability by the defendant to alleviate 
plaintiff losses."). Punitive Damages received front page coverage in the New York Times. The article, 
"Debate Grows On Jury's Role in Injury Cases," quoted Sunstein, Viscusi, and Eisenberg debating the 
sensibility of punitive damages in light of the pending appeal of the $290 million punitive damages verdict 
in the Cali fornia Ford Bronco rollover case, in which the jury had awarded the "largest punitive award ever 
affirmed by an American court in a personal injury case." See Adam Liptak, Debate Grows On Jury's Role 
In Injury Cases, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,2002, at A I. For more examples of Viscusi's work in this area, see 
W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety 
Torts, 87 GEO. L. J. 285 (1998); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to Promote 
Efficiency, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 139 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages 
Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 342-44 (2001). Fora discussion of Viscusi's extensive publications, 
see David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law alld Economics Be Both Practical and Principled? 
53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 395-98 (2002). 
52 Alan Zarembo, Alaska Oil Spill: Funding Jury Research Has Served Exxon Well in Court, 
THESUNLiNK.COM, Dec. 4, 2003, available at http://thesunlink.comlredesignI2003-12-
04/nationworldl3380 16.shtml (last accessed June 20, 2004)(stating that the "Exxon research" has provided 
"ammunition" to "industry leaders who live in fearoflarge awards and often campaign against them"); see 
also id. (noting that this "Exxon-funded research" was repeatedly cited by leading corporations who filed a 
brief in the State Farm case, see supra note 28, and countered by twenty-one academics who made a 
"lengthy attack on the studies"). 
53 See. e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations: 
Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2000) (discussing Viscusi's scholarship); David Luban, 
Responses: A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. LJ. 359 (1998), responding 10 W. Kip 
Viscusi, Reply: Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. LJ. 381 (1998). 
54 See Richard Lippitt, Intellectual Honesty. Industry and Interest Sponsored Professorial Works. and 
Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the Money. or Is the Money Earning the Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1075, 1087-91 (200 I) (discussing Viscusi's punitive damages scholarship underwritten by the 
Exxon and the Olin Corporation); see also Darryl K. Brown, Law Schools and Corporate Influence: 
Money's Power To Shape Ideas and Opinions, THE WITNESS (Sept. 2000), available at 
http://thewitness.orgiarchiveisept2000Ibrown.lawschools.html(last accessed June 20, 2004) (noting Viscusi 
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conferences55 and in the literature.56 This intense academic debate over 
punitive damages-with "disagreements at every lever,57-is becoming more 
visible to the public and in the courts. 
Even though these recent high profile studies have become ensnared in the 
polarized politics of tort reform, they represent important new efforts to reach 
a broader audience beyond the traditional boundaries of the academy and an 
attempt to bridge the longstanding gap between scholarship and tort policy. 
Marc Galanter, whose scholarship in the early 1980s initiated the probing 
empirical response of the legal academy to the tort "explosion" rhetoric, 
observed that public "perceptions of an eruption of pathological litigiousness 
are ... a symptom of the weakness of contemporary legal scholarship.,,58 The 
empirical information available on the tort system was, according to Galanter, 
"thin and spotty," and he urged legal scholars to take on the task of collecting 
data and developing coherent theories as "an inescapable collective 
responsibility of a group that purports to proffer expert opinions about the 
arrangements of public life.,,59 Over a decade later, in 1992, Michael Saks 
continued to decry the "meager" data available on the behavior of the tort law 
system, but noted with chagrin that the "lack of evidence, which might seem 
like an insuperable barrier, has barely slowed down many policy-makers, 
scholars and other commentators," leading to "a picture of the litigation 
"turned out to be a strong opponent of punitive damages. Vicusi [sic 1 has received substantial sponsorship 
of his research from corporations such as Exxon."). See also Russell Mokhiber, Exxon: Mean and Stupid, 
THE MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (March 1999), available at 
http://multinationalmonitor.orglmmI999/mm9903.03c.html(last accessed June 20, 2004) (criticizing 
Exxon's funding of the studies as "mean and stupid"). 
55 In March 2001, the Harvard Journal on Legislation held a symposium on "Reforming Punitive 
Damages," featuring many leading commentators and leaders on the issue. For a list of participants, see 
News and Events. HLS Conference to Examine Punitive Damage Reforms. available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edulnewsl200 1/03/12_legjournaLhtml (last accessed June 20, 2004) (including, 
e.g .. Marc Galanter, Walter Olson, Kip Viscusi, David Schkade, Neil Vidmar, and Mary Rose). See also 
the Winter 200 I symposium issue published by Wake Forest Law Review, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co.: Lessons in State Class Actions. Punitive Damages. and Jury Decision-Making. 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 871, 871-1198 (2001) (featuring seven articles by leading scholars). 
56 See. e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi. Juries. Hindsight. and Punitive Damages Awards: Reply to 
Richard Lempert, 51 DE PAUL L. REV. 987 (2002)(responding to Lempert's criticism of Reid Hastie & W. 
Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can 't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
90 I (1998), published as Richard Lempert, Juries. Hindsight and Punitive Damages Awards: Failures of a 
Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999»; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining 
Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implicationsfor Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002)(focusing 
on the mismatch of proposed reforms with the psychology of actual jury behavior in awarding punitive 
damages). 
51 Robert A. Klinck, Symposium: Reforming Punitive Damages: The Punitive Damages Debate, 38 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS .. 469, 470 (200 I) (characterizing the state of punitive damages scholarship). 
58 Galanter, Landscape of Disputes. supra note 4, at 5. 
59 Id. at 71. See also Galanter, Antidote, supra note 7, at 1098 (noting 1994 articles by himself and 
Deborah Hensler that called for "cultivating a stronger knowledge base"). 
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system that is built of little more than imagination.,,6o In 1998, Michael 
Rustad argued that having the data in hand for the policy debate was vital: 
"Before radically restructuring tort law, legislators need reliable, 
comprehensive empirical studies of the functioning of punitive damages.,,61 
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, authors of several of the major studies, 
posited that empirical research is a "powerful alternative to the tactical use of 
passion and the false hope of an imaged past. ,,62 Even the authors of Punitive 
Damages advocated that legislative or judicial changes in punitive damages 
law "be based on accurate, rather than fanciful, understanding of jury 
behavior. ,,63 
Yet, despite the universal recognition ofthe need for a public debate better 
informed by empirical data, Galanter suggests that "[t]he emerging 
cumulative picture of the workings of the legal system that has been produced 
by 'law and society' scholars and institutions has been seldom welcomed, 
occasionally resisted, and usually ignored by proponents of the jaundiced 
view.,,64 Rustad attributed the split in views to "looking at different parts of 
the same elephant," characterizing the tort reformers' rejection of the 
empirical data as simply "serv[ing] their own political agenda.,,65 Perhaps the 
controversy over the corporate funding of Punitive Damages supports 
Rustad's doleful conclusion that "conflict between science and advocacy is 
irreconcilable.,,66 
This article suggests that reconciliation is not hopeless, but that "being 
empirical" in a new way is vital to resolving the conflict.67 The empirical 
knowledge base about punitive damages specifically, and jury verdicts 
generally, has grown exponentially in recent years and fostered dynamic legal 
scholarship. Yet, is this rich scholarship reaching the real world in a way that 
fosters consensus instead of further polarization? Are policymakers or the 
public listening to anything more than the reductionist media sound-bites 
from either "side" of the debate?68 To be effective, empirical scholarship 
60 Michael 1. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything AboUl the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-
and Why Not?, 140 U. PA L. REV. 1147, 1154-56 (1992). 
61 Rustad, Unraveling. supra note 41, at 16. 
62 Daniels & Martin, supra note 36, at 100. 
63 SUNSTEIN et aI., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 51, at vii. 
64 Galanter, Shadow Play, supra note 5, at 13. 
6S Rustad, Unraveling, supra note 41, at 55. 
66 [d. 
67 See Heise, supra note 3, passim (emphasizing the need for empirical over anecdotal legal 
scholarship). . 
68 Neil Vidmar's review ofsociolegal scholarship and the tort reform debate also questions "whether 
anyone in a position to make policy listens," noting striking examples of where courts have rejected, 
misinterpreted, or ignored social science findings, but also recounting that the Illinois Supreme Court 
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must be contextual and communicative, not just statistical. Those interested 
in tort reform should be encouraged to view the critique of punitive damages 
in the context of the multi-dimensional layers oflaw and society and place-
jurisprudential history, legislative developments, doctrinal landscape, verdicts 
statistics, case narratives, and tort case load trends. Even if incomplete, once 
woven together, these related strands can create a much richer foundation for 
engaging in productive debate over reform. Although the punitive damages 
scholarship is prolific, deep, and varied, many of the large studies present dry 
empirical meta-data without providing a multi-dimensional analysis, what this 
article calls "integrated empiricism." In his seminal 1986 article The Day 
After the Litigation Explosion, Galanter effectively used four "vivid 
illustrations" to show some of the "beneficial effects of litigation" and to 
"balance the anecdotal stock" of the tort reform movement,69 but the dominant 
response of the scholarship that followed Galanter's seminal work was 
quantitative and theoretical, rather than narrative or contextual. 
There are indications, however, that punitive damages scholarship may be 
moving in this new direction. 70 A 2001 study of Florida punitive damages 
awards by Neil Vidmar and Mary Rose appears to be the first avidly 
contextual study of punitive damages. 71 Vidmar and Rose examined Florida 
considered affidavits from himself. Galanter. Daniels. and Martin that "discussed researching findings 
contradicting empirical assertions in the legislative record associated with passage" ofillinois' tort reform 
act in 1995. which the court held was unconstitutional. Vidmar. Maps. Gaps, supra note 41. at 202. 
Several of the major empirical scholars recount how their work has been increasingly noticed by the courts 
and used by parties in appeals of punitive damages awards. See. e.g.. Thomas H. Koenig and Michael L 
Rustad. Book Reviews: In DeJense oj Tort Law. THE CONSUMER LAW PAGE. available at 
http://consumerlawpage.comlarticleltort-Iaw.htm (last accessed June 20. 2004) (noting that the Supreme 
Court referred to Koenig and Rustad's study in the Honda case, and that "our biggest impact has been in 
the courts"). The recent Punitive Damages book has also already been influential. invoked by judges in ten 
cases since 1999. Zarembo. supra note 52. 
"" Galanter, The Day Ajier, supra note 8, at 29-31. 
70 In outlining areas that needed further research in his 1998 article Unraveling, Rustad repeatedly 
suggested a need for more information on "factual foundation" and "circumstances" that lead to awards. 
Rustad, Unraveling. supra note 41. at 68. 
71 Neil Vidmar & Mary R. Rose. Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and In Reality. 
38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2001). Vidmar and Rose's study is the only published study found that 
focused on a state's entire experience with punitive damages awards. A study on California punitive 
damages verdicts from 1991-2000 by Professor J. Clark Kelso, at McGeorge School of Law, and Dr. Kari 
C. Kelso was. apparently, never published. An Analysis oJPunitive Damages in California Courts. 1991-
2000 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, Capital Center for Government Law & Policy. University of the 
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law), available at 
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/government_law_and Jlol icy/publications-
IcccglpJlubsJlunitive_damaves_report.PDF (last accessed June 20, 2004). That study, underwritten by a 
grant from the Civil Justice Association of California, "one of the leading proponents of punitive damage 
and civil justice reform in California," id. at I n.1 (funding which the authors claimed did not influence 
their study). studied 489 punitive damages awards between January 1991 and December 2000. 
Three other studies of state experiences have focused more broadly on all tort cases. A study of all 
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punitive damages verdicts from 1988 to 2000, using data extracted from the 
Florida Jury Verdict Reporter. They focused on the reform efforts of the 
Florida Legislature and set their empirical data on awards into two important 
qualitative contexts: first, by breaking down verdicts into topical categories 
and, second, by providing a sampling of factual narratives from the cases 
studied. As a result of this multi-dimensional approach, their responses to 
claims by tort reformers in Florida about "out of control" punitive damages 
are much more persuasive than ifthey had presented only the meta-data. The 
Hawaii study presented in this article builds on this contextual approach by 
focusing on the similar tort reform pressures on the Hawaii Legislature, 
presenting the meta-data on Hawaii punitive damages judgments for a 
seventeen-year period (1985-2001), then segregating the data by topical case 
category and providing case narratives. This parallel approach allows some 
useful comparisons between the punitive damages experiences of two 
jurisdictions at the far-flung ends of the United States. Some striking 
similarities are found between the two studies. 
Building on Vidmar and Rose's approach, this article adds contextual 
layers to the analysis,72 slicing the data in a wider variety of ways to probe the 
critique of punitive damages from more varied quantitative perspectives, and 
presenting historical, doctrinal, and caseload trend information for the entire 
jurisdiction. The study also provides access to all of the narratives for the 
reported punitive damages judgments in Hawaii, not just a sample. Although 
a perfectly integrated approach that considers every aspect of punitive 
damages awards in any jurisdiction is perhaps impossible, the goal of this 
article is, nonetheless, to move the scholarship in this new direction. The 
article presents the Hawaii data within the framework of a more complex, 
albeit imperfect,73 model of empirical integration, weaving together many of 
products liability and medical malpractice verdicts in Franklin County, Ohio over a twelve-year period used 
a similarly detailed multi-dimensional empirical approach, but it did not include case narratives and did not 
analyze punitive damages because none were reported. Merritt & Barry. supra note 47, at 315. Merritt and 
Barry generally found that, contrary to the claims made in high-profile headlines, thejury verdicts in these 
two kinds of cases in Ohio were "modest," id. at 315, and rates and verdict size had been declining. Id. at 
319. The other two studies were both led by Thomas A. Eaton, of the University of Georgia School of 
Law, who examined tort verdicts in certain Georgia counties in the mid-1990s. See Eaton & Talarico, 
Georgia I. supra note 47, and Eaton, et aI., Georgia II. supra note 47. 
72 Contextual analysis is a natural complement to statistical methods. See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian 
Verrneule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 158 (2002) (vigorously 
disagreeing with a "resolutely externalist approach to legal scholarship" and defending the value of non-
empirical legal scholarship). 
73 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,49,50 (2002) ("All 
knowledge and all inference in research is uncertain," and the researcher's challenge is to "estimate [and 
reveal] the degree of uncertainty inherent in each conclusion") [hereinafter Epstein & King, Rules]. One of 
the imperfections in this study is that, even though it attempts a fairly complete integration of what it 
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the most significant factors that affect the landscape of any state's punitive 
damages system, using transparent methodologies74 and web-accessible 
data,75 that can be duplicated in other jurisdictions and enhance future 
comparative analyses. 
The Hawaii study examines the complete universe of 2,250 state and 
federal tort judgments in Hawaii from 1985 to 2001, which produced sixty-
three punitive damages judgments. 76 The analysis uses seven viewpoints: 
1) jurisprudentiallhistorical (addressing the development of Hawaii tort 
law in the courts), 
2) doctrinal (analyzing the background principles of punitive damages 
unique to Hawaii), 
3) legislative/political (discussing the legislative influence on state tort 
law and pressures for statutory punitive damages reform), 
4) quantitative/horizontal (looking across the entire state and federal 
court system in Hawaii, including Hawaii's mandatory arbitration system for 
lower-value tort cases), 
5) quantitative/longitudinal (viewing the data over a long time period, 
seventeen years), 
6) qualitative/vertical and categorical (examining the facts of the cases 
that produced the trial court verdicts), and 
7) socio-economic/systemic (considering overall trends in Hawaii tort 
caseloads, population, and economic information). 
Although Hawaii is the most geographically isolated archipelago in the 
known about the punitive damages and tort system in Hawaii, it does not fully use an interdisciplinary 
approach, falling short of the third goal for empirical research advocated by Epstein, King, and others. See 
Frank Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. 
CHI. L REV. 135, 150 (2002) ("legal researchers should take advantage of and build upon the considerable 
body of research on law found in other disciplines, such as political science, economics, and the behavioral 
sciences"). 
74 This study attempts to follow the basic rule that research should be replicable to ensure its integrity. 
See Epstein & King, Rules, supra note 73, at 38, 42-44 (critiquing empirical legal scholarship and 
suggesting rules for methodology). See also Cross, Heise & Sisk, supra note 73. at 135 (strongly 
criticizing Epstein and King's own methodology but agreeing that their "discussion of research methods 
provides a very helpful guide for those who produce and consume empirical legal research, both 
quantitative and qualitative"); see also id. at 150 (agreeing with Epstein and King that "articles should be 
fully transparent in their procedures and claims. which necessarily requires that researchers use more rigor 
in presenting their methodology and inferential claims"). 
75 See Epstein & King, Rules, supra note 73, at 131-32 (urging legal scholars to provide better access 
to data underlying their empirical studies to allow evaluation and encourage others to build on that 
research). 
76 This article uses the term "judgment" to mean jury or judge awards or verdicts that have been 
approved by the trial court. The teml"awards" is used for Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration Program 
("CAAP") decisions, which are then later administratively approved by the circuit court, absent a notice of 
appeal. 
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world and one of the smallest states (with a fairly stable population of only 
1.2 million),77 Hawaii courts have a distinctly activist reputation and have 
often been on the cutting edge of national tort doctrine. Hawaii has also 
produced several large punitive damages verdicts/8 including the record-
breaking $1.2 billion punitive damages award in February 1994, rendered 
seven months before the Exxon verdict, against the estate of deposed 
Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos.79 Consequently, the state has not 
77 Hawaii's popUlation was roughly ten times smallerthan Florida's population during the time periods 
covered in the two studies. See Vidmar & Rose, supra note 71, at n.19 (noting Florida population figures, 
ranging from 12.89 million to 14.71 million). 
78 Other than the 1994 Hilao verdict (a federal court class action, see infra note 79), the largest 
punitive damages judgments in Hawaii state tort cases include: 
(I) The $4.78 million punitive damages award in Takaki v. Tavares, see discussion infra p. 289, affd 
sub nom Takaki v. Cambra, 56 P.3d 732 (2002), a 2001 Honolulu judgment. The jury awarded 
compensatory damages of$400,000 for intentional infliction ofemotional distress to a husband, wife, and 
daughter who suffered bankruptcy and loss of their home after Mr. Takaki's film production truck was 
deliberately burned to the ground by George Cambra, a competitor in the movie production business in 
Hawaii, who later pled guilty to arson and then conspired to hide his assets (see Takaki, Case S39, 
Appendix B, p. 347). See also Curtis Lum, Film Arson Verdict Challenge Likely, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
Mar. 1,2001 at B2. 
(2) The $11.25 million punitive damages award to a young man rendered a quadriplegic in the Masaki 
products liabi.lity case, which was reversed and remanded by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Masaki v. 
General Motors. Inc., 780 P.2d 566, rec 'n denied, 833 P.2d 899 (1989) (see Masaki, Case S 16, Appendix 
B, p. 366); 
(3) A $14.27 million punitive damages verdict in 1995, upheld in 1997 by the Hawaii Supreme Court 
in Kawamata Farms. Inc. v. United Agri Products, 948 P.2d 1055 (1997), against DuPont in a tort case 
involving property damage to farmers on the island of Hawaii who used Benlate that killed or damaged 
their flower and vegetable crops. Because this case involved property damage and not personal injury, it 
was not reported in Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii and not included in this article's study of Hawaii 
punitive damages verdicts. See Hugh Clark, $23 Million Awarded To Big Isle Farmers, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Jan. 27, 1995, at A3 (reporting a total state court jury verdict of$23.85 million: $12.5 million 
in punitive damages and $8.39 million in compensatory damages to plaintiffSTT Farms of South Kona; 
and $1.77 million in punitive damages and $1.8 million in compensatory damages to Kawamata Farnls of 
Waimea); and 
(4) A 1980 verdict by a Honolulujury awarding $21 million in punitive damages and $7.4 million in 
compensatory damages to the surviving families of two workers who died, and six others who were injured, 
in a explosive fire at the Chevron and Shell Oil storage facilities in Honolulu. Interview with University of 
Hawaii Law Professor Eric Yamamoto (Mar. 20, 200 I) (Professor Yamamoto served as one of the defense 
counsel in the case); see Mary Adamski & Harold Morse, 'Mass Explosion' Averted From Fire At Tesoro 
Refinery, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 14, 1999, at A I. The case settled in 1984 for$15 million. See 
Quick Facts on Chevron in the USA, PROJECT UNDERGROUND, available at 
http://www.moles.org/ProjectUnderground/motherlode/chevron!chevronl.html. Because this verdict 
predates the first volume of Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii, it is also not included in this article's study. 
79 Two tort verdicts by Honolulujuries, one in 1994 and one in 1996, which both involved the brutal 
dictatorship of former deposed Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, set "world records." See Walter 
Wright, Four Groups Seek Marcos MOlley, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 24, 1994, at A3 (quoting Melvin 
Belli, Sr., one of the victims' lawyers, referring to Hilao as "the biggest personal injury verdict in the 
world"). After decades of notorious dictatorial rule, Marcos fled to Hawaii in 1986 to escape the revolution 
against his government. Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1462-63 (D. Haw. 
1995). Marcos died while the lawsuits were pending and his Estate was substituted as the defendant. Id. at 
1462. 
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escaped the strong winds of national tort reform.80 
Like other state legislatures, the Hawaii Legislature has long been under a 
steady stream oflocal and national pressure to enact strict reforms to the state 
tort law system, including caps and other limitations on punitive damages.81 
Despite intense lobbying by tort reform proponents, however, Hawaii has not 
yet enacted any statutory modifications to its longstanding common law 
doctrine allowing punitive damages awards. The conflicted views about 
punitive damages in Hawaii were reflected in the State's landmark case on 
punitive damages, the 1989 Masaki case, which simultaneously heightened 
the plaintiffs burden of proof to the highest civil standard of "clear and 
convincing,,,82 yet strongly endorsed punitive damages awards generally and 
approved them specifically for products liability cases. The punitive damages 
In the first case, a Honolulujury awarded $1.2 billion in punitive damages against the Marcos Estate 
for the mass torture of over 10,000 victims. Id. at 1464. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
award even though the punitive damages award was made before the compensatory award, which the Estate 
challenged under the BMW guideposts. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). 
Almost a decade later, whether these record-setting judgments will ever be paid is still in doubt, given 
the significant complexities facing these and other actions seeking to locate and recover funds from the 
Marcos Estate. See Walter Wright, Manila At Odds With Marcos Victims Over Funds, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1995, at A2 (reporting that $475 million of Marcos' fortune discovered in a Swiss 
bank account was being claimed by the new Philippine government for agrarian reform); Sherry P. Broder 
& Jon M. Van Dyke, Marcos Saga To End With Pay For Victims. HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 25, 1996, 
at B3 (editorial by plaintiffs' counsel noting efforts to secure the award despite how the Estate "cleverly hid 
their assets"); Mary Adamski, Attorney for Marcos Victims Can Seek out Assets. Judge Told, HONOLULU 
STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. 3, 1997, at A5 (noting plaintiffs' struggle to collect the award); Mary Adamski, 
Marcos Family Agrees To Pay $150 Million, HONOLULU STAR-BULLTIN, Feb. 25, 1999, at A I (discussing 
$150 million settlement agreement); Lori Tighe, $150 Million Settlement In Marcos Suit Bittersweet, 
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Apr. 30, 1999, at A2 (discussing victims' reactions to settlement); Associated 
Press, Marcoses get extension on $150 million penalty, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 3, 2000, at B2 
(noting the Marcos' family'S failure to deposit the funds for the settlement). 
The second case, also involving the horrors of the Marcos regime, did not involve a punitive damages 
award explicitly, but did set a civil verdict record. In 1996, a Honolulu jury awarded the estate of a 
Philippine national treasure hunter a $22 billion compensatory award for the Marcos regime'S brutality 
toward and kidnapping of plaintiff, and the theft of his pure gold Buddha, gold bars, coins, diamonds, and a 
roomful of gold bullion. Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209 (1998) (affirming in part, reversing in part). 
Roxas appears to be the largest civil jury verdict ever reported until Engle (see supra note 6 discussing 
Engle). 
Unlike Exxon and Engle, however, the Marcos verdicts caused no visible consternation among tort law 
critics and seemed to enjoy popular approval, most likely because Marcos was globally notorious for his 
brutal dictatorship and ultimately had few powerful defenders in the United States. See. e.g .. Editorial, 
Marcos Judgment: Record Award in Rights Case, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 24, 1994, at AIO 
("Whether or not they ever receive any money ... [t]he magnitude of the award is commensurate with the 
crimes of the Marcos regime - and a warning to other dictators"). 
80 See Part 11\ infra (discussing legislative history of tort reform); see also Randall H. Endo, Recent 
Development. Punitive Damages in Hawaii: Curbing Unwarranted Expansion. 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 659 
(1991) (noting that the "sheer size" of the Masaki verdict in 1988, even though reversed on appeal, see 
supra note 78, "renewed interest in the issue of punitive damages"). 
81 See Part III infra. 
82 See Masaki, 780 P.2d 566. 
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polemic is as vibrant in America's tropical paradise as it is in the rest of the 
country. 
Although an empirical study of Hawaii punitive damages judgments has 
long been needed,83 none had been done prior to 1998, when the author of this 
article conducted a preliminary survey of punitive damages judgments in the 
state circuit courts as part of a study group formed by the Hawaii 
Legislature.84 The study presented in this article substantially refines that 
preliminary work and seeks to present a more comprehensive and accurate 
study of Hawaii punitive damages data. From a scholar's perspective, 
Hawaii's small size has many advantages. Hawaii shares many of the salient 
doctrinal characteristics of punitive damages law with other states,85 allowing 
appropriate comparison to other jurisdictions. Yet, the state is small enough 
to permit analysis of the complete universe of tort verdicts, allowing an 
examination of an entire state's modem experience with punitive damages and 
eliminating the need for sampling.86 The sixty-three punitive damages 
judgments in Hawaii over the past seventeen years is low in absolute terms 
compared, for example, to the total of208 reported in the Florida study over a 
shorter time period.87 This low "n" limits the inferences that can be drawn 
about causation and future behavior ofthe punitive damages system in Hawaii 
or elsewhere.88 Considering population differences, however, the relative 
number of Hawaii punitive damages judgments is quite comparable to other 
8) See Endo, supra note 80, at 686 ("Hawaii should conduct an empirical study of punitive [damages] 
awards in Hawaii's courts."). 
84 See discussion of Hawaii Tort Law Study Group, Part III C infra. The author also supervised a 
limited empirical review of punitive damages awards in Hawaii by then law student Greg Takase for a 
writing seminar in Spring 1997. 
85 See Part II infra. 
86 The Merritt and Barry study of Ohio verdicts observes that one limitation of prior studies of 
products liability and medical malpractice verdicts is that the prior studies "fail either to examine all jury 
verdicts within a jurisdiction or to include sufficient control variables to support complex analyses." 
Merritt & Barry, supra note 47, at 318 n.7. Because of the relatively small number of punitive damages 
judgments involved, this study does not use the array of more sophisticated quantitative methodologies 
used for large-number studies (except for some use oflinearregression trend lines) or for inferential studies 
based on samples. Whether the data presented could benefit from more complex statistical techniques is a 
question left for further study. 
87 Vidmar & Rose, supra note 71, at 492 (Table I )(total of column 3)(1989-1998). 
88 Lee Epstein & Gary King, Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191,207-08 (2002) [hereinafter Epstein & 
King, Reply] ("Applying the rules of inference is not always easy in any particular project, and perfection is 
nommlly out of the question. So what do we ask? We ask that the rules be understood, and that ... 
uncorrected methodological problems be flagged for readers and an appropriate amount of additional 
uncertainty be added to one's conclusions."). For example, all of the trend lines for the judgments data, see 
infra Part IV, have low coefficients of determination (R2), well below the normally acceptable level of.70, 
which makes confident projections of trends impossible even though the trend lines are informative in 
characterizing the existing data. 
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states,89 suggesting that comparison is a worthy exercise.90 Hawaii's small-
state experience may provide a more complete public story about punitive 
damages than is possible in large states. A focus on more isolated state 
jurisdictions like Florida and Hawaii is also meaningful because state courts, 
not federal courts, are the dominant theater for tort trials. 91 The empirical 
studies to date have found substantial variation in the incidence of awards 
among the geographic areas studied.92 According to Galanter, these variations 
"from Place to Place," reflect "an aspect of local legal culture that is little 
understood.,,93 Thus, a focus on the nuances of a particular jurisdiction is 
imperative. By presenting an integrated empiricism model that can 
complement existing empirical studies on punitive damages, this article seeks 
to make the debate over punitive damages more sane, more honest, and more 
accessible to skeptical legislatures and popular audiences, who too often see 
the tort world in extremes colored more by anecdote than fact. 94 
One final preliminary observation about this study bears mention here. 
There is, without doubt, wide room for disagreement on the ultimate place of 
punitive damages in the American tort law system.95 This article does not 
advocate or denounce any particular reform proposal, but rather seeks to use a 
variety of tools to explain what we know and do not know about punitive 
damages judgments in one state system, so that the debate can move away 
89 See Part IV D & E infra. 
90 For the same time period reported by the Florida study, 1989-1998, in Hawaii state courts (not 
including CAAP), there were a total of fourteen punitive damages verdicts (State Chart l,infra, p. XX). 
Considering the eleven punitive damages awards under CAAP (which would otherwise be channeled 
through the state court system, see CAAP Chart I, infra, p. XX, but most likely would have generated 
fewer verdicts), the comparable Hawaii "state court" total for this period is 25. Inflating this by a factor of 
ten to account for the difference in total population, see supra note 77, this equates to 250 punitive damages 
judgments, surprisingly close to the 208 reported in the Florida study. 
9, See Galanter. The Day After, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that "[mJore than 98% of all civil cases are 
filed in the state courts"). 
92 Galanter & Luban, supra note 5, at 1413 (citing the Daniels and Martin study's findings). 
93 Galanter, Antidote, supra note 7, at 1128 (noting the variations in jurisdictional data found in prior 
studies); see also Galanter, Shadow Play, supra note 5, at 2 (noting "great local variation and a rough 
regional pattern" in the incidence of punitive damages). 
94 In this regard, this Hawaii study echoes the sentiments expressed in similar studies of state tort 
verdicts in Eaton et aI., Georgia II, supra note 47, at 1098 ("These observations, of course, do no mean that 
all tort and civil litigation reform is unwarranted or unwise. There may be good reasons independent of the 
'litigation explosion ... runaway jury' myth to modify existing legal rules. The policy debate regarding 
proposed changes, however, should be honest and grounded in an accurate picture of what actually 
transpires in our nation's courts. We hope that our study contributes to a better understanding of that 
picture.") and Ohio, Merritt & Barry, supra note 47, at 398 ("Rather than heed those fictions, legislators 
and voters should turn their attention to our growing knowledge of how the tort system truly operates. "). 
9S Even Galanter favors limited refornl of the punitive damage system. Acknowledging that punitive 
damages should not be "utterly discretionary and without limits," Galanter and Luban propose that juries be 
required to provide a "plausible rationale for the size of punitive awards," but that courts give those 
justifications "a large dollop of judicial deference." Galanter & Luban. supra note 5. at 1461. 
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from the rhetorical poles and toward informed dialogue. Although true 
neutrality, even for the empirical scholar, is unobtainable,96 and "[i]t is 
certainly true that statistics can 'lie' and perhaps even do so badly,,,97 the goal 
of neutrality is worth pursuing, and the transparency of the methodologies 
presented in this article can provide an objective check on this attempt to ''just 
present the facts." The empirical approaches used in this article may be 
"instances [where] advancements in knowledge creep incrementally,,,98 but 
such incremental steps may be the only viable path toward shedding some 
new "light on old legal issues.,,99 Even though no amount of empirical 
scholarship will convince everyone to adopt a particular resolution of a 
controversial issue, 100 empirical research can "be useful for helping to make 
public policy, for learning about the world for its own sake, or for helping to 
inform the normative debate."lol 
Part I presents the jurisprudential context of the Hawaii punitive damages 
study by sketching the political and legal roots of Hawaii's judicial system 
and examining the development of the predominantly liberal jurisprudential 
trends in Hawaii tort law. Part II focuses on Hawaii's broad judicial standards 
for punitive damages. Part III reviews the history oftort reform pressures on 
the Hawaii Legislature, including numerous specific proposals for changing 
Hawaii's punitive damages law. Part IV presents the quantitative portion of 
the Hawaii punitive damages study including all tort judgments from 1985-
2001. The data are presented to respond to the common critiques of, and 
proposals to reform, punitive damages in Hawaii. Data on Hawaii tort 
caseloads, population, and economic trends are also presented to provide 
additional context for the analysis of the punitive damages data. Part V 
% See Heise, supra note 3, at 814 ("It is at least hoped that empirical scholarship can more easily 
separate the nomlative from the descriptive and better maintain neutrality. Of course, this remains just a 
hope. It is perhaps unavoidable that research questions are posed for a reason and that 'all measurement is 
lightly or heavily scented with the values of those whose hands who are on the switch.' However, 
empirical legal scholars, or at least the best of them, endeavor to approach their research questions 
objectively and their methodology of empirical choice facilitates as much objectivity as is humanly 
possible. "). 
97 [d. (citing MARK TWAIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924) ("There are three kinds oflies: lies, damned 
lies, and statistics.")). 
98 [d. at 834 ("In most instances advancements in knowledge creep incrementally, and often in 
painstakingly slow fashion. Moreover, such nibbles constitute the bulk of empirical research."). 
99 [d. (noting that empirical legal research "speaks to issues that the more traditional theoretical and 
doctrinal genres cannot reach"). 
100 See, e.g .. SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 29 (Patricia Ewick, Robert Kagan & 
Austin Sarat eds., 1999) ("Social science infomlation competes with anecdote, horror story, and myth for 
the attention of policy makers. What we offer is complexity and often increased uncertainty. This is hardly 
the stuff to win friends when decisions have to be made and sides have to be taken. "). 
101 Epstein & King, Rep/y, supra note 88, at 193-94. 
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complements this quantitative data by applying qualitative methods of case 
coding and case narratives. Part VI concludes by discussing the contributions 
that integrated empiricism can make to the punitive damages polemic in 
Hawaii and nationwide. The forty-four Charts of the quantitative data 
referred to in this article are included at the conclusion of the text, followed 
by the thirteen Tables that analyze the qualitative data, and then Appendices 
A (sample verdict forms) and B (narratives of all sixty-three punitive damages 
judgments in the study) are presented. 
I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT: TORT LAW IN HAWAII 
Although direct comparisons between empirical data on punitive damages 
and general legal-historical background "data" are perhaps impossible, an 
examination of punitive damages judgments in any jurisdiction may be 
incomplete without knowing the broad contours of that legal system's 
character and its historical approach to tort law. To understand the big-picture 
framework within which Hawaii's punitive damages system operates, it is 
important to review briefly the general jurisprudential history of Hawaii's 
legal system and the State's historically liberal tort doctrine. In Hawaii, these 
two foundational layers suggest a judicial environment for punitive damages 
that is strongly pro-plaintiff in orientation, perhaps more so than any other 
state. Based on historical and jurisprudential context alone, one might expect 
higher and more frequent punitive damages judgments in Hawaii than in other 
states. And, if the rhetoric of many legislative proposals that have been 
introduced in the Hawaii Legislature on punitive damages in recent years is to 
be believed, Hawaii has a serious problem with "out of control" punitive 
damages judgments. If true, perhaps the judgments are simply a byproduct of 
the state's liberal legal context. Yet, the analysis later in this article indicates 
that, in Hawaii, even though the state's liberal jurisprudential context 
undoubtedly provides a rich growth medium for punitive damages judgments, 
the relatively low number, frequency, and size of punitive damages judgments 
indicates that this strong contextual influence is either not significant or is 
countered by other factors. 
A. The Legal and Political Roots of Hawaii's Judicial Landscape 
Hawaii's legal history is unique among American states because it blends 
ancient Native Hawaiian social custom and more recently introduced Western 
-law. It is also unique because its modem development has been heavily 
influenced by the rich cultural history of the state's immigrant populations. 
Hawaii's judiciary traces its roots to the customs and oral traditions of the 
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islands' indigenous population of Native Hawaiians, who, for more than one 
thousand years before Western influences, lived according to an "elaborate 
system of rules of behavior and codes of conduct known as kapu and 
kanawai.,,102 The arrival of Captain Cook in 1778 began a flood of contact 
with the West that irreversibly changed the ancient social structure. 103 With 
the advent of the independent Hawaiian Kingdom in 1810, King 
Kamehameha I issued proclamations creating the first criminal laws. 104 His 
son Liholiho (Kamehameha II) and his premier Queen Kaahumanu abolished 
the longstanding kapu system, and with the missionaries' arrival in 1820, 
western law was further introduced to the islands. l05 Formal enactment of 
written laws began in 1827, and justices of the people were appointed the 
following year. \06 In 1839, the Kingdom adopted a Declaration of Rights and 
Laws, and, a year later, King Kamehameha III adopted the first constitution, 
setting forth the framework of island governance. 107 
The Kingdom of Hawaii modeled its law and government after England 
and the United States but also explicitly incorporated into the Hawaiian 
Constitution that earlier law "fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent or 
established by Hawaiian national usage.,,108 In 1847, an independent judiciary 
was created, moving the supreme judicial power from the king, premier, and 
chiefs to a Western-style structure. 109 After the tumultuous events of the 
illegal overthrow in 1893 of the last Hawaiian monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, 
and forced annexation to the United States in 1898, the Hawaii Organic Act of 
1900 made Hawaii a Territory of the United States whereby it "formally, 
symbolically, accepted Anglo-American traditions oflawandjustice."llo The 
shift toward Western-dominated governance, including the adoption of a 
private property ownership system through the Great Mahele of 1848, was 
102 Lani Ma'a Lapilio, The /I/h Century Hawaiiall Judicial System, I 999-0ct. HAW. B.J. 86 (1999). 
Kapu means "taboo, prohibition" and kanawai means "law, code, rule." MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL 
H. ELBERT, NEW POCKET HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 51,53 (1992). 
103 Lapilio, supra note 102, at 86. 
104 STATE OF HAWAII JUDICIARY, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1981-1982). King Kamehameha I conquered 
most of the islands in 1795 and established the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1810. See also Lapilio, supra note 
102, at 86. 
lOS Lapilio, supra note 102, at 86. 
106 STATE OF HAWAII JUDICIARY, supra note 104, at 4; Lapilio, supra note 102, at 86. 
107 STATE OF HAWAII JUDICIARY, supra note 104, at 4. The later Constitution of 1852 laid the 
foundation for the current structure of the Hawaii judicial system, including establishment of the circuit 
courts. [d. 
108 [d. This provision later became the first section (§ I-I) of the Revised Laws of Hawaii (the 
precursor to Hawaii Revised Statutes). [d. 
109 Lapilio, supra note 102, at 87. 
110 STATE OF HA WAll JUDICIARY, supra note 104, at 4. The Organic Act also restructured the Hawaiian 
judiciary and legal system, creating the framework for the modem courts. Lapilio, supra note 102, at 88. 
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profound and often conflicted with Native Hawaiian traditions. I II 
The 20th Century saw another fundamental shift in the social fabric that 
greatly influenced the development of a liberal common law in Hawaii. In the 
early to mid-1900s, the political system in the Territory was controlled by 
haole" 2 Republicans. This elite owned or leased "the bulk of the Islands' 
productive land and water rights" I I3 and, according to one account, 
"Republican politics in Hawaii was little else but the politics of business, big 
business.,,1l4 Simultaneously, immigrants from China, Japan, and the 
Philippines dramatically altered the ethnic mix of the islands. I 15 The attack on 
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the monumental impact of World 
War II on Hawaii, including five years of strict martial law, brought 
tremendous social and political change to the islands, giving residents a 
profound appreciation for civil liberties. I 16 About the same time, alongside 
the urbanization of Hawaii's economy and the rise ofa new middle class, the 
children of immigrant plantation workers of Asian ancestry "were coming to 
adulthood," creating a huge new block of socially progressive voters. ll7 
Hawaii residents of Japanese ancestry returned from World War II service in 
Europe as highly decorated veterans, painfulIy aware of the internment of 
over 100,000 Japanese Americans on the mainland, liS and with a newfound 
commitment to achieving political leadership and social justice. 119 The 
election of 1954 ushered in Hawaii's "so-calIed Democratic revolution, .. 12o 
setting the stage for a new "generation of Democratic politics,,121 and 
III See Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1263-68 
(Haw. 1995) (describing history of Hawaii law). 
112 In the Hawaiian language, haole means "foreigner," PUKUI & ELBERT, supra note 102, at 21, but, in 
common usage, usually refers to Caucasians. 
II) GEORGE COOPER & GAVAN DAWS, LAND AND POWER IN HAWAII: THE DEMOCRATIC YEARS 2 
(1990). 
114 Id. at 3. 
III Jose Julian Alvarez-Gonzalez, Law Language and Statehood: The Role of English in the Greal 
Slale of Puerto Rico, 17 LAW & INEQ. 359,427, n.346 (1999). 
116 COOPER & DA WS, supra note 113, at 4. 
117 Id. at 4, 5-6. 
118 Eric Yamamoto et aI., American Racial Juslice on Trial- Again: African American Reparations. 
Human Rights. and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (2003) (discussing the 1944 
Supreme Court Koremalsu decision, which upheld "the constitutionality of the race-based internment of 
120,000 innocent persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast during World War II"). 
119 COOPER & DAWS, supra note 113, at 4 ("many of Hawaii's young nisei (the first generation of 
Japanese ancestry born in the United States, thus American citizens) fought with great distinction in 
Europe, simultaneously dispelling the myth of the haoles' local omnipotence and infusing the Islands' large 
Japanese community with tremendous pride and a determination to achieve a place in the political and 
economic sun."). 
120 Id. at 5. 
121 Id. at I("beginning in the mid-1950s, the Democrats took political power in what became an 
overwhelmingly Democratic state"). 
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initiating the substantial social change that has dramatically shaped the state's 
legal system until the present day. Hawaii's court system took its modem 
shape in the late 1950s, when serious, cohesive efforts to streamline and 
modernize island courts began, culminating in major reform in 1959, the year 
of statehood, when Hawaii's State Constitution was also adopted. 122 
Even judging by national standards, Hawaii's Democrats were "very 
liberal, and they came into office promising broad reform," including the 
promotion of civil liberties. 123 For example, Hawaii developed a workers 
compensation program that led the nation in payout rates; was the first state to 
adopt mandatory pre-paid health care for workers (1974); was among the first 
states to abolish the death penalty (1957); was the first state to legalize 
abortion (1970); and became the first state in the nation to ratify the proposed 
Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (1972).124 This historical, 
social, and political backdrop provided a strong foundation for the distinctive 
brand of judicial liberalism that came to characterize Hawaii's courts and 
legislature, and these influences created an equally liberal tort law tradition in 
Hawaii. 
B. Modern Tort Law in Hawaii: A Liberal Tradition 
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, when the American legal system was 
undergoing significant change throughout the country, Hawaii set into place 
many of the building blocks for its progressive social justice and tort law 
system, generalIy favoring the rights of victims and expanding the liabilities 
of defendants. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two competing dramas 
began to unfold that would form the major components of Hawaii's modem 
tort law system. On the one hand, the Hawaii courts consistently, though with 
a few important exceptions, became the source of liberal (i.e. pro-plaintiffs' 
rights) rulings that expanded tort liability and increased judicial access for tort 
victims, including in the area of punitive damages. On the other hand, 
businesses and the insurance industry exerted consistent (although not very 
effective) counter-pressure on the State Legislature to enact tort reform 
measures aimed at reducing and controlling tort litigation. On balance, the 
legislative tort refonns successfully pushed by conservative interests turned 
out to be quite mild compared to reforms in other states and have, in a general 
sense, been counterbalanced, even substantially outweighed, by a steady 
stream of expansive case law from the Hawaii courts. 
122 Id. 
12l Id. at 5. 
124 Id. 
I 
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Viewed in context, the Hawaii Supreme Court, rather than the State 
Legislature, "has been the major player in tort rights and reform in Hawaii.,,125 
Studies of the Hawaii Supreme Court, 126 including University of Hawaii Law 
Professor Richard S. Miller's extensive 1992 analysis,127 concluded that the 
court, particularly under the leadership of Chief Justice William S. 
Richardson (1966-1982), revolutionized tort law in a manner similar to (and 
sometimes ahead of) the major liberalizing decisions of the California courts 
starting in the 1960s.128 
Writing in 1992, Miller thought that under the leadership of Richardson's 
successor, Chief Justice Herman T. Lum (1983-1993), Hawaii's "pro-plaintiff 
tort revolution" had "all but come to an end.,,129 As indicated in this Part, 
however, the Court's tort jurisprudence under Lum's successor, Chief Justice 
Ronald Moon (1993-present), does not indicate a pronounced rollback and, in 
some areas, suggests instead a return to the more liberal tort law regime of 
Chief Justice Richardson. 
When woven together, the Court's decisions in a number of important 
areas during the modern tort era present a tapestry of jurisprudence that is, 
reflecting Hawaii's unique culture and history, aimed at protecting the "little 
guy.,,130 A brief survey of major tort law doctrines in Hawaii that affect 
personal injury litigation provides a more detailed context for these 
characterizations. 131 It also suggest that Hawaii plaintiffs may have more 
125 Richard S. Miller & Geoffrey K.S. Komeya, Tort and Insurance "Re/orm" in a Common Law 
Court, 14 U. HAW. L. REV 55,116 (1992). 
126 See. e.g., Paul S. Ferber,Judicial Legislation in the Supreme Court o/Hawaii: A Brie/Introduction 
to the "Felt Necessities o/the Time. "8 HAW. B.1. 77 (1971). 
127 Miller & Komeya, supra note 125. 
128 Id. at 59-60. As Professor Miller observed: 
.. It would not have been a surprise to anyone following the recent political history of Hawaii that 
the Richardson Court would adopt a most liberal and activist posture in its decisions. Following 
years of domination by the 'Big Five' and conservative business interests, Hawaii's governmental 
structure shifted into the hands of the liberal Democrats and their supporters, mostly Hawaii's 
working people and those who had come from a plantation background, with the election of 
Governor John Bums in 1962 .... William S. Richardson, who served as Lieutenant Governor 
under John Bums, was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was 
thus put in the hands of a Chief Justice who was committed to serve the common people. Tort 
decisions following the most liberal trends ... ought not to have been unexpected." 
Id. at 61-62. 
129 Id. at 66. 
130 
A major exception to the court's broad interpretation of plaintiffs' torts rights are certain decisions 
during the Lum years, generally in the area of state tort immunity, where the court has tended to take a 
conservative view and been rather protective of the State's coffers. See infra notes 204-207, and 
accompanying text. 
131 In areas of tort law other than personal injury cases, the court has been similarly pro-plaintiff. For 
example, on the fundamental issue of who can sue for a public nuisance, the Hawaii Supreme Court stands 
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opportunities than they might in other jurisdictions to bring and succeed on 
personal injury lawsuits, providing a richer-than-usual context for generating 
punitive damages awards. 
1. Duty and Causation 
The Hawaii courts have long expressed a broad conception of the key 
negligence concepts of duty and causation. As to duty, "Hawaii has 
recognized that new duties constantly arise in light of changing social 
circumstances.,,1J2 For decades, Hawaii has allowed tort suits between 
children and parents. 133 More recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court in the 1996 
Touchette decision, a domestic arson-murder case with horrendous facts, 
endorsed a novel expansion of tort liability.134 
The Hawaii courts have also taken a liberal view of causation. In the 1961 
case Mitchell v. Branch, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the Restatement's 
flexible substantial factor test, replacing the traditional test of proximate 
cause. 135 In 1985, the Intermediate Court of Appeals pushed the substantial 
factor test to new limits in Leary v. Poole. 136 In Leary, the court rejected the 
defendant's superseding cause arguments and allowed a plaintiff to proceed 
on a negligence theory against the defendant driver who had, eight weeks 
before plaintiffs highway accident, skidded into and caused the removal ofa 
guardrail, the absence of which contributed to the plaintiffs subsequent 
injuries at the exact same location on a steep Oahu highway.137 The jury-
centric substantial factor test is firmly entrenched in Hawaii case law. 138 
Similarly, Hawaii remains at the cutting edge in the area of market share 
liability law. In Smith v. Cutter Biological Inc., 139 the Hawaii Supreme Court 
held that market share liability applied to HIV -positive Factor VIII blood 
alone at the liberal edge of the public nuisance law landscape. See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public 
Nuisance: Solving Ihe Paradox oflhe Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755, 763 (2001). 
132 Peter F. Lake, Common Law DUly in Negligence Law: The Recelll Consolidation of a Consensus on 
Ihe Expansion of Ihe Analysis of DUly and the New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy 
Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1538 (1997). 
133 Tamashiro v. De Gama, 450 P.2d 998 (Haw. 1969) (holding that the doctrine that prohibits suits by 
parents against their children does not obtain in Hawaii); Petersen ex rei. Petersen v. City & County of 
Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969) (holding that minor children may sue their parents for negligence in 
Hawaii). 
134 Touchette v. Ganal, 922 P.2d 347 (Haw. 1996). 
135 Mitchell v. Branch, 363 P.2d 969, 973 (Haw. Ct. App. 1961). 
136 705 P.2d 62 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985). 
137 Id. at 64·65, 66·67. 
138 See Doe Parents No. I v. State Dep't Educ., 58 P. 3d 545, 596 (Haw. 2002); Taylor-Rice v. State of 
Hawaii, 979 P. 2d 1086, 10 II (Haw. 1999) (discussing the Court's longstanding adoption ofthe substantial 
factor test, calling it "a realistic approach to the problems of causation"). 
139 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991). 
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product that had infected a hemophiliac with the AIDS virus. Adopting the 
doctrine's "broadest version,,,140 the Court candidly stated: "The problem 
calls for adopting new rules of causation, for otherwise innocent plaintiffs 
would be left without a remedy.,,141 One commentator called Smith "an 
enormous expansion in the law of actual causation.,,142 
2. Contributory and Comparative Negligence 
The Hawaii courts have long had a similarly liberal view of contributory 
and comparative negligence. In 1965, the Hawaii Supreme Court reduced the 
arsenal of defenses in negligence actions when it decided Bulatao v. Kauai 
Motors, Inc.,143 joining the "path-breaking decision"l44 of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 145 and merging 
secondary assumption of the risk with contributory negligence. 146 Since the 
adoption of Hawaii's modified comparative negligence statute in 1969,147 the 
Hawaiian courts have interpreted it in favor of plaintiffs, including a 1996 
decision in which the Intermediate Court of Appeals directed that juries be 
allowed to consider the consequences of finding a plaintiffs liability above 
the statute's 50% threshold. 148 The Court has also since eroded the viability 
of primary implied assumption of the risk as a defense. 149 
3. Medical Consent 
In 1970, two years before the landmark D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision Canterbury v. Spence, ISO the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted a 
common-law duty of full disclosure by physicians of the risks of medical 
140 Andrew Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share Liability in Blood 
Products Litigation. 68 TuL. L. REV. 883,910 (1994). 
141 Smith,823P.2d717,at719. 
142 Klein, supra note 140, at 912. 
143 Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Inc., 406 P.2d 887 (Haw. 1965). 
144 Miller & Komeya, supra note 125, at 91. 
145 Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90 (N.J. 1959). 
146 As a result, defendants in Hawaii are not allowed to argue what some call secondary or 
"unreasonable assumption of the risk," and must be content with the two remaining defenses of primary 
(reasonable) assumption of the risk and contributory (now comparative) negligence based on the 
unreasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct. For a discussion of Hawaii's complex assumption of the risk 
doctrine, see Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1290-92 (Haw. 1992). 
147 HAW. REV. ST. § 663-31 (2002). See generally Article, A Proposal for the Judicial Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence in Hawaii, 5 HAW. B.J. 49 (1968). 
148 Rapoza v. Parnell, 924 P.2d 572, 580 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996). 
149 See Larsen v. Pacesetter, 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) ("we join those courts that have abolished 
primary implied assumption of risk in strict products liability"); but see Foronda ex rei. Est. of Foronda v. 
Hawaii Int'I Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 836 (Haw. 2001) (preserving primary implied assumption of the 
risk in sports injury cases). 
150 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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treatment in Nishi v. Hartwell. 151 Although the standard of disclosure adopted 
by the Court was the more conservative "physician-oriented" test, the case 
was a landmark in medical consent law. 152 In 1995, the Court overruled this 
conservative aspect of Nishi in Carr v. Strode,153 and adopted the more 
plaintiff-friendly "patient-oriented" standard of care for a physician's duty to 
disclose risk information prior to treatment. 154 
4. Products Liability Law 
In 1970, Hawaii joined the national pro-plaintiff products liability 
"bandwagon" in Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 155 adopting Section 402A of 
the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts 2d, a strict liability 
approach to product defects. 156 As Harvey Henderson noted, "[f]ollowing 
Stewart, plaintiffs in Hawaii had three alternative theories of liability: 
common law negligence, implied warranty and strict liability in tort. For a 
small state, Hawaii has developed a fairly significant body of case law since 
the Stewart decision.,,157 The Hawaii Supreme Court has continued to expand 
its products liability jurisprudence I 58 with "unmitigated pro-claimant cases 
and holdings.,,159 The Court later adopted pure comparative negligence for 
products cases,160 expanding the remedies available to, and the ba~gaining 
III Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116, 119 (Haw. 1970). 
Il2 See George Bussey, Case Note, Keomaka v. Zakaib: The Physician 's Affirmative Duty To Protect 
Patient Autonomy Through the Process o/Informed Consent, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 801, 809-12 (1992). 
IS3 Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995). 
154 O'Neal v. Hammer, 953 P.2d 561,565 (Haw. 1998) ("we expressly adopted the 'patient-oriented' 
standard applicable to a physician's duty to disclose risk information prior to treatment"). 
III 470 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970); see Miller & Komeya, supra note 125, at 59 (calling Stewart one of 
"the principal decisions which epitomized the tort revolution in Hawaii"). 
156 See Stewart, 470 P.2d at 243 (expressly adopting a strict liability approach, embracing the doctrine 
in Greellman v. Yuba Power Products. Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962), id .. and importing "essentially the 
rule adopted in Restatement of Torts, 2d, 402A," id. at n.3). See also Harvey E. Henderson, Jr., Recurrillg 
Issues ill Hawaii Products Liability, 1996 Jan. HAW. B.J. 6. 
Il1 Henderson, supra note 156, at 6. 
158 Hawaii is one of only six states to have adopted the consumer expectations test as an independent 
test for design defect cases, a position that now runs contrary to the Restatement (Third) 0/ Torts. 
Restatement (Third) o/Torts: Products Liability. § 2 cmt. d, reporter's note (1998). 
Il9 Miller & Komeya, supra note 125, at 110. See also id. at 107-12 (noting that the Lum court has 
"continued without significant hesitation to follow the pro-claimant trend of its predecessor," id. at 107). 
The exception, noted by Miller & Komeya, id. at 111-12, is in a handful of cases involving hotel and 
apartment defendants for installed products, where the Court seems to be concerned about local economic 
implications of expansive liability. See Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 669 P.2d 154 (Haw. 1984) (towel rack 
collapsed under weight of guest using bathroom); Armstrong v. Cione, 738 P.2d 79 (Haw. 1987) (injury 
from cracked shatter-proof shower door in apartment). 
160 Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 .P.2d 343 (Haw. 1982); Armstrong. 738 P.2d 79 (rejecting 
application of comparative negligence to products liability); Hao v. Owens-Illinois, 738 P.2d 416 (Haw. 
1987) (finding that a plaintiffwith 51 % fault attributed to his smoking could still recover against a 2% fault 
defendant); see also Torres v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 949 P.2d 1004 (Haw. Ct. App. I 997)(finding that pure 
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power of, plaintiffs. 161 
Some commentators believe that, although unexpressed, the reason for this 
liberal products liability jurisprudence is "home court advantage," i.e. the fact 
that the impacts of products liability tend to "land on manufacturers located 
outside Hawaii," while the benefits inure to local victims, presenting 
"relatively little or immediate direct impact on local enterprises or local 
insurance rates. ,,162 
5. Joint and Several Liability 
In the area of joint and several liability, the Hawaii Supreme Court has 
struggled to balance conflicting tort policies. In May 1986, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict in Kaeo v. Davis,163 a case that 
nonetheless quickly became a nationally notorious joint and several liability 
story.l64 In Kaeo, the trial court found a 1 % at-fault municipal defendant 
jointly and severally liable with a 99% at-fault drunk driver for a $725,000 
damages award. 165 Despite the Supreme Court's reversal,166 the trial court's 
verdict left a reverberating impression that Hawaii juries and courts were 
distinctly pro-plaintiff. 167 A few months later, the legislature held a historic 
special session to adopt a package of tort reform bills that on their face 
(though not in fact) "abolished" joint and several liability in Hawaii. 168 
comparative negligence principles apply to plaintiffs recovery in strict products liability cases). 
161 See Lisa M. Ginoza & Curtis G.K. Yuen, Note, Armstrong v. Cione and Hao v. Owens -Illinois: 
Applyillg Pure Comparative Negligellce Principles to Strict Products Liability Actions, IOU. HAW. L. REV. 
393 (1988). In Masaki v. General Motors Corp ... 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989), the Hawaii Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiff needed to prove only that the defendant's design was the legal cause of injury, then 
the burden of proof would shift to the defendant to prove that the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of 
danger inherent in the design. Id. at 579. The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that it must be 
allowed to offer evidence as to the feasibility and beneficial effect of including a warning, and allowed the 
plaintiff to present evidence ofa proposed alternative design. Id. at 580. See discussion of Masaki in 
John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth "/or 
Section 402A Products Liability Design De/ects - A Survey o/the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 493, 631 (1996). 
162 Miller & Komeya, supra note 125, at 115. 
163 Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 1986). 
164 See Mark M. Hager, What's (Not!) in a Restatement? ALI Issue-Dodging on Liability 
Apportionmellt, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77, 104 (2000) (discussing Kaeo first among a list of alleged "poster-
child case[s] of purported injustice under joint and several liability"). 
165 Kaeo, 719 P.2d at 390. 
166 The Supreme Court held that the trial court should have informed the jury (as the City had 
requested) about the application of Hawaii's joint and several liability law, so that the jury could have 
understood the severe implications of its decision on the defendants' ultimate liability. Kaeo, 719 P.2d 
at451. See Jeffrey D. Watts, Note, Kaeo v. Davis: In/arming Juries a/the Effects a/Their Special 
. Verdicts Under the Law 0/ Joint and Several Liability, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 275 (1987). 
167 Hager, supra note 164, at 104. 
168 John Y. Gotanda, Joint alld Several Liability ill Hawaii: An Allalysis 0/ Proposed Changes, 21 
HAW. BJ. 175 (1988). This move by the legislature is discussed at greater length in Part III. 
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More recently, in 1998, the Hawaii Supreme Court again checked a lower 
court's more liberal view of joint and several liability. In Ozaki v. 
As~ociation of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 169 the Hawaii 
Intermediate Court of Appeals held that a condominium association could be 
held jointly and severally liable with a trespassing murderer for a tenant's 
death, even though the condominium association's liability was based on 
negligence only. Two months later, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
quickly and forcefully reversed, relieving the condominium association of all 
liability under Hawaii's comparative negligence statute and mooting the 
application of the joint and several liability statute. 17O Legislative intent 
behind the 1986 tort reform laws l71 and the far-reaching business implications 
of the Intermediate Court of Appeals' decisions apparently heavily influenced 
the Hawaii Supreme Court's rapid reversal. 172 This handful of conservative 
judicial decisions, however, just nibbles at the edges of Hawaii's otherwise 
quite liberal statutory structure for joint and several liability, which is 
discussed at greater length in Part III below. 
6. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In 1970, Hawaii sparked a national judicial trend by abolishing the 
physical injury rule in negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") 
cases, allowing the claim as an independent cause of action. 173 Hawaii courts 
recognized NIED claims even based on injury to property alone. In 
Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, 174 distressed owners of a Maui home that 
flooded as a result of the State's negligent failure to clear a plugged culvert 
were allowed to recover, even though they had not yet moved in, incurred 
169 Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998). 
170 Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. I 998)(finding thatthe 
5% negligence-based fault of the victim should have been compared directly to the 3% negligence-based 
fault of the condominium association). 
171 Id. at 648-49. 
172 See. e.g .. id. at 645 (noting participation of Amicus Curiae Hawaii Insurance Council). 
173 For a thorough discussion of the Hawaii case law, see Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime. " I U. HAW. L. REV. I 
(1979) [hereinafter Miller, Emotional Distress). See also Kenneth W. Miller, Note, Toxic Torts and 
Environmental Distress: The Casefor an Independent Cause of Actionfor Fear of Future Harm, 40 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 681, 695 (1998) (noting Hawaii began the trend); Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis: 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and the False-Positive, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1229, 1236 (1996) 
("Hawaii and California led the move toward recognizing emotional distress as an independent tort 
action."). The Hawaii NIED doctrine has been called "amusing," "unmanageably broad," and 
"dysfunctional." David Crump, Evaluating Independent Torts Based Upon "llllentional" or "Negligent" 
Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 439, 500-01 (1992). 
174 Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970). 
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only property damage, and suffered no physical injury related to the flooding 
incident. A series of cases followed that put Hawaii in a field of its own in 
this area of the law,175 creating a novel and expansive test that seems to still 
be broadening. Under Hawaii law, plaintiffs may recover even for NIED 
experienced from post-accident news of the death ofa pet, 176 making Hawaii 
one of only a few jurisdictions in the country to recognize this tort. 177 
Hawaii NIED law continued to be broadly interpreted in subsequent cases 
like the 1989 Masaki v. General Motors case, which allowed recovery by 
parents who suffered emotional distress upon seeing their adult son in the 
hospital after a severe accident. 178 The court took another liberal turn in the 
1999 case John and Jane Roes v. FHP, Inc., 179 holding that airport baggage 
handlers who were exposed to, but not ultimately infected by, HIV -tainted 
blood from a burst package could claim NIED for the period of time during 
which they had a legitimate fear of AIDS. 180 Without doubt, Hawaii has 
established itself as the national standardbearer of liberal NIED rulings. 
7. Premises Liability 
One year after the California Supreme Court's landmark 1968 landowner 
liability ruling in Rowland v. Christian,181 the Hawaii Supreme Court 
followed suit, deciding in Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu 182 to join 
California in abandoning the traditional categorical approach to landowner 
liability and adopting a broad reasonable care standard "for persons 
reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises.,,183 
Premises liability and the general concept of duty were further expanded 
I7S See generally Miller, Emotional Distress. supra note 173. 
17. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981) (holding that family members 
could recover damages for injured feelings and mental distress suffered through loss of dog). Hawaii also 
recognized that NIED plaintiffs can extend beyond legal relatives in Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 
(Haw. 1974) (allowing victim's "hanai," infonnally adopted, grandson to recover for witnessing her death 
in crosswalk). 
177 See Debra Squires-Lee, In De/elise o/Floyd: Appropriately Valuillg Companioll Animals in Tort, 
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1078-80 (1995). "No jurisdiction, however, has gone as far as Florida and Hawaii 
have in allowing recovery for emotional damages resulting from the tonious killing of a companion 
animal." Id. The Hawaii Legislature panially limited this type of claim in a 1986 amendment, HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 663 - 8.9 (Michie 2002), but still allowed it for cases where physical injury or mental illness 
could be proven. 
178 Masaki v. General Motors, Inc., 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989), rec'n denied, 833 P.2d 899 (Haw. 
1989). See Linda M. Paul, Note, Masaki v. General Motors Corp.: Negligent Infliction 0/ Emotional 
Distress and Loss o/Filial Consortium, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 215 (1990). 
179 John and Jane Roes v. FHP, Inc., 985 P.2d 661 (Haw. 1999). 
180 Id. at 665-66. 
181 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
182 Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969). 
183 Id. at 446. 
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by the Hawaii Supreme Court in later cases. In Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway 
Hotel, Inc.,184 the Court broadened innkeeper liability by imposing a broad 
duty on hotels to protect guests from the criminal conduct of third parties. 185 
More recently in Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 186 a case where the plaintiff 
slipped on a McDonald's french fry in a Kona Wal-Mart store, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court quickly affirmed 187 the Intermediate Court of Appeals' 
adoption of a liberal "mode of operation" rule for self-service businesses that 
market goods in a manner that encourages hazardous conditions. Despite a 
flurry of amici briefs from businesses and insurers, the Court agreed that, 
under the mode of operation rule, the store need not have had actual or 
constructive notice of the fallen french fry to be liable. 188 
8. Tort Damages/or Breach o/Contract 
Until recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court also took a "novel approach 
allowing recovery of emotional damages in breach of contract actions.,,189 In 
Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, decided in 1972,190 the Court allowed emotional 
distress damages arising from the defendant hotel's policy of consistently 
over-booking rooms. The Court later broadened this doctrine to include 
commercial contracts in the 1980 case Chung v. Kaonohi Center CO. 191 In 
1999, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court abruptly reversed this liberal 
doctrine and rejoined the "overwhelming majority ofstates.,,192 In Francis v. 
Lee Enterprises, the Court refused to recognize tortious breach of contract as 
a cause of action in an employment context. 193 This decision was later 
184 Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377 (Haw. 1987). 
185 See Virginia M. Chock & Leslie H. Kondo, Note, Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc.: 
Imposing a Duty To Protect Against Third Party Criminal Conduct on the Premises, II U. HAW. L. REV. 
231,231 (1989) (noting that Knodle expanded premises liability in Hawaii). 
186 Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000), afTg in part and rev'g in part, 5 P.3d 418 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1999). 
187 The Intemlediate Court of Appeals' decision was issued on November 17, 1999, and the Supreme 
Court's decision was issued on July 27, 2000. 
188 See Gump, 5 P.3d. at 408 (noting participation of business, property owner, and insurance amici); 
id. at 410-11. 
189 Comment, Brown v. Fritz: A Further Restriction 011 the Recovery 0/ Damages/or Emotional 
Distress Arising From a Breach o/Contract, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 203, 214-15 (1990). See also Matt 
McCall, Casenote, Russ Francis v. Lee Enterprises: Hawaii Turns Away from Tortious Beach a/Contract, 
23 U. HAW. L. REV. 647, 647 (2001)("ln the seventies and early eighties, Hawaii was at the forefrontofa 
national movement attempting to reach beyond the strict confines of traditional contract law - toward better 
compensating plaintiffs in contract disputes.") 
190 Dold v. Outrigger Hotels, 501 P.2d 368 (Haw. 1972). 
191 Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980) (allowing emotional distress damages to 
plaintiffs, who spent substantial funds for a restaurant opening, whose space was then leased to another 
tenant). 
192 McCall, supra note 189, at 647. 
193 Francis v. Lee, 971 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1999); McCall, supra note 189, at 647. 
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codified by the Hawaii Legislature. 194 
9. Employment Torts Law 
Generally, the Hawaii Supreme Court has "a tradition of interpreting 
Hawaii's worker compensation statutes liberally" and has taken a "pro-
employee course.,,195 In a 1982 case that gained national prominence, Parnar 
v. Americana Hotels, Inc.,I96 the Court held that an employer may be held 
liable in tort for discharging an at-will employee in violation of a clear 
mandate of public policy.197 This kind of wrongful discharge claim was 
deemed tort-like because of the broad range of remedies, such as lost wages, 
emotional distress, and punitive damages. 198 
10. Dram Shop and Social Host Liability 
Initially, the Hawaii Supreme Court took an expansive view of dram shop 
and social host liability for the accidents caused by inebriated customers and 
guests, but the development of the doctrine in this area has been volatile. In 
1980, in Ono v. Applegate, 199 the Court "broke with a long tradition and held 
that a bar could be held liable to an accident victim of a bar patron who was 
negligently served liquor, in violation of a statute, while intoxicated," thus 
''join[ing] the mainland's progressive trend of extending the negligence 
principle."zoo After Ono, however, the Court under Chief Justice Lum 
adopted a more limited view of dram shop liability, "put[ting] an end to the 
logical extension of the negligence principles set free in Ono.,,201 In 1990, in 
Johnston v. KFC National Management Co. ,202 the Court declined to extend 
194 HAW. REV. ST. § 663-1.2 (2002). 
19S William Shultz, Mitchell v. State and HRS § 386-3: Workers' Compensation Reform in the State of 
Hawaii, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 807, 817 (1999). 
196 Pamer v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982). See Brock Rowalt, Comment, The 
Public Exception to Employment At Will: Can Judicial Decisions Be Used As A Source of Public Policy?, 
62 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 325, 340 (1993)(noting that, despite criticism that the approach subjects employers to 
unpredictable tort damages, many courts have followed Parnar). 
197 For a detailed discussion of this case, see Deborah S. Jackson & Elizabeth J. Fujiwara, Employee 
Rights Under Judicial Scrutiny: Prevalent Policy Discourse and the Hawaii Supreme Court, 14 U. HA W. L. 
REV. 189 (1992). 
198 See Lisa A. Chun, Comment, United States v. Burke and Internal Revenue Code Section I04(a)(2J: 
When Will Personal Injury Damages Be Taxed?, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 263, 293-94 (1994). 
199 Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980). 
200 Miller & Komeya,supra note 125, at61. See also. Note, Ono v. Applegate: Common Law Dram 
Shop Liability, 3 U. HAW. L. REV. 149 (1981). 
201 Miller & Komeya, supra note 125, at 96 (suggesting the Court showed a new appreciation for 
. defendants' arguments about economic impact and the legislature's intent behind tort refonn). See also 
George B. Apler, Note, Bertelmann v. Taas Associates: Limits on Dram Shop Liability; Barring Recovery 
of Bar Patrons. Their Estates and Survivors, II U. HAW. L. REV. 277 (1989). 
202 Johnston v. KFC National Management Co .. 788 P.2d 159 (Haw. I 990). 
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Ono to non-commercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages, i.e. the social host. 
Yet, in 1994, dram shop liability expanded again in Reyes v. Kuboyama. 203 
11. Governmental Immunity and Liability 
Despite its otherwise pro-plaintiff jurisprudence, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court has demonstrated a reluctance to impose broad liability on government, 
narrowly interpreting the State Tort Liability Act. 204 Although the court 
seemed to reverse direction in a 1999 case that expanded state highway 
liability to cover negligent drivers,205 the decision sparked a strong legislative 
reaction.206 With respect to punitive damages, however, the State government 
has long been immune by statute.207 
12. Bad Faith Insurance 
In 1996, the Hawaii Supreme Court made Hawaii the 4th state to 
recognize the tort of bad faith insurance, opening up new horizons for 
litigation and punitive damages. 208 Although some commentators had earlier 
predicted that the tort opened up a "bad faith-punitive damages lottery,,,209 
others suggested that the predictions of an "explosion" in litigation, at least in 
Hawaii, were unlikely.2IO 
203 Reyes v. Kuboyama, 870 P.2d 1281 (Haw. I 994)(holding "Hawaii's liquor control statute imposes 
a duty to innocent third parties upon liquor licensee to refrain from selling alcohol to a minor, and that duty 
may be breached even if the intoxicated minor who causes an injury is not the minor who actually 
purchased the liquor"). See Mark L. Weber, Note, Reyes v. Kuboyama: Vendor Liability for Sale of 
Intoxicating Liquor to Minors Under a Common Law Negligence Theory, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 355, 355-56 
( 1995). 
204 See. e.g., Figueroa ex rei. Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d I 198 (Haw. 1979) (holding State not liable 
for damages in civil rights suits); Wolsk v. State of Hawaii, 711 P.2d 1300 (Haw. 1986) (finding State 
immune from lawsuit by injured campers); see generally Randall L.K.M. Rosenberg, Note, Wolsk v. State: 
A Limitation of Governmental Premises Liability, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 30 I (1987). See also discussion of 
municipal liability in Kaeo, supra note 163. But see Tseu ex reI. Hobbs v. Jeyte, 962 P.2d 344 (Haw. 1998) 
(holding that State Civil Rights Commission could be liable for negligent investigation of a housing 
complaint). 
20S Taylor-Rice v. State, 979 P.2d 1086 (Haw. 1999) (overruling Ikene v. Mauro, 511 P.2d 1087 (Haw. 
1973». 
206 See "A Bill for an Act Relating to Litigation Highways [sic]," H.B. No. 519, Stand. Com. Rep. No. 
81,21" Sess. Leg. (2001) (reacting to Taylor-Rice by proposing limits on state liability of certain careless 
drivers). 
207 HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-2 (2003) ("The State ... shall not be liable for ... punitive damages.") 
(The State Tort Liability Act was originally enacted in 1957.) 
208 Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Insurance Co., 920 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996). For an excellent 
discussion of the implications of Best Place. see Lane C. Boyarski, The Best Place. Inc. v. Penn American 
Insurance Company: Hawaii Bad Faith Cause of Ac/ionfor Insurer Misconduc/. 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 845, 
875 (1997). 
209 Boyarski, supra' note 208, at 847, n.272 (citing Douglas Houser, Good Faith As A Maller of 
Law: The Insurance Company's Righ/to be Wrong. 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 665, 666 (1992». 
210 Boyarski, supra note 208, at 875. 
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13. Survival and Wrongful Death 
The tort of wrongful death was adopted as part of the common law of 
Hawaii in 1860,211 long before the doctrine was codified by the State 
Legislature.212 Since codification, the courts have broadly interpreted both the 
survivafl3 and wrongful death statutes, including a 1994 decision that 
allowed two separate families of a deceased victim to recover for wrongful 
death damages. 214 
In summary, with few exceptions, Hawaii has a distinctly liberal torts 
jurisprudence, opening the courthouse doors widely to plaintiffs' personal 
injury litigation. Hawaii's legal and tort law history provide a very rich 
"growth medium" for punitive damages awards. As discussed in the next 
Part, Hawaii's punitive damages jurisprudence also is quite liberal and should 
foster high frequency and amounts of awards. Despite this supportive 
context, however, the quantitative data discussed below do not indicate an 
explosion in awards, suggesting that Hawaii's liberal jurisprudential context 
and punitive damages jurisprudence must be tempered by other influences 
that also affect the award of punitive damages. 
II. THE DOCTRINAL CONTEXT: 
HAWAII'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE 
To build the second foundational layer of an integrated examination of 
punitive damages in Hawaii, and to provide a judicial context for any 
potential legislative reform, this Part analyzes the major features of Hawaii's 
punitive damages jurisprudence. This evaluation concludes that, on the 
whole, this doctrinal landscape is quite liberal, like the broader contours of 
general tort law discussed in above in Part I. Hawaii punitive damages case 
law favors the injured plaintiff and is favorable to punitive damages awards. 
Approximately 200 reported appellate cases in Hawaii discuss punitive 
damages in some way, but only about twenty of these cases provide 
substantive guidance on the contours of punitive damages doctrine. This 
211 Kake v. C.S. Horton, 2 Haw. 209 (1860). 
212 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (2003). 
213 See. e.g .. Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1998), ajJ'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998) (allowing loss of 
enjoyment of life under a survival action). 
214 See Lealaimatafao v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 867 P.2d 220 (Haw. 1994) (allowing both 
"legal" family and second "common law" family of victim of electrocution accident to claim under 
wrongful death statute). 
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analysis focuses on punitive damages case law arising from personal injury 
cases in state court/IS although awards also arise from other tort contexts, 
such as defamation, injury to property, and trespass.216 Hawaii case law 
broadly interprets the purpose of punitive damages to include not only 
deterrence and punishment, but also compensation and attorneys fees (see Part 
II A below). Since 1911, Hawaii has had a broad amalgamated standard for 
determining when punitive damages may be awarded, including malice, 
willful indifference, wanton or oppressive acts, criminal indifference to civil 
obligations, and an "entire want of care" that "raises the presumption of a 
conscious indifference to consequences," affording juries broad discretion 
(Part II B). This flexible standard has supported awards in a wide variety of 
factual contexts, and the Hawaii Supreme Court had stated that awards are 
appropriate in products liability cases (Part II C). In the 1989 Masaki 
decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the "clear and convincing" 
21S For Hawaii cases involving federal statutory law on punitive damages, see. e.g .. Flowers v. First 
Hawaiian Bank, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137-38 (D. Haw. 2003) (denying punitive damages under federal 
statutory standard in soldier's claim against bank and credit union under the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act); Pachuta v. Unumprovident Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 742, 764 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding punitive 
damages not available under ERISA); Patricia M. v. Lemahiue, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1243. 1252-53 (D. Haw. 
200 I) (allowing claim of punitive damages for mistreatment of special education child under Federal 
Rehabilitation Act); Lesane v. Hawaiian Airlines, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1127 (D. Haw. 1999) (recognizing 
availability of punitive damages under Title Vll). Otherwise, recent federal court cases in Hawaii have, of 
course, closely followed Hawaii state law on punitive damages. See. e.g .. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. 
Servco Pac. Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1158-59 (D. Haw. 2003) (allowing punitive damages claim forbad 
faith to proceed under Best Place doctrine); Daly v. Harris, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1124-25 (D. Haw. 2003) 
(applying Hawaii decisional law that bars punitive damages against a municipality); Miracle v. New Yorker 
Mag., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1203 (D. Haw. 2003) (applying Masaki standard to punitive damages claim of 
self-proclaimed lost daughter of Marilyn Monroe); Bynum v. Magno, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1257 (D. 
Haw. 2000) (applying Masaki clear and convincing standard); Matsuda v. Wada, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 
1325 (D. Haw. 1999) (applying Hawaii law); Allen v. lranon, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1240-41 (D. Haw. 
1999) (applying Hawaii law); Kahale v. AOT Auto. Services, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302-03 (D. Haw. 1998) 
(denying punitive damages for employment discrimination based on Hawaii standard); and Tran v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (D. Haw. 1998) (denying plaintiffs claim for punitive 
damages from insurance company for mishandling of claim, relying on Masaki clear and convincing 
standard). 
216 In one early defamation case, Kahanumoku v. Advertiser Publ'g Co., 26 Haw. 500 (1922), the 
Territorial Supreme Court upheld a trial court award of compensatory damages that it assumed also 
included exemplary damages. The case is of historical interest because it involved a lawsuit by one of 
Hawaii's most famous sons, the champion surfer and swimmer Duke Kahanamoku, a Native Hawaiian, 
against the Honolulu newspaper for calling him a "slacker" when he had failed to enter a swimming meet. 
Id. at 506-507. The Supreme Court affimled the verdict, even though it rejected Kahanamoku's argument 
on appeal that the jury should have been instructed that the term "slacker" implied he had evaded military 
duty, a libelous accusation coming one year after the amlistice in World War I. Id. For discussion of 
punitive damages in the context of an early trespass case, see Chin Kee v. Kaeleku Sugar Co., 29 Haw. 524 
(1926) (finding insufficient evidence of "special misconduct and aggravation" in case where defendant's 
crew had harvested sugar cane from three acres of plaintiffs land in Hana, Maui and reaffirming that 
principals are not liable for punitive damages from the conduct of their employees absent participation in 
the act, expressly or by implication). 
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standard of proof, raising it from the preponderance of the evidence standard 
that had previously been in force (Part II D). The standard for appellate 
review is the highly deferential "abuse of discretion" standard, and appellate 
courts loosely review the amount of awards under an "excessiveness" 
standard (Part II E). In Hawaii, the defendant's wealth is a legitimate factor 
the jury may consider in setting the amount of the award (Part II F). Finally, 
Hawaii courts take the position that punitive damages can be awarded even 
when no compensatory award is made (Part II G). Woven together, these 
doctrinal strands indicate a fertile jurisprudential ground for punitive damages 
awards in Hawaii. 
A. The Purpose of Punitive Damages 
Like other states, Hawaii recognizes that the fundamental purpose of 
awarding punitive damages is to "punish the wrongdoer and to deter him and 
others from committing similar wrongs and offenses in the future.,,217 Yet, 
Hawaii also implicitly recognizes broader purposes. In a footnote in Masaki, 
the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized other goals, including preserving the 
peace, inducing private law enforcement, compensating victims, and paying 
plaintiff's attorneys fees.218 In 1996, the Hawaii Intermediate Court of 
Appeals endorsed this dicta from Masaki, explicitly allowing consideration of 
plaintiff's attorneys fees as a factor in setting the amount of a punitive 
damages award. 219 The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed this broad approach 
one year later in Lee v. Aiu,220 a real property title dispute, holding that 
"facilitating payment ofa plaintiffs attorney's fees is one of the purposes of 
punitive damages.,,221 This broad approach tends to favor the full 
217 Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 919 P.2d 263, 270 (Haw. 1996) (citing Masaki, 780 P.2d at 575). 
218 Masaki, 780 P.2d at 571 n.2 (citing Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law a/Punitive Damages, 
56 s. CAL. L. REV. 1,3 (1982». 
219 Kunewa v. Joshua, 924 P.2d 559,568-72 (Haw. App. 1996) (upholding trial court instructions that 
allowed jury to consider plaintilT's attorneys fees in setting award of $95,000 in punitive damages but 
remanding award for other evidentiary errors); Romero v. Hariri, 911 P.2d 85, 94-95 (Haw. App. 1996) 
(upholding trial court's denial of attorneys fees where plaintiffwas awarded $1 million in punitive damages 
that already factored in, under Masaki. attorneys fees as a legitimate purpose ofa punitive damages award). 
In Kunewa, the court claimed it was joining the "majority of jurisdictions," id. at 568, but a review of other 
states' doctrine indicates that Hawaii appears to be one of only eleven jurisdictions that expressly allow the 
plainti IT's attorneys fees to be calculated into the punitive award. This conclusion is based on a comparison 
of Hawaii punitive damages doctrine to other states conducted by the author and Research Assistant Jamie 
Tanabe in 2002, using RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE By STATE GUIDE To 
LA W AND PRACTICE (1991), as a foundation and then updating the information for each individual state 
[hereinafter States PD Doctrine Survey, on file with author]. 
220 Lee v. Aiu, 936 P.2d 655 (Haw. 1997). 
221 Id. at 671 (affirming in principle the punitive damages award, but vacating and remanding for new 
trial to allow Lee to introduce, "as an element of punitive damages, evidence of those attorney's fees she 
incurred in litigation with the Dixons"). 
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compensation of plaintiffs, but also may be subject to new constitutional 
challenges by defendants.222 
B. Conduct Requiredfor Award of Punitive Damages 
Hawaii allows punitive damages awards for a very wide range of conduct, 
making it one of the more liberal states on this issue. Of the forty-six states 
permitting punitive awards, the nature of the conduct justifying these awards 
falls roughly into four primary categories: 1) proof of mal ice required (twelve 
states); 2) punitive damages allowed for conduct more culpable than gross 
negligence but without proof of malice (twenty-five states); 3) punitive 
awards for gross negligence allowed (seven states); and 4) statutory 
provisions authorizing punitive damages upon violation of a statute {two 
states).223 Hawaii's complex standard is a flexible common law amalgamation 
of the first three categories. As the Hawaii Supreme Court recently 
emphasized: "the jury need[] only find either willful misconduct or entire 
want of care, to wit, gross negligence, in order to properly award punitive 
224 
damages." 
Hawaii's earliest decision discussing the standard for punitive damages, 
the 1857 Coffin v. Spencer case,m involved a barroom assault in the 
Merchant's Exchange. After the plaintiff made offensive comments to the 
defendant, who was playing billiards, the defendant "dropped his cue and 
walked up to the plaintiff in a somewhat menacing manner, putting his hands 
on each side of the plaintiffs neck, seizing him by the collar," causing 
plaintiff to injure his knee, faint, and go into shock.226 The Territorial 
Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the lower court's award of punitive 
damages, articulating the well-accepted principle that "malicious motives" 
can warrant punitive damages. 227 
222 The KUllewa court's dismissal of federal constitutionality concerns about such a broad state 
standard, 924 P.2d at 569-71, may be out of date in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent more 
conservative decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. 1115. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 409, 424-26 (2003). See 
supra note 28. 
223 States PD Doctrine Survey, supra note 219. 
224 
Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 960 (Haw. 1997). 
22S Coffin v. Spencer, 2 Haw. 23 (1857). 
226 [d. at 23-24. 
227 [d. at 25-26. The Court's explanation of the circumstances warranting a punitive damages award 
are still illuminating today: "In aggravated cases, when it appears that the defendant was actuated by 
malicious motives, as, for instance, when a violent assault and battery has been committed without any 
apparent provocation, or upon slight and inadequate provocation; when the defendant has used dangerous 
weapons; or when he has accompanied the act with such expressions as displayed a malicious purpose, and 
not merely a temporary excitement or irritation of passion from provocation, in such cases juries go beyond 
the rule ofajust compensation for the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and very justly too, in my opinion, 
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About fifty years later, in the 1911 case of Bright v. Quinn, the Territorial 
Supreme Court provided a much broader discussion of the range of conduct 
that can support punitive damages.228 In Bright, the plaintiffwas standing on 
the running board of an electric street-car running down Hotel Street in 
downtown Honolulu when he was "thrown to the ground by the impact of the 
automobile [that] was going in the opposite direction.,,229 Plaintiff suffered 
severe injuries, required surgery, and had over five months of painful 
recovery, requiring eight days of hospitalization, as well as job 10ss.230 In 
upholding the verdict, the Court emphasized that "the collision was 
accompanied by a crash which was plainly audible to those on the street-car 
and that the defendant continued on his way in his automobile without 
stopping to render assistance or make any inquiries.,,23I Although the jury did 
not specify the exact nature of its $1000 award, the Court found ample 
support for any punitive component, holding: "In such cases a reckless 
indifference to the rights of others is equivalent to an intentional violation of 
them. ,,232 The Court also stated the standard covered a patchwork of conduct 
and intents: "Such damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant 
'has acted wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as implies a spirit of 
mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations' ... or where there has 
been 'some wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise 
the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.",233 
This multi-prong Bright standard, still the dominant test in Hawaii, has 
many dimensions. Some of the early cases focused on the fraudulent conduct 
of the defendant234 but created doctrine that liberally allowed punitive 
award against the defendant what are called vindictive damages, punitive damages, or, as we say, smart 
money. In such cases they give these extra damages, as a punishment to the plaintiff, and, for the sake of 
example, to deter others from committing the like offense." [d. at 26-27. Although instructed on the law of 
punitive damages, the jury in Coffin did not appear to impose them. The jury awarded the plaintiff$54.20, a 
little more than the amount of plaintiffs physician's bill. [d. Apparently, the jury was persuaded that 
plaintiff, who had been drinking to excess the two prior nights at Booth's Dancing Saloon and who sparked 
the confrontation at the billiard hall by making rude and offensive comments to defendant, bore some 
responsibility for his own injuries. [d. 
228 Bright v. Quinn, 20 Haw. 504, 511-12 (1911). 
229 [d. at 505. 
230 [d. at 51 I. 
231 [d. at 513. 
2J2 [d. at 512. 
m [d. 
21< In 1978, the Court clarified that an award for punitive damages is restricted to an evaluation of 
the defendant's conduct towards the plaintiff, and not towards the court. Kang v. Harrington, 587 P.2d 
285,291 (Haw. 1978) ("fraud on the court is unrelated to the fraud on appellee and will not provide a 
basis for an award of punitive damages"); see also Kunewa. 924 P.2d at 571-72 (holding that a 
defendant's violation of the circuit court's order could not support a punitive damages award). 
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damages.235 In 1954, the court affinned a punitive damages award of$1850 
in a fraud case, Howell v. Associated Hotels. Ltd., even though there were no 
special damages awarded.236 In Howell, the plaintiff, a professional 
photographer, had given the defendant eighteen ektachrome transparencies to 
sell to a third party. Plaintiff sought return of the transparencies after learning 
that defendant had retained them instead of selling them. Defendant ignored 
plaintiffs request, made little or no effort to restore the transparencies, and 
claimed that he could not find them, even though he actually had them in his 
237 
possession. Placing Hawaii in the minority of states that allow punitive 
damages for injury to property (and in cases without special damages), the 
Court acknowledged Hawaii's rule was "not universal," but nonetheless 
approved punitive damages in trespass to property cases where there is 
"special misconduct and aggravation.,,238 
In the 1961 case Anderson v. Knox, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied the Bright rule to a Hawaii case and affirmed an award of$1 0,000 in 
punitive damages against an insurance salesman who sold an unsuitable 
insurance policy to the plaintiff on Maui.239 Relying on defendant's 
numerous misstatements and omissions, plaintiff purchased the policy, which 
resulted in the dissipation of the cash value of plaintiffs old insurance policy 
and the prospect of an indebtedness of$125,000.240 Defendant's deceit was 
sufficient to sustain the award. 
C. Beyond Personal Injury: Punitive Damages Available in a Broad Range 
of Cases 
The Hawaii punitive damages standard has supported punitive damages 
awards in a wide variety of cases. The myriad manifestations of malicious, 
reckless, and extremely careless behavior crop up not just in personal injury 
cases, but in many other contexts as well. In the reported appellate decisions, 
the Hawaii courts have allowed awards without any categorical limitation, 
including cases involving: defendant public officials241 (although 
235 Hawaii courts do not, however, allow the double recovery of punitive damages and statutorily 
authorized treble damages. See Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d 604 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997); see also Cieri v. Leticia 
Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29 (Haw. 1995). Hawaii case law has resolved that "the recovery should be 
either treble damages or punitive damages, whichever is the greater amount." Han, 93 I P.2d at 6 I 9 (citing 
Eastern Star, Inc. v. Union Bldg. Materials Corp., 712 P.2d 1148, 1160 (Haw. 1985». 
236 Howell v. Associated Hotels, Ltd., 40 Haw. 492 (1954). 
237 Id. at 492-93. 
238 Id. at 493-94. 
239 Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 728 (9th Cir. 1961). 
240 Id. at 726-27. 
241 A public official, acting in his or her scope of employment, is not immune from punitive damages. 
In Kajiya v. Department o/Water Supply, 629 P.2d 635, 640 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981), the Intermediate Court 
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governmental entities are protected from punitive damages242); bad faith 
insurance claims;243 and, multiple tortfeasors for their individual conducr244 
(but not under a vicarious liability theory24S or under a joint and several 
liability theory246). 
Some specific areas of broad liability are worth mentioning in more detail 
because they belie the perception that punitive damages are the exclusive 
province of personal injury cases and show that they are often sought in 
property and business disputes. For example, in 1983, the Intermediate Court 
of Appeals applied the basic malice or aggravation standard in Lussier v. 
Mau-Van Development, Inc., 247 a case of first impression involving a 
shareholder's derivative action. The court held that a court in equity could 
impose punitive damages "where the acts complained of are done willfully, 
wantonly or maliciously or is [sic] characterized by some aggravating 
circumstances. ,,248 In the 1997 case, Lee v. A iu, a dispute over title to real 
property in Hilo, the Supreme Court held that there was "substantial evidence 
from which the jury could find that the Dixons engaged in aggravated or 
outrageous misconduct," and therefore the Court affirmed the $40,000 
punitive damages award.,,249 In Clog Holdings v. Bailey/50 a 1999 decision 
of Appeals held that a Maui public water supply official who added chlorine to a water system that killed 
plaintiff's valuable pet Japanese carp (koi) fish could be held punitively liable for an exercise of official 
discretion ifhe acted maliciously. 
242 In Lauer v. Young Men's Christian Ass 'n, 557 P.2d 1334 (Haw. 1976), the Hawaii Supreme Court 
held that a municipal corporation may not be liable for punitive damages, although individual employees 
may be. The Court reasoned that allowing punitive damages against a municipal corporation is contrary to 
public policy. [d. at 1343. . 
243 See Best Place, Inc. v. Penn. America Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1996) (extending punitive 
damages to bad faith insurance claims). 
244 When two tortfeasors commit an act deserving of a punitive award, the Hawaii courts have held that 
punitive damages may be assessed against both parties. See, e.g., Beerman v. Toro Mfg. Corp., 615 P.2d 
749 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing child whose eye was severely injured by debris from a lawn mower 
while standing in line at a school water fountain to proceed against manufacturer and distributor on remand, 
but noting that "there are Hawaii Supreme Court cases holding that punitive damages may be recovered 
against corporate defendants, such as Toro or Inter-Island, only if the corporations expressly or impliedly 
authorized the allegedly tortious act before or after it was committed"). 
245 In The City a/Columbia, II Haw. 693 (Haw. Rep., 1899), the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Hawaii stated a master could be liable for punitive damages if "the act of the servant was necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of his employment, and was intended for that purpose, however ill advised or 
improper, ". though the servant may have executed it willfully and maliciously." [d. See also Kealoha v. 
Halawa Plantation Ltd., 24 Haw. 579 (Haw. Terr. 1918), modified, 24 Haw. 597 (Haw. 1919) (punitive 
damages allowed against principal only ifhe participated in the acts of the agent). 
246 See Ozaki v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652, 669 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1998), ajJ'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998). 
247 Lussier v. Mau-Van Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 824 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983). 
248 [d. at 825 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (deciding, however, that the standard was not 
met and upholding a directed verdict for the defendant on this issue). 
249 Lee v. Aiu, 936 P.2d 655 (Haw. 1997). The Court remanded, however, to allow plaintiff the 
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involving a highly controversial dispute over access to the shoreline on 
property owned by Beatle Oeorge Harrison in Nahiku, Maui, the Supreme 
Court found that punitive damages could be awarded "when a defendant 
maliciously obstructs an easement ... despite the defendant's claim, 
unsupported by a reasonable belief, that no easement existed.,,251 
Accordingly, applying the higher Masaki standard of proof, the Court 
remanded to allow an award if the jury could find with "convincing clarity" 
that the defendant met the substantive Bright standard.252 
In Hawaii, as clarified in the landmark 1989 Masaki v. General Motors, 
Inc. case, punitive damages are also available in products liability actions.253 
In Masaki, the plaintiff Stephen Masaki, a mechanic, was severely injured 
when a OM van he was working under unexpectedlY'shifted into reverse from 
park, hitting his head and breaking his neck.254 Stephen and his parents 
alleged that OM knew of the defect but failed to fix it; even OM's expert 
testified that the company could have installed an active warning system "at a 
low COSt.,,255 On the punitive damages issue, the Supreme Court defined the 
limits of the complex Bright standard by noting that a punitive award is 
appropriate when "the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional, and 
deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with being a 
crime.,,256 The Court stated that an award requires "something more than a 
mere commission of a tort."m Although the Court held that defendant's 
mental state, not just conduct, was critical to the awarding of punitive 
damages,258 the Court ultimately affirmed a broad interpretation of the 
punitive damages standard by allowing such awards for products liability 
cases where an inquiry into a corporation's "mental state" is often a question 
of whether it considered and rejected a low-cost alternative. 259 
opportunity for a higher award because the Court found she was entitled to introduce evidence of the 
attorneys fees she had incurred because of defendants' conduct. Id. at 670-671. 
250 Clog Holdings v. Bailey, 985 P.2d 1062 (Haw. 1999). The Court's decision in Clog had no 
precedential value as the Court later ordered it vacated (Jan. 7, 2000), issued a superseding opinion, 2000 
WL 121820 (Feb. 1,2000), and ordered both opinions withdrawn from the bound volume for unspecified 
reasons (Apr. 20, 2000). 
251 2000 WL 121820 at *21. 
252 Id. at *22. 
253 780 P.2d at 573 (citing Bright standard). 
254 Id. at 569. 
255 Id. at 580. 
25. Id. at 570 (citing W.P. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, cmt. b). 
257 PROSSER & KEETON. supra note 256, at 573. 
258 See 780 P.2d at 570. 
259 Id. at 572-73 ("We see no reason why punitive damages may not also be properly awarded in a 
products liability action based on the underlying theory of strict liability where the plaintiff proves the 
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The availability of punitive damages as a remedy in products liability cases 
in Hawaii was reaffirmed by the Court in the 1992 case Larsen v. 
Pacesetter.260 In Larsen, the plaintiff suffered through multiple surgeries to 
replace a recalled pacemaker that ultimately proved not to be defective.261 
Although the Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' punitive 
damages claims, finding that fraud had not adequately been shown, the Court 
reiterated that "[p ]unitive damages may be recovered in a products liability 
suit, in the absence of a fraud claim, so long as defendant has acted wantonly 
or oppressively or with ... malice.,,262 
In another 1992 case, Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines. the Hawaii Supreme 
Court continued to allow broad application of punitive damages, stating in a 
footnote that, although punitive damages are "not generally available under 
collective bargaining agreements, if the agreement is silent as to remedies, 
arbitrators can award punitive damages.,,263 Applying this Hawaii law two 
years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated the availability of 
punitive damages in a Hawaii collective bargaining case where there was 
"substantial evidence" that the defendant had engaged in "extraordinary 
misconduct," "acted with malice or wanton indifference," and that his breach 
"reflected a willful abuse of duty.,,264 In Hawaii, even estates of deceased 
victims can maintain claims for punitive damages under the "willful, 
malicious, wanton, or aggravated wrongs" standard.265 
D. Burden of Proof After J 989. Clearly "Clear and Convincing" 
About fifteen years ago, Hawaii's punitive damages jurisprudence took an 
anomalous conservative tum when the Court joined the majority of states by 
adopting the more restrictive "clear and convincing" standard for evidence 
supporting a punitive damages award. Of the forty-six states that allow 
punitive damage awards, twenty-four states require clear and convincing 
evidence, four states apply various standards of proof according to the 
underlying claim, and eight states require only a preponderance of the 
requisite aggravating conduct on the part of the defendant. "). 
260 Larsen v. Pacesetter, 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992). 
261 Id. at 1279. 
262 Id. at 1288-89 (internal citations omitted). 
263 842 P.2d 634, 647 (Haw. 1992) (emphasis omitted), affd sub nom. Hawaiian Airlines. Inc. v. 
Norris. 512 U.S. 246(1994). 
264 Mano v. Haw. Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Local 996, 234 F.3d 1277 (911) Cir. 2000). 
26S Ozaki, 954 P.2d at 668 (holding that murder victim would have had claim for punitive damages, had 
she survived, based on underlying claim for assault and battery; therefore holding that, under survival 
statute, punitive damages claim against murderer survived victim's death and could be asserted by her 
estate). 
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evidence.266 After extensive deliberation, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted 
the clear and convincing standard in the 1989 Masaki case, finding that the 
punitive nature of the award warranted a burden higher than the usual 
preponderance standard in civil cases.267 According to the Masaki court, 
"punitive damages are a form of punishment and can stigmatize the defendant 
in much the same way as a criminal conviction. ,,268 The clear and convincing 
standard is now well-established Hawaii law on punitive damages.269 
The Masaki Court's adoption of the highest civil burden of proof for 
punitive damages is the most significant restriction on punitive damages 
awards in Hawaii, either by the courts or the legislature. However, the actual 
impact of the ruling may have been minimal, given that, as described above, 
the Court simultaneously endorsed the long-standing broad standard for such 
awards and extended the reach of punitive damages to products liability 
cases.270 In addition, the higher standard may not matter in cases with tragic 
facts like Masaki. 271 On the other hand, the higher standard enhances a 
defendant's ability to convince a court to dismiss weak punitive damages 
272 
claims before trial. Ironically, also in 1989, the number of reported tort 
judgments in which punitive damages were requested had already dropped 
dramatically-from twenty-two the prior year to only six in 1989, the third 
lowest number during the seventeen years studied.273 The number of punitive 
damages judgments that year also dropped dramatically from eight in 1988 to 
zero in 1989.274 The year following Masaki, the number of requests bounced 
back, increasing to seventeen of the reported verdicts, and the number of 
judgments increased to twO.275 The long-term trend on requests and verdicts 
showed a gradual overall decline after Masaki, but it is difficult to discern 
266 States PD Doctrine Survey, supra note 219. As of the 200 I survey, ten states had not addressed the 
issue. 
267 Masaki. 780 P.2d at 574-75. 
268 Id. at 575. 
269 See. e.g.. Ditto, 947 P.2d at 960 (citing Masaki). 
270 Masaki, 780 P.2d at 572-73. 
271 Masaki's attorney, Howard Glickstein, who settled the case on remand for an undisclosed 
amount, expressed confidence that a new jury would still have awarded a high punitive damages 
amount even under the more stringent standard. See Ken Kobayashi, $5 Million Judgment Upheld: 
Record Damages Awarded to Van Victim, HONOLULU ADVERTISER. Sept. 21,1989, at A3 (quoting 
Glickstein, "we're confident that ajury of 12 fair and impartial people will agree"); see also Lee 
Catterall, New Trial Orderedfor Crippled Man Awarded $11.25 million, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, 
Sept. 21, 1989, at A4 ("In my heart, I believe those three words (clear and convincing) would not have 
made any difference" to the jury, quoting Glickstein). 
272 See, e.g .. Bynum, 125 F. Supp. at 1257 (dismissing punitive damages claim for lack of evidence 
under Masaki standard). 
273 See infra Part IV C 2-3. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
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whether Masaki's higher burden of proof caused any distinctive depression. 
E. Deferential Review of Punitive Damages Awards: "Abuse of Sound 
Discretion" and "Excessiveness" 
The Hawaii courts apply a "sound discretion of the trier off act" standard 
in reviewing awards of punitive damages.276 On appellate review, a punitive 
award or denial will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion.277 Such an abuse occurs when "[the court] exceeds the bounds of 
reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial 
detriment of a party,,,278 for example, if it denies an award but fails to enter 
sufficient findings offact and conclusions oflaw to support its denial.279 
Hawaii's appellate courts review the amount of a punitive award under a 
deferential "excess" or "outrageous" standard. In Parnar v. Americana 
Hotels, Inc.,280 the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld a $1.5 million punitive 
damages judgment in favor of a wrongfully discharged hotel employee under 
the general rule that a finding of an amount of damages is so much within the 
exclusive province of the jury that it will not be disturbed on appellate review 
unless: I) palpably not supported by the evidence, or 2) it is so excessive and 
outrageous when considered with the circumstances of the case as to 
demonstrate that the jury in assessing damages acted against rules of law or 
were misled by passion or prejudice.281 This standard for reviewing 
excessiveness is similar to twenty-one other states that consider whether the 
award was a product of the jury's passion or prejudice or some other improper 
element. 282 The same test for appellate review is used when an award is 
determined in a jury-waived trial. 283 
F. Defendant's Wealth: A Legitimate Factor 
The consideration of wealth as a factor in setting the amount of punitive 




279 [d. at 890. 
280 No. 68-459P, 1988 WL 247984, at*1 (Haw. Aug. 17, (988). The Parl/ar judgment isone of those 
included in the study. See infra Part V C 2 (discussing Category 2 cases). See also supra notes 196-97. 
281 Parl/ar, 1988 WL 247984, at *2 ("The jury found that defendants had discharged Pamar in 
violation of a clear mandate of public policy, therefore punishment in the form of punitive damages was 
allowable."). 
282 States PD Doctrine Survey, supra note 219. 
m See Romero v. Hariri, 911 P.2d 85, 93 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding, in a real estate fraud case, 
$1 million dollar punitive damages award by trial court judge and advisory jury). See also Kang v. 
Harrington, 587 P.2d 285, 292-93 (Haw. (978) (discussing remittitur doctrine in review of punitive 
damages award). 
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damages can help and hurt both parties. For the most vocal advocates oftort 
reform, however, it is seen as an illegitimate "deep pockets" factor that 
unfairly punishes large businesses and professionals such as physicians. 
Consistent with the Hawaii courts' broad view of punitive damages,juries are 
allowed to consider the financial worth of the tortfeasor in calculating the 
ainount that would accomplish the desired punitive effect; this is in line with 
the large majority of jurisdictions that also allow consideration of this 
factor. 284 The Hawaii Supreme Court has recommended, however, certain 
safeguards to protect the defendant. In Dunlea v. Dappen, a sexual abuse 
case, the Hawaii Supreme Court generally agreed with the proposition that 
"discovery of a defendant's assets is not appropriate until there's a prima facie 
showing in discovery that you are going to get to ajury on punitives," but the 
Court noted that "the trial court has discretion to fashion appropriate orders 
and procedures to avoid prejudice to the defendant" short of barring 
discovery.285 Wealth is only one factor in setting the amount of the award, 
and a court is not required to consider it, yet it provides plaintiffs seeking 
punitive damages against a wealthy defendant a fruitful avenue for increasing 
the amount of the award. 286 Not surprisingly, some of the reform proposals 
considered by the Hawaii Legislature would bar wealth as a legitimate factor 
for the jury's consideration.287 
G. Actual Damages Not Required 
Hawaii is in the minority of states taking the posItion that punitive 
damages can be awarded even in cases where there are no compensatory 
damages. Since the 1954 Howell case,288 the Hawaii courts have held that a 
plaintiff need not suffer actual damages in order to recover a punitive award. 
Hawaii is one of sevente en jurisdictions that allow for punitive damages when 
no actual damages are assessed; twenty jurisdictions refuse to award punitive 
damages without actual damages.289 The Howell court pointed out the 
recognized distinction between the injury inflicted and damages awarded as 
compensation, as well as the very different standards used for calculating the 
two types of awards. The Court put the decision in the hands of the jury, 
finding that although "punitive damages must bear some relation to the injury 
inflicted ... they need not bear any relation to the damages allowed by way of 
284 States PD Doctrine Survey. supra note 219 (approximately 44 states allow this factor). 
28S Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196.207 n.12 (Haw. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
286 See Romero. 911 P.2d at 93. 
281 See infra notes 422-23 (discussing S.B. 328. introduced in 2003). 
288 See Howell v. Associated Hotels, 40 Haw. 492 (1954). 
289 States PD Doctrine Survey, supra note 219. 
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compensation.,,29o The Court recognized the authorities were split on whether 
punitive damages were appropriate when no actual damages were awarded, 
but ultimately ruled that such an award was in the interests of "promoting 
justice.,,291 Many of the reform proposals considered recently by the Hawaii 
Legislature would statutorily reverse this doctrine, either by allowing a 
punitive award only after a compensatory award has been made or by 
requiring punitives to be below a certain multiplier of the compensatory 
award.292 
In summary, other than Hawaii's adoption of the clear and convincing 
standard of proof in 1989, the State's decisional law on punitive damages is 
uniformly liberal- perhaps even the most progressive in the country. This is 
consistent with the Hawaii state courts' overall approach to tort law, as 
discussed in Part I, above, which affords plaintiffs broad tort remedies. As 
explained in Part III, below, despite the constant pressures for "tort reform," 
the State Legislature has not significantly inhibited these jurisprudential 
developments and, specifically in the area of punitive damages, has thus far 
resisted a wide variety of proposals for limitations on the current system. 
III. THE LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT: 
TORT REFORM AND THE HAWAII LEGISLATURE 
Adding to the strength of the "socially conscientious" tort jurisprudence in 
Hawaii is a state legislature that is historically reluctant (or politically unable) 
to venture far into the judiciary's tort law turf. In recent years, however, the 
Hawaii Legislature has been under increasingly strong pressure to exert more 
control over Hawaii tort law, including in the area of punitive damages. Yet, 
the legislative debate itself is a source of some of the most common 
misperceptions about punitive damages that are addressed in the Hawaii 
study. Thus, it is important to analyze the contributions of the legislature to 
Hawaii tort law both generally and specifically in the areas such as punitive 
damages targeted by the tort reform movement. 
A. The Era oJTort ReJorm in Hawaii 
As part of the national tort reform movement in the mid-1980s, most states 
290 Howell. 40 Haw. at 500-0\. 
291 Id. at 495 ("The authorities are divided on this question and as there has been no local decision 
squarely on this subject we may choose that which appears more reasonable in promoting justice."). 
292 See infra Part III C; see infra. e.g.. note 342 (discussing 1992 Punitive Damages Standards 
Act). 
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enacted substantial changes to their tort laws,293 hoping to limit the number of 
cases filed, to control the extent of recoveries, and to address perceived 
unfairness to defendants. In the past fifteen years, the debate in Hawaii over 
tort reform generally, and controls on punitive damages in particular, has 
mirrored this national trend. 294 According to the chief lobbyist for the 
plaintiffs' bar in Hawaii, Bob Toyofuku, the perception of a "litigation 
explosion" has made tort reform a "high priority" for the legislature since the 
early 1980s.295 In his view, the bills introduced "would make it harder for an 
injured party to recover or [would] reduce the amount that could be recovered . 
. .. Generally, the legislature has moved toward protecting defendants by 
reducing the awards a plaintiff can get. ,,296 
Catching the national wave, in 1986, Hawaii adopted a package of tort 
reform measures during a specially convened session of the part-time State 
Legislature. That legislation enacted a mix of temporary and long-term 
modifications to Hawaii tort law,297 including a more generous statute of 
limitations for minor victims of medical torts,298 consideration of taxes in 
calculating future earnings/99 a cap on pain and suffering at $375,000 (with 
29) Marvell, supra note 40, at 194 ("The pleas of the presidential administration of Ronald Reagan and 
insurance companies were successful in that during 1986 and 1987 most states limited recovery in tort cases 
by, among other things, putting upper limits on damages, establishing sanctions for frivolous suits, putting 
limits on punitive damages, and limitingjoint and several liability.") (citing Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, 
"Off to the Races": The 1980s Torts Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990». 
Another wave oflegislation occurred in the mid-I 990s. See G. Robert Blakey, Corporate Misconduct: Of 
Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts About Multiple Damages, 60 SUM. LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 97, III n.56 (1997) (,"Tort reform' is carrying the day in the nation. Between 1995 and 1997, 
twenty-eight states passed some form oflegislation; sweeping refonll was recently passed in Illinois, Texas, 
Ohio, and Louisiana. ") (citing Letter of Sherman Joyce (undated), President of the American Tort Reform 
Association, to selected law professors). 
294 Jerry Burris, Move to Change Liability Law, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 26, 1989, at A3 (noting 
effort by Hawaii businesses to limit product liability "mirrors activity in many Mainland states and in 
Congress"); see also id. (quoting Bob Toyofuku, spokesperson for Hawaii Academy of Plaintiff Attorneys, 
as stating that the Hawaii business lobbying was part of a national effort). 
295 Interview by Shaunda Liu with Bob Toyofuku, Spokesperson for Hawaii Academy of Plaintiff 
Attorneys, Honolulu, Haw. (July 10,2001). 
296 Id. 
297 Not all of these modifications can be considered "reforms." Some changes were "sheep in wolfs 
clothing," such as the joint and several liability modification that contained several major exceptions 
including all economic damages in personal injury cases, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9(1) (2003), and 
exempted entirely cases in six major tort categories, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1 0.9(2)(A)-(F)(2003), as well 
as retaining joint and several liability for noneconomic damages when the tortfeasor's fault is 25% or more, 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9(3)(2003). The new "definition" of noneconomic damages, which included 
pain and suffering, was so broad that is effectively counterbalanced the limitations put in place by the cap 
on pain and suffering, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.5 (2003). 
298 HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (2003). 
299 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.3 (2003). 
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major exclusions),300 new limitations on (but not a bar against) negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claims in property damage cases/OJ the 
recovery by collateral sources via a lien onjudgment,302 modification (but not 
abolition) of joint and severalliability,303 and a significant forced three-year 
rollback of commercial liability insurance rates. 304 
The major reforms passed by the Legislature in 1986, however, included 
no provisions regarding the lightning-rod issue of punitive damages, and 
ultimately provided little relief to defendants in the way of true tort reform. 
Professor Miller observed that the "Hawaii Legislature has clearly felt the 
need to respond, but in keeping with its liberal Democratic roots and 
traditions ... managed very successfully either to adopt changes which may 
be effective in reducing costs and excluding non-meritorious actions but 
which do not significantly limit suits, recoveries or damages, or changes 
which create a mere appearance of reform and which impose only the 
narrowest oflimits on tort recoveries.,,305 He wryly concluded: "So much for 
legislative tort reform."J06 
B. The Mandatory Tort Arbitration System: CAAP 
One aspect of the 1986 tort reform package did, however, ultimately have 
a significant effect on approximately one-fourth of all punitive damages 
awards: the Court-Annexed Arbitration Program ("CAAP"), which was 
aimed specifically at diverting smaller-value tort cases from the circuit courts' 
dockets. 307 The Hawaii Judiciary had initiated CAAP in February 1986 as an 
experimental program for the circuit courts, under which parties with cases 
valued under $50,000 could volunteer for the program.J08 Six months later, 
during the special session, the legislature enshrined CAAP in Hawii Revised 
Statutes § 601-20, establishing a statewide system of mandatory and 
nonbinding arbitration for all civil actions in tort having a probable jury value 
(not reduced by the issue of liability, and exclusive of interest and costs) of 
300 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (2003). 
301 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.9 (2003). 
302 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10 (2003). 
303 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (2003). 
304 Act 2, 13th Leg., Spec. Sess., 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 3-6. 
lOS Miller & Komeya, supra note 125, at 64. 
306 Id. at 65. 
307 See infra Part III B. About 25% of all of the punitive damages judgments covered by this study 
were CAAP cases. See Table 2. As of 1992, court arbitration programs were operating in at least twenty 
states and ten federal district courts. John Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration 
Program Final Evaluation Report (PCR Working Paper Series: 1992-1, Mar. 1992) at iii [hereinafter 
Barkai & Kassebaum, 1992 CAAP Report] (on file with author). 
308 Id. at 2. 
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$150,000 or less, which became effective in 1987.309 CAAP was unique 
among state arbitration programs because it had the highest jurisdictional 
limit of all similar programs nationwide/ lo and because its primary goal311 
was to lower litigation costs by limiting pre-trial discovery.312 
Under the Hawaii Arbitration Rules/ '3 tort cases are considered 
automatically to be "in" CAAP unless the plaintiff certifies at the time of 
filing that the case value exceeds the $150,000 jurisdictional amount - a 
certification reviewed by the Arbitration Administrator and subject to review 
by each Circuit Court Arbitration Judge.314 Unless the parties select a private 
arbitrator, the Arbitration Administrator assigns one within twenty days31s 
from a panel of qualified arbitrators-local attorneys including both plaintiff 
and defense tort lawyers, as well as non-tort lawyers.316 Arbitrators have 
broad authority to hear the case and "[t]o relax all applicable rules of evidence 
and procedure to effectuate a speedy and economical resolution of the 
case.,,317 Discovery is allowed at the arbitrator's sole discretion.318 All 
arbitrations take place, and all awards are filed, no later than nine months 
from the date of service of the complaint on all defendants. Unless a party 
files a written notice of appeal and request for trial de novo within twenty 
days,319 the clerk of the circuit court enters the arbitration award as a final 
judgment of the court.320 In 2001, the legislature amended the arbitration 
309 HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-20(a)(2003); Barkai & Kassebaum,I992 CAAP Report. supra note 307, at 
2. The legislature directed the State Supreme Court to adopt rules for the program by January I, 1987; the 
rules became effective as of February 1987 for the First Circuit, and later in 1987 for most other circuits. 
HI. R. CIR. CT. Ex. A. ARB. Rule 27. 
310 Barkai & Kassebaum, 1992 CAAP Report. supra note 307, at iii. 
3 II The stated goal of the program was to "provide for a procedure to obtain prompt and equitable 
resolution of certain civil actions in tort through arbitration." HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-20(a) (2003). See 
also Barkai & Kassebaum, 1992 CAAP Report. supra note 307, at iii. CAAP's other goals included 
speeding up the courts' docket, providing litigants a fair hearing, encouraging early settlements, and 
preventing backlogs and delays. Id. 
312 Id. at iv. 
JIJ The Hawaii Arbitration Rules are included as Exhibit A to the Hawaii Circuit Court Rules and are 
cited as HI. R. CIR. CT. Ex. A. ARB. Rule. 
314 HI. R. CIR. CT. Ex. A. ARB. Rule 8(A)-(B). 
31S Id. Rule 9. 
316 Id. Rule 10. 
JI7 Id. Rule II. 
31S Id. Rule 14. 
319 Id. Rule 22. 
320 Id. Rule 21. Thus, CAAP "awards" are included in the study as Hawaii tort "judgments" but 
analyzed separately. CAAP awards have the same force and effect as a final judgment of the court in a civil 
action, but may not be "appealed." HI. R. CIR. CT. Ex. A. ARB, Rule 21. If a party seeks trial de novo, then 
the arbitration award is sealed until after the verdict, and statements or testimony made in the course of the 
arbitration hearing are not admissible in court, id. Rule 23(C), but discovery for the arbitration proceedings 
is admissible. /d. Rule 23(B). Sanctions may be imposed by the circuit court after the verdict against the 
non-prevailing party who sought the trial, including costs, expert witness fees, costs of jurors, and attorneys 
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rules specifically to endorse the existing practice of awarding punitive 
damages in CAAP cases, but the rules now require arbitrators to state with 
specificity the basis and amount of any punitive damages in the award.32J 
CAAP has significantly changed the nature of tort caseloads in Hawaii-
and the system for awarding punitive damages-by keeping smaller-value 
cases out of the hands of juries and putting them into the hands of practicing 
attorneys. In 1992, approximately 2,815 tort cases were filed,322 and 
approximately 1,500 of these (53%) were eligible for CAAP.323 Twenty-four 
percent of the cases assigned to CAAP were later dismissed, exempted, or 
removed for other reasons.324 Of the cases that did remain in CAAP, most 
settled, with about one-third going to an arbitration award325; trial de novo 
was sought about 50% of the time326 (or one of every six CAAP cases327). 
The average CAAP award was $30,000, and 88% of all CAAP cases 
terminated at $50,000 or less.328 A comprehensive 1992 study by University 
of Hawaii Law Professor John Barkai and Sociology Professor Gene 
Kassenbaum of the first five years ofCAAp329 concluded that, in general, the 
program some~hat reduced the costs oflitigation for the parties and expedited 
decisionmaking in many but not all cases.330 
Despite the lack of dramatic cost savings to parties, CAAP has had 
significant effects on a public scale. Overall, as further discussed below/31 
fees not to exceed $15,000, which are then deducted from any award to the plaintiff, who must pay any 
deficiency. Id. Rule 26. To be a prevailing party, a party must either (I) seek trial and improve on the 
arbitration award by 30% or more, or (2) not seek trial and the "appealing" party fails to improve on the 
arbitration award by 30% or more. Id. Rule 25(A). 
321 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 658A-21 (Michie 2001). 
322 See Trend Chart I, infra, p. XX (2689 tort cases filed in 1991/92; 2941 cases filed in 1992193; 
averaging 2815 cases filed in 1992). 
323 Barkai & Kassebaum, 1992 CAAP Report. supra note 307, at iii. 
324 Id. at v. 
J25 Id. at vii. 
326 Id. at vi. 
327 Id. at vii. 
328 Id. at vi. 
329 See id.: see also John L. Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, Using Court-Annexed Arbitration To Reduce 
Litigant Costs and To Increase the Pace of Litigation, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 43 (1989); John Barkai & Gene 
Kassebaum, The Impact of Discovery Limitations on Cost. Satisfaction. and Pace in Court-Annexed 
Arbitration, II U. HAWL.REV. 81 (1989). 
3JO Barkai & Kassebaum, 1992 CAAP Report. supra note 307, at iv (CAAP "has significantly reduced 
pretrial discovery expenses for both plaintiffs and defendants," noting average cost savings of $496 for 
plaintiffs and $266 for defendants, but finding only a 2.6% increase in recovery for the plaintiff and a 1.2% 
savings for the defendants, id. at viii). Barkai and Kassebaum also observed that, if the volunteer time of 
. arbitrators (paid only an honorarium of$IOO) were valued at market rates, "almost all ofCAAP savings 
would be eliminated." Id. at x. Moreover, CAAP cases that went to the award stage were actually "slower 
and more expensive than the average case in regular litigation." Id. at vii. 
331 See Section IV, infra. 
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the increase in the pending tort case rate dropped significantly after CAAP 
was initiated as cases were diverted from the system.332 As further discussed 
in Part IV, CAAP acts as a significant indirect "control" on Hawaii's punitive 
damages awards by filtering such awards through attorney-arbitrators. 
C. Post-1986 Tort Reform Legislation: Focus on Punitive Damages 
After 1986, punitive damages became a central issue in the continuing tort 
reform debate in the Hawaii Legislature. By 1987, tort reform bills were 
again before the legislature, inciuding proposals to bar punitive damages 
entirely.333 The same bills surfaced in 1988,334 alongside new bills that would 
prohibit the award of punitive damages specifically against county 
governments. 335 None of the bills passed. 
This was also the year of Hawaii's landmark punitive damages judgment, 
Masaki v. General Motors Corporation, in which a Honolulu jury issued a 
verdict against GM of$II.25 million in punitive damages and $5.6 million in 
compensatory damages in favor of 28-year-old mechanic Stephen Masaki and 
his parents.336 Whether the Masaki verdict fanned the fires of reform is 
unciear,337 but the verdict did coincide with a reinvigorated local tort reform 
movement and added to the pressure on the State Legislature. In 1988, a 
group of Hawaii businesses formed the Hawaii Product Liability Task Force, 
hiring lobbyists, lawyers, and public relations specialists to push a new 
package of tort reform legislation.338 The Task Force's familiar theme was 
332 Barkai & Kassebaum, 1992 CAAP Report. supra note 307, at viii. 
m S. 0186, 14th Leg., 1987 Sess. (Haw. 1987) (prohibiting the award of punitive damages except 
where mUltiple damages allowed by law); S. 0189, 14th Leg., 1987 Sess. (Haw. 1987) (proposing same 
prohibition). 
334 H.R. 3129, 14th Leg., 1988 Sess. (Haw. 1988) (proposing general prohibition on punitive damages, 
including medical torts cases, unless approved by court); S. 2751, 14th Leg., 1988 Sess. (Haw. 1988) 
(companion bill); S. 2089, 14th Leg., 1988 Sess. (Haw. 1988) (prohibiting any punitive damages awards, 
except where multiple damages allowed by law). 
33S S. 2178, 14th Leg., 1988 Sess. (Haw. 1988) (prohibiting punitive damages awards against 
counties); S. 2460, 14th Leg., 1988 Sess. (Haw. 1988) (same). 
336 See supra notes 253-259 and 267-271 for a discussion of Masaki. 
JJ7 When the Hawaii Supreme Court overturned the Masaki verdict, the Honolulu papers carried only 
two small articles on the decision. See Ken Kobayashi, $5 Million Judgment Upheld: Record Damages 
Awarded to Van Victim, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 21, 1989, at A3 (noting Court's remand on the 
basis of a new "clear and convincing" standard for punitive damages, and that the jury verdict was "the 
highest award in Hawaii for a single victim in a personal injury or wrongful death case"); see also Lee 
Catterall, New Trial Ordered/or Crippled Man Awarded $11.25 million, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, 
Sept. 21, 1989, at A4 (noting that, although the court reversed on the punitive damages standard, it affirmed 
the $6.2 million compensatory award, the "largest ever decided for a single family in Hawaii"). Despite the 
record verdict in Masaki, the lead plaintiffs' attorney in the case, Howard Glickstein, observed no 
"legislative fallout" or "special legislation reaction" from the verdict. Interview with Howard Glickstein, 
Attorney for Masaki, Honolulu, Hawaii (Apr. 16, 1999). 
338 Jerry Burris, Move to Change Liability Law, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 26, 1989, at A3. 
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that the tort liability laws "cause[d] more harm than good" and that some 
people used the system as "an opportunity for profits rather than as a means to 
obtainjustice.,,339 Many of the tort reform bills from previous sessions were 
re-introduced in 1989, including the bill proposing immunity from punitive 
damages for the counties,340 but none passed. 
In 1991, the House considered a bill that would have codified the existing 
broad judicial standard for awarding punitive damages but also tried to 
control "extreme" awards by limiting punitive damages to two times the 
compensatory award.341 The following year, punitive damages received 
substantial attention among the business community and in the legislature 
and, for the first time, a comprehensive bill aimed at punitive damages reform 
was introduced. The proposed Punitive Damages Standards Act contained 
numerous provisions to limit punitive damages. 342 First, it sought to tighten 
the higher standard of proof adopted in Masaki, by allowing punitive damages 
awards in personal injury, property damage, economic loss, or wrongful death 
cases only if the plaintiff proved by "clear and convincing" evidence that the 
harm was the result of actual malice or fraud. Second, it would have 
prohibited the introduction of evidence of defendant's financial condition for 
the purposes of proving a punitive damages claim. Third, it would have 
screened out more awards by allowing punitive damages only in cases where 
a compensatory award was made .first, then allowing punitive damages only in 
a bifurcated proceeding. Fourth, it proposed to cap punitive damages at twice 
the compensatory award. Finally, fifth, it would have prohibited punitive 
damages in certain drug or food product cases. The ambitious Punitive 
Damages Standards Act passed only its first reading in the House.343 
While the legislature was considering the 1992 Act, punitive damages 
were in the local news. In February 1992, an article appeared in Hawaii's 
leading business newspaper, Pacific Business News, which discussed Rustad 
and Koenig's national study of punitive damage awards in product liability 
cases under the surprisingly candid headline "Product Liability Lawsuits 
Seldom Yield Punitive Damages.,,344 Ironically, the two major Hawaii 
339 Id. 
340 H.R. 0328, 15th Leg., 1989 Sess. (Haw. 1989) (same as prior bill); S. 0249, 15th Leg., 1989 Sess. 
(Haw. 1989) (companion bill). 
341 H.R. 564, 16th Leg., 1992 Sess. (Haw. 1991) (this bill would have allowed award of punitive 
damages where a tortfeasor's conduct was outrageous, the tortfeasor acted with evil motive, or the 
tortfeasor acted or failed to act in conscious disregard or indifference to a high degree of risk of physical 
harm to another person; and it would have limited punitive damages to 200% of the compensatory award). 
342 H.R. 3935, 16th Leg., 1992 Sess. (Haw. 1992). 
343 First Reading of H.B. 3935, 16th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1991 Haw. House J. III. 
344 Richard T. Sale, Product Liability Lawsuits Seldom Yield Punitive Damages, PAC. BuS. NEWS, Feb. 
17, 1992, at 19 ("The reputation of punitive damages resulting from product liability cases has been 
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punitive damages verdicts that soon followed the article were both in business 
fraud cases, not personal injury cases. In March 1992, a record-breaking 
punitive damages award of $618,000 was awarded in a realty fraud case345 
and, in September 1992, a jury awarded Paul Brown, Honolulu's premier 
hairstylist, a record punitive damages award of $3.8 million in a business 
fraud case against a national accounting firm. 346 By 1993, the momentum for 
punitive damages reform seemed to have gathered more steam in Hawaii. 
Several bills were introduced in the State Legislature calling for the complete 
abolition of punitive damages as a tort remedy.347 Another bill proposed 
diverting all punitive damages awards in intentional tort or civil rights cases 
to the state's victim compensation fund. 348 Additionally, the Punitive 
Damages Standards Act was re-introduced.349 Again, however, none ofthese 
bills passed. 
In 1994, another major flurry of legislative activity to reform the state's 
tort laws occurred,350 but no sweeping or specific changes to punitive 
damages were enacted. The following year, in 1995, the legislature continued 
to address only discrete types of tort liability,351 without addressing punitive 
damages. 
In 1996, an effort to reform punitive damages was introduced as part of a 
general tort reform bill. H.R. 2927 would have allowed punitive damages 
drastically exaggerated, at least that is the finding of one recent study."). 
345 Thomas Kaser, Punitive Damages Upheld in Realty Case: $618,000 of Total $1,051, 000 Award in 
the '83 Sale of Nuuanu Home, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 18, 1992, at A3 (noting the award was 
"believed to be the highest punitive damages ever awarded for real estate fraud in Hawaii."). 
346 Thomas Kaser, Punitive Damages Agaillst Firm in Brown's Lawsuit: $3.8 Million, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER, Sept. I, 1992, at A5 (discussing lawsuit for fraudulent misrepresentation by Honolulu 
hairstylist Paul Brown against the accounting firm Arthur Young & Co.). Paul Brown himselflater became 
a target ofa punitive damages award in a case involving sexual harassment ofa salon employee. See infra 
Part V C 2. 
347 H.R. 833, 17th Leg., 1993 Sess. (Haw. 1993) (prohibiting any court in a tort action from awarding 
punitive damages); S. 1251, 17th Leg., 1993 Sess. (Haw. I 993)(companion bill). Both bills passed only 
their first reading in the Senate and House. 
34S H.R. 477, 17th Leg., 1993 Sess. (Haw. 1993). 
349 H.R. 866, 17th Leg., 1993 Sess. (Haw. 1993) (passed first reading in House). 
35U The most important tort bills of the 1994 session would have exempted Hawaii State Government 
from joint and several liability (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.5 (2003» and extended the 1986 pain and 
suffering cap of$375,OOO (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7(2003». In response to pressures from particular 
interest groups concerned about broad tort liability, the legislature adopted "horse tort" immunity (HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 663B-2 (2003» and "feed the poor" immunity for charitable organizations (HA W. REV. STAT. 
§ 663-10.6). On the other hand, the legislature also codified strict liability for gun owners (HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 663-9.5 (2003». 
351 For example, the legislature specifically created tort liability for drug dealers whose wares caused 
injuries (HAW. REV. STAT. § 6630 (2003». The legislature also extended the modified joint and several 
liability statute (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (2003» and, in a bold move that seemed to shock the 
plaintiffs' bar into action, adopted pure auto no-fault, only to have it vetoed by the Governor. Statement of 
Objections to S.B. 1792, 18th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1995 Haw. House J. 931-933. 
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only for intentional or knowing wrongdoing, limited punitive damages to 
$250,000 or twice the amount of compensatory awards, whichever was 
greater, codified the "clear and convincing" standard of proof, and directed 
the Hawaii Supreme Court to adopt post-trial and appellate review standards 
for such awards. 352 In December 1996, Pacific Business News carried an 
article on punitive damage awards, noting that Hawaii had few such 
awards. 353 Despite this sobering good news, the Hawaii business community 
continued to press for punitive damages reform. 
In 1997, the same punitive damages reform proposals from 1996 were 
reintroduced in H.R. 2927.354 A novel bill was introduced that would have 
limited the attorneys fees in cases where punitive damages were awarded to 
10% of the value of the award if the award was one million or less, and 5% of 
the value of the remainder of the award over one million dollars.355 Neither 
bill passed. Instead, the Legislature expanded tort liability in several areas.356 
In 1997, some members of the State Legislature had "had enough" of the 
continual battering by a stream of tort reform pressures. Seeking to impose a 
two-year truce, the legislature passed a concurrent resolution that established 
a task force that eventually called itself"The Tort Law Study Group.,,357 The 
resolution's authors, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, expressed 
concern about the impact of the tort system on the "cost of doing business" 
and the damage that "abusive" tort cases caused to the common law tort 
system.358 They also stated that "the piecemeal enactment of [reform] may 
prejudice the claims of deserving injured parties or fundamentally imbalance 
3S2 H.R. 2927, 18th Leg., 1996 Sess. (Haw. 1996) (passed first reading in House); S. 2571, 18th Leg., 
1996 Sess. (Haw. 1996) (companion bill). See also H.R. 3718, 18th Leg., 1996 Sess. (Haw. 1996) 
(proposing to limit punitive damages to twice the compensatory award and require a finding of actual 
malice or fraud by clear and convincing evidence). 
3SJ Jacob Kamhis, Punitive Damage Award Tax May Change Amounls Requested, PAC. Bus. NEWS, 
Dec. 27, 1996, available at http://pacific.bizjournals.com/pacific/storieslI996/12/30/story5.html (last 
accessed June 20, 2004)(Alan Van Etten, an attorney with Damon Key Bocken Leong & Kupchak 
commented that cases with significant punitive damage awards are rare in the islands.). 
354 H.R. 1165, 19th Leg., 1997 Sess. (Haw. 1997). 
355 H.R.0259, 19th Leg., 1997 Sess. (Haw. 1997). 
356 The legislature codified the requirements for liability waivers signed by clients of risky recreational 
activities operators (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.54 (2003», but, in an ironic twist of political fortunes, 
industry actually received less protection under the new law than before. For a compelling account of the 
politics of this bill, see Ammie Roseman-Orr, Recreational Activity Liability in Hawaii: Are Waivers Worth 
the Paper on Which They Are Wrillen?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 715 (1999). The legislature added reciprocal 
beneficiaries as a plaintiff class under the State Wrongful Death Act (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (2003», 
but granted yet another special interest group immunity from tort lawsuits, this time the Hawaii motor-
sports industry (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.95 (2003». 
357 S.C.R. 256, H.D. I, 19th Leg., 1997 Sess. (Haw. 1997). 
358 Id. (whereas clause). 
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or disrupt the system of common law tort liability,,,359 and that "both 
businesses and consumers would benefit by a systematic evaluation of the 
appropriate nature, scope, and application of tort immunity and other 
adjustments to our tort system in order to reduce transaction costs as a system 
driver.,,36o Accordingly, the legislature requested the Hawaii State Bar 
Association to conduct a study of Hawaii's tort law system and make 
recommendations regarding the role of insurance, attorneys fees, transaction 
costs, statutory immunity, and other definitive resolution mechanisms, as well 
as other ways for ensuring recovery by wronged parties while reducing 
transaction costS.361 The legislature specified the segments of the legal and 
business community from which the members of the study group were to be 
drawn. 362 Although it provided no resources or staff for the research or 
writing of the report, the legislature ordered a final report in two years, by 
January 1999.363 
Despite the legislature's valiant attempt to force a cease-fire in the tort 
reform battle, the lobbying continued, and even intensified, while the Tort 
Law Study Group process was underway. In 1998, a new alliance of 240 
"local" Hawaii businesses, now constituted as the Hawaii Coalition To Stop 
Lawsuit Abuse, began to push vigorously for tort reform.364 One of the 
Coalition's target areas for reform was punitive damages because, as it stated: 
"In the United States today, there are more lawsuits, involving more dollars 
in punitive damages, than in any other five countries combined.,,365 The 
Coalition's familiar mantra was "too many people now look at our courts as 
an opportunity for profit, rather than as a means of obtainingjustice.,,366 The 
319 Id. 
160 Id. 
361 /d. (resolved clause). 
362 Id. Those included: representatives of Hawaii's business community organizations, plaintiffs' 
attorneys, insurance industry, appropriate state and county government agencies, the Judiciary, and torts 
scholars from the University of Hawaii Richardson School of Law. Id. It is the last provision that invited 
the author of this article to join the study group. 
161 Upon request of the group members, all of whom volunteered hundreds of hours in two years of 
meetings, the Hawaii Judiciary's Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution provided invaluable staff and 
facilitation services to the Group. See Letter from Elizabeth Kent, Director, CADR, to Senators Norman 
Mizuguchi and Calvin Say (Dec. 22, 1998), in TORT LA W STUDY GROUP REPORT To THE 1999 SESSION OF 
THE HAWAII STATE LEGISLATURE PURSUANT To S.C.R. 256, H.D. I (1997), Dec. 31, 1998 (on file with 
author). Policy, doctrinal, and original empirical research projects were conducted pro bono by the author 
and a team of law students from the William S. Richardson School of Law, including: Jean Campbell, 
Garrick Lau, Kristin Masuda, Naoko Miyamoto, Philip Miyoshi, Deborah Mueller, William Keoni Shultz, 
and Elise Tsugawa. 
3M Jim Boersema, Frivolous Lawsuits Are Out o/Control, PAC. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 6, 1998, available at 
http://pacific.bizjournals.comlpacific/storieslI998/02/09/editoriall.html(last accessed June 20, 2004). 
16S Id. 
366 Id. 
2004] Hawaii Punitive Damages 199 
Coalition blamed the tort system for a variety of ills, including hidden "tort 
taxes" on goods; soaring health costs; reduced access to some professional 
services; rising liability and malpractice insurance costs; fewer product 
innovations; and fewer opportunities for local business to invest in new jobs 
and expand operations. 367 The Coalition pointed to other states' sweeping tort 
reform efforts and touted Alabama's new business-friendly campaign, 
suggesting anti-business tort law contributed to Hawaii's economic slump,368 
which was triggered by the huge drop in investment in Hawaii businesses and 
real estate when Japan's economy con flated in the early 1990s.369 
The number of bills introduced in 1998 relating to punitive damages alone 
expanded in scope and increased dramatically to seven bills. Dozens of 
businesses lined up to testify on behalf of the bills, some telling personal 
stories oflawsuits against them that amounted, in their view, to "extortion.,,37o 
One of the bills the Coalition introduced sought to limit punitive damages 
and to require a portion of any award to be paid to the state.371 Another 
proposal that passed the House but died in the Senate would have, as part of a 
broader tort reform package, required any punitive damages award to be set 
by the judge not the jury; limited punitive damages to three times the 
compensatory award; diverted one-third of any punitive damages award to the 
state treasury; and required the judiciary to track and report such awards each 
year.372 Other bills would have required any punitive damages awards to be 
determined by ajudge and capped them at $250,000.373 One bill would have 
allowed punitive damages only for intentional or knowing misconduct; 
required the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's conduct warranted punitive damages; limited the dollar amount to 
367 Id. 
368 Id. See also Lori Tighe, A Lesson in Hawaii Law: This Could Happen to You, HONOLULU STAR-
BULLETIN, Feb. II, 1998, at A I (quoting member of Hawaii Coalition To Stop Lawsuit Abuse as 
suggesting that businesses avoided Hawaii because of its tort system; paraphrasing State Representative 
Terrance Tom as saying that "Hawaii's reputation for being lawsuit-happy has repelled potential businesses 
from coming to the state"). 
369 See infra Part IV D 3 for a discussion of Hawaii's economic downturn in the 1990s. 
)70 Craig Gima, Business Owners Tell Lawmakers They Need Tort Reform Right Now: A House Bill to 
Stop Frivolous Injury and Damage Lawsuits Does Not Get a Senate Hearing, HONOLULU STAR-BuLLETIN, 
April 9, 1998, at A4 (noting testimony of Alan Shimamoto regarding a lawsuit against his parents for 
leaking gas tanks and stating such lawsuits are "almost like extortion"). 
371 Craig Gima, Tort-Reform Measure Amended. Advallces, HONOLULU STAR-BuLLETIN, Feb. II, 
1998, at A8. 
372 H.R.2544,19thLeg.,1998Sess.(Haw. 1998);S.2557,19th Leg., I 998Sess.(Haw.1998)SDI, 
HDI (HSCR 1273-98) (companion to H.R. 2544; same proposals regarding punitive damages). 
37J H.R. 2717, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. (Haw. 1998); H.R. 3399, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. (Haw. 1998) 
(same bill); S. 2415, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. (Haw. 1998) (companion bill); S. 2728, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. 
(Haw. 1998) (same bill). 
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the greater of $250,000 or twice the amount of compensatory damages; and 
required the Hawaii Supreme Court to adopt rules establishing post-trial 
standards and appellate guidelines for judicial review of punitive damages 
awards.374 
Public debate over the bills mirrored the national polemic. One major 
Hawaii newspaper supported the Coalition's efforts, suggesting that major tort 
reform was needed "this session" because "Hawaii is one of the few states 
that have failed to revise their legal system in recent years" to control 
frivolous lawsuits and limit "outlandish compensation. ,,375 The editorial 
specifically supported a proposal to limit punitive damages. Reform would, 
in the editorial's view, replace greed with fairness, and tum the courts from a 
menace to business into an arena for equitable resolution.376 In a February 
1998 Pacific Business News article entitled "Frivolous Lawsuits Are Out of 
Control," Jim Boersema called for tort reform in Hawaii similar to reform 
measures taken in Alabama, claiming they had spurred economic growth. 377 
Plaintiffs' lawyers countered by calling the claims of the Coalition 
"myths.,,378 Richard Turbin, a prominent Honolulu torts attorney and then 
chair-elect of the 35,000-member national Tort and Insurance Practice Section 
of the American Bar Association, argued that "[c]urrent facts" belied the 
popular myth among Hawaii's political culture that legislation was needed to 
limit lawsuits. 379 Rising to the rhetorical challenge, the plaintiffs' bar, too, 
used powerful imagery: 
[t]he public is being misled by claims that there is a frivolous lawsuit 
problem escalating in America. Clearly, the driving force[s] behind the 
fallacy are powerful insurance business interests that finance lobbying 
efforts for legislation to limit consumer lawsuits. Fortunately, our civil 
justice system offers a way for ordinary people to hold Hawaii's power 
elite accountable. America's legal system is a linchpin of 
374 H.R. 1165, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. (Haw. 1998). 
m Editorial, Major Tort ReJorm is Needed This Session, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 12, 1998, 
at BI. 
376 [d. 
377 Boersema, supra note 364. Boersema's assertion that Alabama had "enjoyed double digit growth 
for the past five years" attributable to Alabama's "sweeping reform of state tort laws," id .. was misplaced 
optimism according to a later report indicating that "Alabama's tort reform package had been virtually 
abolished during this period of economic prosperity." Chad E. Stewart, Comment, Damage Caps in 
Alabama's Civil Justice System: An Uncivil War Within the State, 29 CUMBo L. REV. 20 1,230 (1999). 
378 See Richard Turbin, The Myth oj Frivolous Lawsuits: Tort ReJormers Can Pick Another Cause; 
Hawaii Doesn ·t Have a Problem with Rampant Litigation, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Feb. 21, 1998 
at BI. 
379 [d. 
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democracy. If we restrict citizen's access to the courts, we are crippling 
the democratic order.38o 
While the debate raged and tort reform bills were moving along in the House, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee tried to forestall action by pointing to the 
ongoing Tort Law Study Group effort. Senate Consumer Protection 
Committee Chair Wayne Metalf expressed his concern that there was a lack of 
information on tort lawsuits in Hawaii, saying, "If we're going to enact 
fundamental changes to the system, there has to be a factual basis to do it.,,381 
Not surprisingly, little about Hawaii tort law actually changed during the 
1998 session.382 
The Tort Law Study Group finished its voluminous report383 on December 
31,1998, and presented it to the Legislature in January 1999.384 The group 
made consensus recommendations385 in six major areas: 1) joint and several 
liability: recommending retention of the existing law but mandating larger 
insurance coverage and institution of a tracking system; 2) punitive damages: 
recommending no change in the current system of punitive damages awards 
by juries with review by judges; 3) immunity: recommending granting 
immunity sparingly and using a comprehensive rather than piecemeal 
approach; 4) costs oflitigation: recommending allowing any party to submit 
an Offer of Judgment under Rule 68 and allowing videotape testimony; 5) 
liability insurance: recommending higher motor vehicle liability insurance 
limits, and mandatory liability insurance for licensed professionals and 
businesses; and 6) joint and several liability: recommending it be eliminated 
for those defendants who obtain sufficient insurance coverage.386 
The report prompted the Senate to consider several innovative reform 
380 [d. 
381 See Gima, supra note 370, at A4. 
382 The 1998 legislature did, however, expand immunity in more discrete areas, this time for 
employers giving job references (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-\.95 (2003)) and for hotels whose guests 
used recreational sports equipment (HAW. REV. STAT. § 486K-5.6 (2003)). 
383 The final report and its appendicies are available from the author. 
384 Informational Briefing, Committee on Judiciary & Committee on Commerce & Consumer 
Protection, Hawaii State Senate, 20th Legislature, 1999 Sess., January 27, 1999 (informational briefing to 
allow representatives of the Tort Law Study Group, including the author of this article, to present the 
findings and recommendations contained in the report) (on file with author). 
385 The Tort Law Study Group explicitly adopted a group consensus approach to its deliberations. See 
Tort Law Study Group Report, supra, note 363, Part I, Section A, Report Summary, at 2. Although this 
approach "meant that any proposal had to be accepted by all the various interests represented on the TLSG 
- including business, plaintiffs' counsel, and defendants' counsel," it adopted this approach to "provide[] 
the best foundation for legislative consideration of these highly controversial and important issues." [d. 
386 [d. at 5-6. 
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measures,387 but did not quell the debate over the main tort reform issues, 
including punitive damages. Once again, the House passed a reform package 
but the legislation stalled in the Senate. 388 
Many of the primary rhetorical claims tested by this article's study were 
well articulated in the legislative debate in 1999. The proposal to put punitive 
damages awards in the hands of judges not juries and to limit them to three 
times the compensatory amount was re-introduced as House Bill 2544; again, 
the bill passed the House but died in the Senate.389 The bill asserted: "The 
Legislature finds that in recent years, the number of punitive damages claims 
asserted have increased dramatically.,,390 The effect, according to the bill, was 
"to raise the cost of litigation, undermine confidence in the civil justice 
system, handicap Hawaii's businesses in competition with foreign enterprises, 
and generally increase the cost of doing business in the State.,,391 A bill in the 
House proposed similar limits, but required that one-third of the award would 
go to the State Treasury.392 A Senate version would have limited punitive 
damages to three times the compensatory award but required 100% to be 
given to the State.393 Plaintiffs' lawyers fought back with testimony that 
featured stories of severely injured plaintiffs who had received just and fair 
recoveries under the current tort system.394 
The public testimony presented at the hearings on Senate Bill 2557 is 
indicative of the tenor of the debate over punitive damages and tort reform in 
Hawaii.395 In general, business owners and insurance companies supported 
the bill, while plaintiffs' attorneys and the judiciary396 expressed concern. 
381 As a result of the Tort Law Study Group recommendations, in 1999, the legislature passed 
modifications to Rule 68 to increase the settlement value of the offer of judgment rule. HI. R. CIY. P. 68 
(amendment effective July I, 1999). 
388 Craig Gima, Insurers: Liability findings cOllld increase roles: A Tort Law S/lldy Group Recommends 
Higher Limits on Motor Vehicle Liability. HONOLULU STAR-BuLLETIN, Jan. 27, 1999, at A I. 
389 Re-referral ofH.B. 2544 to Comm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, & Info. Tech., then to the 
Comm. on Judiciary, 19th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1998 Haw. Sen. J. 331, [hereinafter H.B. 2544 Re-Referrafj. 
390 H.R.2544, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. § 17 (Haw. 1998); see also S. 2557, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. (Haw. 
1998). 
391 H.R. 2544, 19th Leg., 1998 Sess. § 17 (Haw. 1998). 
391 H.R. 1695, 20th Leg., 1999 Sess. (Haw. I 999); see also S. 500, 20th Leg., 1999 Sess. (Haw. 1999) 
(companion). 
393 S. 739, 20th Leg., 1999 Sess. (Haw. 1999). 
394 Craig Gima, Attorney Criticizes Cap on Damagesfor Personal Injury. HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, 
Jan. 27, 1999, at A I 0 (citing remarks of Arthur Park, who represented a severely injured boy electrocuted 
by a powerline). 
395 See H.B. 2544 Re-Referral, supra note 389. 
396 The jUdiciary's concerns were three-fold: first, that the proposed obligation of the judiciary to 
deposit one-third of any punitive damages award in the general fund had constitutional infirnlities; second, 
that judges deciding the amount of punitive damages that would then be partially diverted to the state 
general fund might have a conflict of interest; and, third, the scheme would impose an additional 
management burden on the courts. Id. (statement of Michael F. Broderick, Administrative Director of the 
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Proponents of the bill saw punitive damages refonn as a way of "improving 
Hawaii's economic climate and making our state a more attractive place to do 
business.,,397 Murray Towill, then-President of the Hawaii Hotel Association, 
testified that "[p]otential judgments, settlements, and legal costs seriously 
escalate the cost of doing business. ,,398 A real estate broker testified that the 
system was "particularly unfair to small businesses and sole practitioners who 
are defendants in civil cases.,,399 He suggested barring punitive damages 
altogether.4oo An accounting finn business owner testified that the current 
laws "promote frivolous litigation ... add undue liability and discourage 
business in Hawaii, [and] stifle innovation.'.401 
Echoing the national tort refonn rhetoric, Carolyn Fujioka, on behalf of the 
Small Business Council of the Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii, stated that 
"punitive damages should not be routinely included in lawsuits and should not 
be allowed in cases involving ordinary negligence.'.402 She added: 
The threat of large punitive damage awards, even when the injured 
person is largely responsible for [his] own injury, also creates huge 
unknown exposures for businesses. The growth in large punitive 
damage awards points out the increased effort to reach further into 
businesses' "deep pockets." . .. Recently, plaintiffs' attorneys are 
demanding punitive damages for even slight misconduct by a 
defendant. Businesses are sometimes forced to settle a case they know 
they should win because they fear the possibility of a runaway verdict 
that could put them out of business. Business has to pass these types of 
costs on to consumers, so we all end up paying more because of 
excessive punitive awards and settlements.403 
Regardless of the lack of supporting data, Fujioka's arguments captured the 
views of many in Hawaii's business community and this strong perception of 
a burden on Hawaii's economy obviously troubled the Legislators. 
Yet, according to the plaintiffs' bar, "there [was] no rash of punitive 
damages awards which have caused a negative impact on Hawaii's 
Courts and Clyde Namuo, Deputy Administrative Director of the Courts). 
397 Id. (statement of Carolyn Fujioka, testifying on behalf of the Small Business Council of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii). 
398 Id. (statement of Murray Towill, President of the Hawaii Hotel Association). 
399 Id. (statement ofC. Scott Bradley, Managing Director, Coldwell Banker Pacific Properties). 
400 Id. (''The award to the defendant should be limited to their actual damages."). 
401 Id. (statement of Howard Kam, Managing Director, Horwith, Kam & Co.). 
402 Id. (statement of C. Fujioka). 
403 Id. 
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businesses.'.404 The testimony of Gary Galiher, the state's leading asbestos 
plaintiffs' attorney, appealed to local interests: 
According to the information in the compilation of personal injury 
judgments, the largest awards of punitive damages were in cases 
involving multi-national manufacturers.405 By limiting the largest 
awards of punitive damages against the multi-national manufacturers, 
money which would otherwise properly go to Hawaii's victims or their 
family would simply remain as a windfall to the foreign corporations.406 
Galiher asserted that the push for changes in tort law had been based on 
insufficient, incorrect, misleading or inappropriate data. He concluded: 
Hawaii has one of the most stringent requirements for awarding 
punitive damages in the United States. Before punitive damages can be 
awarded, the victim must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant acted maliciously, wantonly, or with criminal 
indifference toward the victim. The judiciary provides the proper 
gatekeeping device as well as the appropriate control on the award of 
punitive damages when they are truly called for. The legislature should 
have confidence in the civil jury system, especially when there is no 
evidence that jury awards in Hawaii are disproportionately large when 
compared with the injuries suffered by our residents.407 
The arguments ofGaliher and the other members of the plaintiffs' bar proved 
persuasive to the State Legislature. 
Ultimately, the punitive damages proposals of 1999 failed. A significant 
tort reform bill did pass the Senate and House, only to be substantially 
watered down in Conference Committee.408 Conscious that the Tort Law 
Study Group did not recommend "sweeping changes to the present theories of 
liability and recovery," the Conference Committee proposed a variety of 
404 Id. (statement of Gary O. Galiher, attorney). 
40l Galiher was, most likely, referring to the 1998 Masakijudgment against GM Motors and the 1993 
Tabieros case (see Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1292-93 (1997)(background on facts 
ofthe case). His statement that this type of case generated the highest average punitive damages awards is 
correct (see infra Part IV C 5 and Part IV C 7 (discussing Category 7 cases), the latter section showing a 
mean award for this category of cases of$5.651 million. However, adding strength to his argument, these 
are the only two such cases since 1985 involving "multi-national manufacturers" and both awards were 
reversed on appeal. See infra notes 445 & 535 and accompanying text. 
406 H.B. 2544 Re-Referral. supra note 389 (statement ofGaliher). 
407 Id. 
408 Conf. Comm. 20-39, 1999 Sess. at 1-2 (Haw. 1999) (on file with author). 
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minor modifications to the tort law system,409 but did not recommend any 
major changes or address punitive damages.4lo Proponents of legislative tort 
reform who had tried year after year to push a variety of measures through the 
legislature to no avail were exhausted and frustrated.411 Senator Randy Iwase, 
who futilely championed tort reform during the 1999 session, summarized the 
situation: "I'm mad as hell:"412 
The 2000 session was relatively quiet compared to 1999.413 Once again, 
tort reform advocates were disappointed. Small businesses were left out of 
reform because, according to Representative Ed Case, "[t]here is too much 
. fi hI' 'N";'b ,,414 resIstance rom t e p amtlus ar. 
In 2001, several of the previously rejected bills on punitive damages were 
once again introduced in the House and Senate.4lS Premised on the now 
409 Id. at 1-3 (attaching S. 186, 20th Leg., 1999 Sess. (Haw. 1999». The reforms included: 
codification of the Hawaii Supreme Court's 1999 Francis decision that barred tort damages for breach of 
contact cases, see supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text; new rules on third-party practice; modified 
rules on attorneys fees and costs for frivolous cases; the abolition of joint and several liability for design 
professionals and certified public accountants in actions not involving physical injury or death. Id. at 2-3. 
410 The legislature continued, through other bills, to create only discrete new liabilities and immunities, 
passing new civil liability for "prostitution coercion" (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663J-3(2003»; expanded 
immunity for individuals who administered defibrillation treatment in emergencies (HAW. REV. STAT. § 
663-1.5 (2003»; and immunity for Y2K bugs (HAW. REV. STAT. Chapter 663M (repealed 2003». 
411 During the 1998 Legislative Session, the small business caucus introduced 24 business-related bills 
"only four made it to committee hearings, and not one became law." Malia Zimmerman, Caucus Pushing 
Small Business, PAC. Bus. NEWS (Jan. 29, 1999), available at http://www.bizjoumals.comlpacifidstories· 
II 999/02/0 IIstory I.html (last accessed June 20, 2004). 
412 Senator Randy Iwase, Taking Issue, PAC. Bus. NEWS (May 14, 1999), available at 1999 WL 
800090322. One bill during the 1999 session, S.B. 186 (which passed the House), would have 
"discouraged frivolous lawsuits." Senator Norman Sakamoto, Good Business Inventions Weakened in 
Legislative Session, PAC. Bus. NEWS (May 14, 1999), available at 1999 WL 8090326 (noting that "bills 
addressing fundamental issues like tax reduction, tort reform, and restructuring civil service were watered 
down" during the session). Tort reform was one of eight issues on the agenda of small business advocates 
during the 1999 session. Malia Zimmerman, Small Business Caucus Bills Surviving Late Into Session, PAC. 
Bus. NEWS (April 9, 1999), available at http://pacific.bizjournals.comlpacifidstorieslI999-
104/12/story4.html (last accessed June 20, 2004). 
4\3 County lifeguard services immunity passed but was vetoed. S. 2001, 20th Leg., 2000 Sess. (Haw. 
2000) (deferred, then passed during the 2002 session as S. 796, 21 st Leg., 2002 Sess. (Haw. 2002) 
extending repeal date to 2007). In 2000, the legislature also expanded the 1986 immunity for blood 
drawers to drug and urine testers (HAW. REV. STAT § 663-1.9 (2002». 
414 Malia Zimmerman. Issues & Answers: It's A Spanking·New Millenium. But Will It Be the Same Old 
Story at the Legislature?, PAC. Bus. NEWS (Jan. 14, 2000) available at 
http://pacific.bizjoumals.comlpacific-/storiesl2000/01117/story5.html(last accessed June 20, 2004 ) (quoting 
Representative Ed Case). See also Malia Zimmerman, Small-Business Group Targets Legislative Goals, 
PAC. Bus. NEWS (Nov. 29, 1999), available at 
http://pacific.bizjoumals.comlpacific/storieslI999111129/story5.html (last accessed June 20, 2004) 
(discussing the lobbying plans on tort reform by local members of the National Federation oflndependent 
. Businesses). 
4IS Many other tort reform measures, particularly request for special interest immunity, also failed as 
well. See. e.g .. H.R. 1248, 21st Leg., 2001 Sess. (Haw. 2001), limiting county liability for personal injuries 
or death resulting from hazardous recreational activities; H.R. 1524, 21st Leg., 2001 Sess. (Haw. 2001), 
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familiar assertion that "in recent years, the number of punitive damages 
claims asserted have increased dramatically," H.B. 150 again proposed a 
formula oflimiting punitive damages to three times compensatory damages, 
allowing only the judge to determine the amount, and requiring one-third be 
paid to the State.416 With the identical prefatory statement alleging claims had 
increased, S.B. 572 took a similar approach by limiting punitive damages to 
three times compensatory damages, but requiring 100% of any award to be 
turned over to the State.417 H.B. 1029 echoed pending congressional 
legislation418 and took a more comprehensive approach, seeking to: 1) limit' 
punitive damages only to cases where a compensatory award was made; 2) 
require courts to use a clear and convincing standard; 3) allow punitive 
damages only for reckless or intentional torts; 4) require only the judge to 
determine the amount, based on four guidelines: reasonable relationship to the 
harm, reprehensibility, profit from the conduct, and defendant's financial 
condition; 5) limit the amount of recovery to $250,000 or the compensatory 
amount, whichever is greater; and 6) only award punitive damages that 
duplicate awards in other cases if new and substantial evidence justifies an 
additional award.419 These proposals, too, failed. 
In the 2002 session, the legislature considered but did not pass several new 
tort reform bills, ignoring punitive damages altogether.420 
The Legislature's 2003 session was similarly uneventful for tort reform, 
despite a historic shift in state politics. Although the Democrats still 
controlled both the House and Senate, for the first time in 60 years, Hawaii 
elected a Republican Governor, former Maui Mayor Linda Lingle, who ran on 
a business-friendly "new beginning" platform.421 A recycled set of bills that 
would limit punitive damages was introduced, but fared no better.422 
limiting state and county liability for use of beaches and hiking trails. 
416 H.R. 150, 21st Leg., 2001 Sess. (Haw. 2001). 
417 S. 572, 21st Leg., 2001 Sess. (Haw. 2001). 
418 See supra note 8. 
419 H.R. 1029, 21st Leg., 2001 Sess. (Haw. 2001). 
420 H.R. 2201, 21st Leg., 2002 Sess. (Haw. 2002) would have required payment of any tort awards 
based on a defendant's criminal act to go to either the victim or to the State's victim compensation fund; S. 
2700, 21st Leg., 2002 Sess. (Haw. 2002) would have capped all general damage awards against the State at 
$500,000; and S. 2016, 21st Leg., 2002 Sess. (Haw. 2002) would have enacted immunity for schools from 
school ground accidents. The legislature passed only the county lifeguard immunity bill originally 
considered in 2000 (Act 170, S. 796, 21 st Leg., 2002 Sess. (Haw. 2002». 
421 Richard Borreca, The Leader of the State, HONOLULU STAR·BuLLETlN, Dec. 2, 2002 (Special 
Inauguration Pullout) available at http://starbulletin.coml2002/12/02/newslstoryI3.html(last accessed June 
20, 2004); Government Alone Can't Do the Job, PAC. BuS. NEWS (Nov. II, 2002), available at 
www.bizjoumals.comlpacific/storiesl20021l1l1Ileditoriall.html(last accessed June 20, 2004) (noting 
Lingle's "widespread business support" and agenda for economic development). 
422 See, e.g., H.R. 971, 22d Leg. (Haw. 2003)(limiting punitive damages as part of an overall cap on 
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In addition to its longevity, a distinguishing feature of the legislative 
debate about punitive damages reform in Hawaii is that the rhetoric remains 
unchanged. For example, in S.B. 328, introduced in 2003, the sponsors again 
repeated their mantra that punitive damages in Hawaii were out of control: 
"The legislature finds that in recent years the number of punitive damages 
claims asserted have increased dramatically.,,423 The unchanging legislative 
polemic and the evident frustration among all of the political players 
demonstrates the pressing need for closer review of empirical information on 
punitive damages verdicts in Hawaii, which should provide a sounder context 
for future legislative consideration of any reform proposals. 
In summary, the legislature's perception of the state of affairs of punitive 
damages, as expressed in the continuous stream of tort reform proposals since 
1986, reflects several core legislative (and popular) beliefs, which are 
examined in this empirical study: 1) "punitive damages are increasing 
dramatically in recent years," in frequency and amount; 2) they are 
handicapping Hawaii businesses (which assumes they are excessively 
imposed on this type of defendant); and 3) they are routinely requested and 
allowed in ordinary negligence cases. In addition, the various legislative bills 
suggest some key reform proposals that can be examined in light of the 
empirical data: 1) a ratio cap on punitive damages of either two times or three 
times the compensatory award; 2) a flat cap of $250,000; 3) an allocation of 
part or all of the awards to a state fund; 4) an elimination of the jury's role in 
awarding punitive damages; and 5) an allowance of punitive damages only in 
"reckless or intentional tort" cases. These hypotheses and reform proposals 
are discussed below as reference points for analyzing the data in Part IV. 
IV. THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF HAWAII 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENTS, 1985-2001 
This Part examines the quantitative data derived from seventeen years of 
experience in Hawaii with punitive damages judgments in three judicial 
systems: the State courts, the State Court-Annexed Arbitration Program 
("CAAP"), and the Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii. Viewing 
the total of sixty-three punitive damages judgments in this period in the 
damages in employment discrimination cases); S. 421, 22d Leg. (Haw. 2003) (imposing a variety of 
limitations on punitive damages for medical torts); S. 407, 22d Leg. (Haw. 2003) (capping punitive 
damages at $375,000); S. 328, 22d Leg. (Haw. 2003) {capping punitive damages at three times the 
compensatory award and allocating all such awards to the State}. 
423 Compare S.B. 328, Part IV, § 10, 22d Leg., 2003 Sess. (Haw. 2003) with H.R. 2544, § 17, 19th 
Leg., § 17, 1998 Sess. (Haw. 1998). 
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context of the 2,250 total tort judgments reported provides rich data for 
examining some of the concerns expressed by proponents of tort refonn; these 
concerns include the alleged excess in the frequency of requests for, and 
awards of, punitive damages. It also allows an analysis of the potential 
effectiveness of various refonn proposals, including caps on awards and 
allocation (state fund) proposals, and the relative role of the different types of 
fact-finders.424 Overall, the data indicate that some of the most commonly 
held beliefs about punitive damages awards in Hawaii-and the rhetoric 
driving the constant pressure on the State Legislature to "do something" about 
punitive damages-are incorrect or exaggerated. The data also indicate that 
some of the most popular refonn proposals, such as a multiplier cap and the 
elimination of the jury's role in detennining awards, may have little practical 
effect on the Hawaii punitive damages system. Although there may be other 
justifications for refonn, such as public policy or political advantage with the 
business sector, the rhetoric and the reality appear to be far apart on many of 
the key issues in the punitive damages polemic in Hawaii. 
A. The Importance of Being Empirical 
In his insightful 1999 Pepperdine Law Review article, "The Importance of 
Being Empirical," Professor Michael Heise discusses the value of, and 
impediments to, quality empirical legal scholarship.425 Joining the ranks of 
diverse legal scholars such as Richard Posner, Derek Bok, Peter Schuck, and 
Lawrence Friedman,426 Heise argues that "too little legal scholarship is 
empirical,,,427 even though the demand for empirical scholarship is strong.428 
He notes that some commentators believe that "an increase in empirical legal 
424 This Part uses quantitative data to examine most of the common legislative beliefs and 
proposals for refonn mentioned at the end of Part III, supra. Other claims, such as that punitive 
damages handicap Hawaii businesses and therefore should be allowed only in "reckless or intentional 
tort" cases, are not subject to quantitative analysis, and are therefore examined in Part V, the qualitative 
analysis of the reported judgments. 
425 Heise, supra note 3. Heise defines empirical legal scholarship as scholarship that "uses statistical 
techniques and analyses, [1 studies that employ data (including systematically coded judicial opinions) that 
facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a larger sample or population as well as replication by other 
scholars." Id. at 810. 
426 Id. at 811 n.16 (citing Peter H. Schuck, Why Don 'I Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 324 (1989), and noting proponents of the "long and distinguished pedigree" of 
empirical scholarship, including Justice Holmes, Roscoe Pound, Charles Clark, William O. Douglas, and 
Underhill Moore). 
427 Heise, supra note 3, at 812. 
428 Id. (citing Craig A. Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between Ihe 
Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 362 tbl.l (1995», For a broad discussion of the 
role of research in legal scholarship, see STUART S. NAGEL & LISA A. BIEVENUE, SOCIAL SCIENCE, LAW, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (University Press of America 1992). 
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scholarship will help ease the growing rift separating legal scholarship from 
the legal profession, .. 429 and that "[t]he legal academy, if it was so inclined, 
could become even more relevant to the judiciary and Bar by producing more 
empirical research.'.430 Rather than detracting from theoretical scholarship, a 
more solid empirical foundation would enhance "legal theory's 
persuasiveness and influence.'.431 
Yet, there are numerous obstacles to empirical scholarship in the legal 
academy, including that "the prospect of external empirical checks on one's 
work fuels a certain level of humility that is sometimes absent in non-
empirical work.'.432 Heise concludes, nonetheless, that "[o]ur legal literature 
would be enriched if more academics, particularly law professors, became 
more engaged in empirical legal research and produced more of it. ,.433 
Heise's observations are particularly intriguing in the context of the 
current debate over punitive damages. Given the breadth, diversity, and depth 
of the empirical scholarship that has been produced in this area of tort law, 
one might wonder why there there still seems to be such a large gap between 
the academy and the popular debate. One answer is not to avoid the 
traditional quantitative approaches of empirical scholarship but rather to make 
them more relevant by enrichening them with complementary non-
quantitative techniques. 
B. Methodology 
The trends in empirical legal scholarship divide into three distinct 
categories: judicial opinion coding or case content analysis,434 descriptive,435 
429 Heise, supra note 3, at 813. He also suggests that empirical legal scholarship can "shore up" the 
"intellectual stature and reputation" of the legal academy "among the broader community of 
[interdisciplinary] scholars." [d. at 815. 
430 [d. at 813. 
43. [d. 
432 [d. at 818. Heise notes that the "incentive structure" for law professors is "largely skewed against 
empirical research and thereby disinclines rational law professors from pursuing it." [d. at 815-16. 
Institutional obstacles include: the need for access to specialized data, computer systems, and software; 
that law libraries do not cater to this type of research; and other "structural barriers," id. at 816; lack of 
training in empirical methods, id. at 817; the norms of legal scholarship that do not encourage 
collaboration, id.; physical isolation, id. at 817-18; relative lack of prestige of empirical work compared to 
theory, id. at 819-20; the lack of internal institutional incentives, id. at 820-21; the peculiar uncertainty of 
empirical work ("[r]esearchers frequently do not know what the data might say until after the data have 
been gathered, coded, and analyzed"), id. at 821; and lack of external institutional incentives, id. at 822. 
433 [d. at 834. Heise's own substantial contributions to empirical legal scholarship are noted in his 
article, id. at 811 n.16. 
434 [d. at 825 (noting the limitations on the usefulness of coding reported judicial decisions, which 
represent "a narrow slice of our judicial system that mayor may not closely resemble the entire legal 
universe"). 
435 Heise includes here empirical work that includes "means, medians, modes, rates, proportions, and 
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and inferentia1.436 This study uses the first two approaches, sorting verdicts 
into analytical categories and working with a universe rather than a sample of 
judgments. Because the entire population of data, rather than merely a subset, 
is available, a descriptive rather than an inferential approach is appropriate.437 
To guard against over-interpretation, this study primarily uses relatively 
straightforward descriptive indicators such as means, medians, and 
frequencies, rather than the more complex social science research methods 
suited for large sets of randomly sampled data.438 
I. The Universe of Data: Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii Reporter 
The database for this study consisted of a total of 2,250 personal injury 
judgments reported over a seventeen-year period in Neal Seamon's Personal 
Injury Judgments Hawaii ("PIJH,).439 PIJH contains all final judgments in 
personal injury and related tort actions filed in the state circuit court and the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, except for class action cases, 
asbestos, and toxic tort cases.440 
Beginning in 1987, when Hawaii adopted the mandatory Court-Annexed 
frequency counts," which both "possess intrinsic value for the information" conveyed and are also 
"beneficial" because they "contribute to an empirical foundation upon which further, frequently even more 
sophisticated, empirical work can build." Id. at 826-27. See also NOREEN L. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE 
METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS I, 182 (Rownan & Allanheld 1985) ("Descriptive statistics are used to 
(I) assess the data for their adequacy and potential usefulness, (2) present information about the data in a 
manner that is substantially better than anecdotes or general impressions, and (3) lay the groundwork for 
comparisons, inferences and hypothesis testing."). 
4)6 Heise, supra note 3, at 827-28. Inferential empirical scholarship includes "studies that use statistics 
inferentially," that is, advance generalizations based on a sample of cases or population of subjects. Id. 
With appropriate methodology (particularly a random, non-biased sample), this approach can be powerful. 
Id. at 827-28 n.132 (citing Eisenberg's punitive damages study, Predictability. supra note 44). 
4)7 CHANNELS, supra note 435, at 183. 
4)8 For a classic text on the wide variety of social science research methodologies, see H. RUSSELL 
BERNARD, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ApPROACHES (Sage 
Publications 2000). 
4)9 Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii ("PUff') is a member of the National Association of State Jury 
Verdict Publishers ("NASJVP"). See Jury Verdict Summaries. available at http://www.juryverdicts.com 
(last accessed June 20, 2004). NASJVP is a national organization of thirty-four publishers of jury verdict 
summaries. The publishers collect detailed information directly from the attorneys who tried the cases, 
write concise summaries, and publish them in periodic reports. Id. In Hawaii, the reporter system is 
primarily used by tort law attorneys and insurers for case evaluation. PUH began reporting verdicts in 
1969, Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii, at http://www.juryverdicts.coml999973/about.html(last accessed 
June 20, 2004), but did not start a regular published service until in 1985. Interview by Tracy Fujimoto 
with Neil Seamon, Editor, PUH, Honolulu, Hawaii (July 21, 1999). PUH Editor Neal Seamon is a licensed 
independent insurance adjustor and former law office manager. Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii, 
available at http://www.juryverdicts.coml999973/about.html(last visited Apr. 17,2004) (last accessed June 
20,2004). 
440 PIJH Instructions (on file with author). 
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Arbitration Program ("CAAP") for tort cases valued at $150,000 or less,441 
PIJH also began reporting the results from CAAP arbitrations when awards 
were filed as final judgments with, or appealed to, the circuit court.442 The 
scope of cases included in PIJH generally is extensive: negligence, premises 
liability, product liability, strict liability, false arrest/false imprisonment, 
defamation (libel and slander), invasion of privacy, negligent/intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, animal owner's liability, innkeeper's liability, 
wrongful termination, constructive discharge, discrimination, malicious 
prosecution, malpractice, wrongful death and birth, wave action, golf carts, 
slip and fall, government and municipal liability, and Federal Tort Claims Act 
cases are all included.443 Types of cases not· included in PIJH include 
property damage cases444 (unless there is a related personal injury claim), and 
some business damage cases. As a result, the study may over-emphasize 
personal injury cases compared to the business dispute context in which 
punitive damages are also often sought by one business against another. For 
each reported judgment, PIJH includes a variety of information.445 
Information about the results of any appeals is not routinely included in the 
verdict sheets; thus, the judgments reported are final as to the trial court, but 
may not have withstood appeal. 446 If a case is appealed and remanded, 
however, PIJH includes the results of the remanded trial, if any, and 
441 See supra Part III B (discussing CAAP program). The State Judiciary initiated CAAP in 1986 and 
the Legislature adopted it statewide effective in 1987. Id. 
442 Interview with Neil Seamon, supra note 439. 
443 Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii. available at http://www.juryverdicts.coml999973/sub.html. 
444 See. e.g .. Kawamata Farms case, discussed supra note 78 (involving $14 million punitive damages 
award for crop damage from defective Dupont product). 
445 The infonnation includes: court; civil number; judge/arbitrator; jury or jury-waived; date of 
judgment; caption; narrative description of the causes of action and summary of the case; the attorneys 
representing the plaintifT(s) and defendant(s); date of filing of the complaint; plaintiff's prayer; plaintiff's 
age, sex, occupation, and marital status; description of alleged injuries; whether the spouse or dependents 
claimed loss of consortium; breakdown of special damages request; plaintiff's last demand; defendant's last 
offer; plaintiff's and defendant's experts; number of trial days and whether the trial was bifurcated; award 
of prejudgment interest; filing of offer of judgment; the verdict/judgment by jury and/or judge, including a 
breakdown of general, special, and punitive damages; and, post-verdict motions and results. See Appendix 
A for sample verdict sheet. 
... Because appellate cases are generally reported by the Hawaii Supreme Court and the Intennediate 
Court of Appeals, see supra Part II, discussing Hawaii case law on punitive damages awards, the reporters 
tend to pick up the largest and more important trial court judgments that are appealed. For example, the 
only two reported products liability awards in the study, Masaki and Tabieros, as well as the only major 
medical malpractice award, Ditto, were all addressed extensively by the Hawaii appellate courts and 
ultimately all three large awards were reversed and remanded. Masaki, 780 P.2d at 566 (reversing and 
remanding punitive damages award); Tabieros v. Diaz, 827 P.2d 1148 (Haw. 1992) (reversing trial court's 
directed verdict for Clark on punitive damages); Tabieros v. Clark, 944 P.2d at 1279 (reversing retrial and 
ordering third trial of judgment against Clark); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d at 959-61 (Haw. 1997) 
(vacating and remanding punitive damages award); Ditto v. McCurdy, 44 P.3d 274, 275 (Haw. 2002) 
(vacating and remanding retrial of punitive damages award). 
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references the earlier (or later) related case. 
Using a verdict reporter system to generate a reliable data set is both 
immensely valuable and fraught with challenges.447 It is important, therefore, 
to understand how the reporter obtains its information. PIJH's sole editor and 
publisher, Neal Seamon, personally reviews the judgment books in the U.S. 
District Court and the State Circuit Courts each month.448 Seamon also 
attempts to interview the attorneys involved with the cases. Subscribers to 
PIJH are predominantly the defense and plaintiffs' bars and insurance 
companies in Hawaii, 449 suggesting that PIJH is viewed as a reliable, neutral 
source of information. 
2. Coding 
This study used seven steps in preparing the data for the quantitative 
analysis presented in this Part. First, all loose-leaf volumes of PIJH from 
1985 to 200 I were hand-checked for completeness and accuracy.450 Second, 
all judgment sheets were coded by decision-maker: state circuit court, federal 
district court, or (post-l 986) CAAP. Third, judgment sheets were then coded 
by prevailing party: judgment for plaintiff or judgment for defendant. This 
coding was not perfect; in a handful of cases, both parties prevailed on some 
issues (e.g., defendant prevailed on a counterclaim) or the court overturned 
the jury verdict; in such cases, the judge's judgment rather than the jury 
verdict was coded. Fourth, the verdict sheets were then examined for whether 
the plaintiff made a request for punitive damages. Only in a few cases in 
447 In one recent study, however, a verdict reporter maintained by single individual for Franklin 
County, Ohio, was found to be more comprehensive and less biased than a computerized LEXIS database 
of jury verdicts. Merritt & Barry, supra note 47, at 323-25. The authors further suggest the "reliability of 
the commercial [verdict) reporting services is not improving with time; on the contrary, it may be 
declining." Id. at 326; see also id. at 326 n.47 (noting that numerous other authors have "questioned the 
reliability of commercial verdict reporters"). They found a bias toward the plaintiffs in verdicts reported by 
the commercial services. Id. at 325. Ultimately, they rejected use of the computerized database other than 
for double-checking the individual's reporter system. Id. at 326. 
448 According to Seamon, Hawaii's Third Circuit does not maintain ajudgment book, so subscribers 
are asked to report judgments directly to him. He obtains the CAAP information directly from the CAAP 
program. Interview with Seamon, supra note 439. 
449 Id. 
450 Because PIJH is issued as a loose-leaf monthly, there are a number of challenges in ensuring a 
comprehensive set of data, including correcting the problems created by: I) dates of judgment that did not 
correspond to the dates of the bi-annual volumes (because of lag time in writing and publishing each 
judgment sheet); 2) revised judgment sheets issued in subsequent volumes; 3) judgment sheets from two 
different sets of volumes revealed numerous discrepancies from filing errors; and 4) a small number of 
miscellaneous errors found in the information on the judgment sheets. Nonetheless, the author wishes to 
emphasize that PIJH provided an impressively comprehensive and accurate set of data. Particularly given 
that the service is a one-man labor of love that necessarily involves the challenges of interviewing busy 
court administrators and reluctant or difficult-to-reach lawyers, the author sincerely appreciates Neal 
Seamon's heroic efforts in publishing this invaluable reporter. 
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which punitive damages were awarded did the verdict sheets not indicate a 
request for punitive damages; these were coded as requests based on the 
assumption that the verdict sheet erred or that a request was made at some 
later point in the case. Fifth, for those verdicts in which a request for punitive 
damages was made, the cases in which punitive damages were awarded were 
isolated. Sixth, for those verdicts that included punitive damages, the award 
was coded for at least three factors: 1) the size of the punitive damages 
award; 2) the size of the punitive damages award· compared to the 
compensatory award; and 3) the ratio of the compensatory award to the 
punitive damages award. Seventh, for each year of the study, the following 
issues were analyzed for all judgments reported that year: 1) the total dollar 
amount of the awards; 2) the mean of all awards; and 3) the median of all 
awards. 
3. Charting 
After coding the judgment sheets, a series of charts was prepared to probe 
whether the specific claims often made by proponents of tort reform in Hawaii 
were supported by the data. One goal of the study was to make the 
presentation of data transparent and readily verifiable. Accordingly, raw and 
summary data are presented as clearly as possible in the charts. The back-up 
data are accessible through the author's web site, and PIJH may be obtained 
by contacting the author, the University of Hawaii Law School Library, or the 
Hawaii Supreme Court law library. 
4. Limitations of the Data 
All data sets have inherent limitations for purposes of interpretation. For 
the PIJH reports, perhaps the two most notable limitations are the lack of 
reports before 1985 and the exclusion of certain categories of tort cases that 
are often significant in a punitive damages study (e.g., non-personal injury 
cases, such as property damage, business-to-business torts, and class actions 
such as asbestos and toxic tort cases). Less important limitations of the data 
include the potential error rate associated with any reporter system that relies 
on elbow grease rather than a computerized tracking system.451 None ofthese 
limitations is unique to Hawaii or significant. Even short of perfection, the 
factually rich data set of 2,250 personal injury judgments provides a 
significant wealth of consistently and neutrally collected data to support 
451 But see Merritt & Barry, supra note 47, at 323-24 (discussing the view of some researchers that the 
hand-created verdict reporters are significantly more accurate and complete than the computer databases 
now available). 
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useful analysis and, in some ways, may be more comprehensive than data yet 
presented for other states. 
The relatively small number of tort cases and punitive damages judgments 
in Hawaii compared to other states is not considered a limitation of the data. 
Because the study presents the universe of data and not a sample or subset, 
there is no risk that it is not representative. The relatively small number of 
punitive damages judgments does mean, however, that predicting future 
trends in Hawaii is very tricky business. For that reason, this study focuses on 
the information provided by existing data and their relationship to each other. 
Where relevant, trendlines using regression analysis were applied to the data, 
even though the R2 was usually too low to provide any predictive confidence. 
The trends data is, at best, only suggestive. 
Another inherent limitation of longitudinal empirical work is that the 
researcher is always running to catch up with current data, making such 
studies extremely time intensive and, frustratingly, never complete.452 Thus, 
although the likelihood of a substantial investment by state judiciaries in the 
collection of more rapidly accessible data is low, this study nevertheless joins 
others in calling for "an ongoing process of data collection and analysis.'.453 
Otherwise, the data will always inherently lag behind the debate. 
Two other limitations are important to mention, although they are limits to 
the analysis and not the data per se. One is that these judgments are a "final 
snapshot" of trial results at the circuit court level and, unless the case is later 
remanded and fully retried, PIJH does not include the results of any appellate 
review. Because the study looks at judgments, not just verdicts or awards, the 
data do capture review of the jury awards by the trial court judge, such a 
remittitur. For punitive damages, however, appellate review often leads to 
substantial reductions in trial awards and, combined with problems of 
defaulting or recalcitrant defendants, and post-judgment settlements, this 
means that "plaintiffs rarely receiver] the amount awarded by the jury.,,454 
Thus, if anything, the trial court judgments data would tend to overestimate 
the actual imposition on, and pay-out by, defendants of punitive damages 
452 Eaton et aI., supra note 47, at 691-92 (Eaton explained after concluding his first study of Georgia 
tort verdicts: "Studies such as ours, and even the more ambitious studies conducted by Rand, the 8JS, and 
the NCSC, cannot provide all the needed infonnation. These studies are after the fact, time consuming, 
expensive to conduct, and have an inherently short useful life. Policymakers in 1997 will ask 'what is 
happening now,' not 'what happened in 1993 .... ). 
453 [d. 
454 Robbennolt, supra note 56, at 165 & nn. 287-92 (sources cited therein). Peterson, Sanna, and 
Shanley found that punitive damages awards Were reduced post-trial in approximately one-halfofthe cases 
examined and that, overall, defendants ultimately paid approximately 50% of the total damages that were 
awarded. Moreover, they found reductions were more likely in cases with higher total awards, higher 
punitive damages, and higher punitive to compensatory damages ratios. /d. at 165-66. 
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awards. 
It is particularly important to remember that reported judgments from cases 
that reached trial are a small subset (about 2.7%) of the total number of tort 
cases filed each year and may not be representative of all filed tort cases.455 
Final judgments also do not reflect either party's pre-judgment victory on 
important legal or factual issues. The infamous "shadow effect" of punitive 
damages, that is, the impact of the potential of an award on the pre-trial (and 
even pre-filing) settlement process, perceived to have a disproportionately 
threatening impact on defendants by some tort reform advocates,456 also 
cannot be discerned from this data. By not examining the shadow effect, this 
study may underestimate the real-world impact on defendants of the punitive 
damages awards that are reported. 
c. Quantitative Analysis 
The national empirical studies of punitive damages awards have primarily 
examined the frequency and size of punitive damages awards, and sometimes 
also the ratio of such awards to the compensatory awards. To the extent 
possible, comparison of the Hawaii data to these national studies is presented 
below, but because studies often vary in the way they present their data (e.g., 
the "rate" of punitive damages award can be among all tort cases filed, among 
all tort verdicts, among all tort verdicts in which plaintiffs requested punitive 
damages, among all tort verdicts in which plaintiffs prevailed, or among all 
tort verdicts in certain categories), straightforward comparisons are not 
always possible. 
1. Skyrocketing Numbers? Frequency of Punitive Damages Judgments 
Compared to All Tort Judgments 
Perhaps the most commonly heard criticism of punitive damages in Hawaii 
and across the United States is that the number of punitive damages awards is 
"skyrocketing.,,457 The study therefore examined the frequency of such 
judgments over the seventeen-year period by comparing the number of 
punitive damages judgments to the total number of tort judgments reported in 
PIJH for the three fora: state circuit court, CAAP, and federal court. 
455 See infra State Chart 15 (showing differential between annual tort filings and tort judgments) and 
Trends Chart 4 (showing types of dismissals of tort cases between 1983/84 and 1999/00: 80% by 
stipulation (settlement), 12.74% by notice, 4.4% by judges (motions), 1.76% by jury verdict, and .97% by 
nonjury verdict). 
456 Koenig, Shadow Effect, supra note 45. 
457 See supra Introduction (discussing the rhetoric of tort reform). 
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a. State Circuit Court Judgments 
As indicated in State Chart 1, the annual number of tort judgments from 
1985 to 2001 in the Hawaii State Circuit Courts has fluctuated from a high of 
70 (in 1985, before the commencement of the diversionary CAAP system in 
1986), to a low of 19 in the last year studied, 2001, with a total of700, a mean 
of 41.18, and median of 37. The annual number of punitive damages 
judgments over the same period ranged from a high of eight (in 1988) to lows 
of zero (1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, and 2000), with a total of 39, an annual 
mean of 2.29, and an annual median of 2. The trend in the number of awards 
for the past seventeen years appears to be slightly downward (R2=.349) (State 
Chart 1). 
Translated into percentages (State Chart 2), the percentage of cases in 
which state courts entered punitive damages judgments compared to the cases 
in which courts entered torts judgments over the seventeen-year period 
fluctuated from a high of21.62% in 1988 (8/37 judgments), to lows of 1989, 
1991,1994,1995, and 2000. 
The mean of the annual rates was 5.29%,458 with a median of5.26%. Thus, 
since 1985, Hawaii state courts have, on average, enteredjudgments including 
punitive damages awards in slightly more than 5% of the total tort judgments 
reported every year. The general trend over time appears to be distinctly 
downward (R2= .127) (State Chart 2). 
b. CAAPAwards 
The State of Hawaii CAAP system became effective in early 1987,459 and 
quickly had a significant impact on the tort case load of the Hawaii Circuit 
Courts. As indicated in State Chart 1, the number of tort judgments in Hawaii 
state courts plummeted between 1985 and 1989 (the end of the second year of 
CAAP) from 70 to 26, a 63% drop. Conversely, as illustrated in CAAP Chart 
1, the total number of CAAP awards reported in PIJH from 1987-2001 
rapidly increased from the program's inception in 1987 with 28 cases to a 
high of 130 in 1995 (compared to a state court high that same year of37, and 
the state court's all-time high of 70) to a low of 60 in 1999. The past three 
years of CAAP data indicate annual levels of awards comparable to the first 
458 The "mean of the annual rates" for the study data was calculated by summing the annual 
percentages and dividing by 17 years for State cases and 15 years for CAAP. The "overall mean rate" was 
calculated as the total value divided by the study period. For example, for State Chart 2, the mean annual 
rate is 5.29%, but the overall mean rate is 5.57% (representing the total number of punitive damages 
judgments (39) divided by the 17-year total of tort judgments (700 cases». In general, the fonner statistic 
is more infonnative and is, therefore, used, unless otherwise indicated. 
459 See supra note 309 (noting CAAP became effective in the First Circuit, which includes all of 
Honolulu, in February 1987). 
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three years of the program (for 1999-2001, the number of awards reported 
annually were 60, 71, and 76; for 1988-1990, the awards reported were 65, 
80, and 62). Overall, a total of 1328 CAAP awards were reported for the 
period studied, an annual mean of88.5346o and a (fifteen-year) median of98. 
The overall trend in CAAP awards is slightly upward over time (R2:=.071) 
(CAAP Chart 1). 
The number of CAAP punitive damages awards over the same period 
ranged from an annual high of3 to lows of 0 in four years (1987, 1990, 1993, 
and 1998), with a fifteen-year total of 17, an annual mean of 1.13, and an 
annual median of 1. The trend was slightly downward over time (R2=.037) 
(CAAP Chart 1). 
Translated into percentages (CAAP Chart 2), the percentage of awards in 
which non-judicial arbitrators included punitive damages compared to all 
CAAP awards over the fifteen-year period fluctuated from an annual high of 
4.62% (1988), to annual lows of 0% in four years (1987,1990,1993, and 
1998), with a mean annual rate of 1.30%, and an annual median of 1.02%. 
Thus, on average, CAAP arbitrators awarded punitive damages in slightly 
more than 1 % of the cases each year since the program's inception in 1987. 
The frequency of awards, however, has been highly variable over time 
(R2=.001) (CAAP Chart 2). 
c. Federal Judgments 
As indicated in Federal Chart 1, the total number offederal tort judgments 
reported in PIJH from 1985-2001 fluctuated wildly each year from a high of 
24 (in 1993) to annual lows between 7 and 10 judgments in eight years with a 
total of 222, an annual mean of 13.06, and an annual median of 13. The 
overall trend is downward (R2=.117), with consistently low numbers in recent 
years (Federal Chart 1). The number of punitive damages judgments in 
federal court over the seventeen-year ranged from an annual high of 3 in 
1996, to lows of ° in 12 years, with a seventeen-year total of 7, an annual 
mean of 0.41 , and an annual median ofO. The trendline for punitive damages 
judgments was essentially flat (R2=.029) (Federal Chart 1). 
Translated into percentages (Federal Chart 2), the percentage of cases in 
which the federal court entered punitive damages judgments compared to 
cases in which the federal court reported any tort judgment over the 
seventeen-year period fluctuated from an annual high of 15.79% (in 1996), to 
460 Because CAAP did not become mandatory until early 1987, see supra note 309, the handful of case 
reports from 1986 (when the program was only an experimental program of the state judiciary) were not 
considered. Thus, the CAAP study period is 15 years, two years shorter than the state court study period. 
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lows of 0% in twelve years, with a mean annual rate of3.53%, and an annual 
median of 0%. Federal punitive damages judgments in Hawaii, at less than 
4% per year, can be fairly characterized as infrequent. Although the trend 
appears to be slightly increasing, the data are highly variable (R2=.059) 
(Federal Chart 2). 
d. Summary: Skyrocketing Numbers or Puttering Along? 
Hawaii's CAAP system now handles the vast bulk of tort cases filed in the 
state, entering an average of89 awards each year, compared to an average of 
41 tort judgments per year in the state courts, and 13 in the federal court. Yet, 
it is the state court system, not CAAP, that experiences the higher average 
number of annual punitive damages judgments. The state court annual mean 
is 2.29 judgments, almost twice the CAAP annual mean of 1.13, and more 
than five times that of the federal court annual mean of 0.41. Similarly, it is 
the state courts that award punitive damages at the highest annual rate among 
the three systems studied. The mean annual state court award rate was 5.29%. 
Next highest was the federal court, with a mean annual award rate of3.53%. 
CAAP had the lowest mean rate of 1.30%. 
The higher incidence of punitive damages judgments in the state court 
system, despite the significantly lower number of tort judgments, is likely 
attributable to the fact that CAAP is the "bottom feeder" in the torts caseload 
food chain. All cases with a probable value of more than $150,000 are, by 
design, left to the state court system, and those cases by definition involve 
higher damages and typically the most severe injuries, two key factors that 
can generate higher rates of punitive damages awards. 
Viewing CAAP cases as an inherent part of the state court system, rather 
than separately, provides a perspective that may be more comparable to states 
that do not have a similar mandatory arbitration scheme. When CAAP cases 
are mixed back into the state court data, the punitive damages award rates of 
the Hawaii state courts including CAAP results in an overall total of 56 
punitive damages judgments (out of 2,031 total tort judgments), an annual 
mean of 3.29, and an annual median of 3 (State/CAAP Chart 1). The 
combined data also indicate, not surprisingly, lower annual award rates, 
ranging from annual lows of .6% (in 1991 and 1994) to an annual high of 
10.7% (1988), with a mean annual rate of 3 .18% (State/CAAP Chart 2). This 
combined mean annual rate is much lower than the state-court only mean 
annual rate of 5.29%, and is also slightly lower than the federal court mean 
annual rate of 3.53%. 
Overall, the data do not show a "skyrocketing" in the number of punitive 
damages judgments in Hawaii. Indeed, the opposite appears to be true: the 
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number of punitive damages judgments in Hawaii has remained very low, 
"puttering along" for nearly two decades and, in fact, the number of 
judgments has visibly declined since the mid-1980s. The data indicate that: 
1) the total number of state court judgments each year (State Chart 1) is 
approximately only 2 (and only about 3 for CAAP); 2) the relative percentage 
of punitive damages judgments compared to all tort judgments in state court 
(State Chart 2), is only a little over 5%, but was highly variable, with no 
punitive damages judgments entered in 6 of the 17 years; 3) considering 
CAAP and state awards together lowers the State's mean annual judgment 
rate to just over 3%; 4) for the last 13 years of the study period (1989-2001), 
the number of state court judgments per year never exceeded 4; compared to 
the first four years of the study period (1985-1988), when the number of 
judgments always ranged between 5 and 8 per year (State Chart 1); and 5) in 
5 of the past 13 years, the number of judgments was 0; considering even just 
the 8 years with judgments, the annual mean was a 
low 2.125 with an annual median of 2 (State Chart 1). The overall trend in 
the number of punitive damages judgments (state court and CAAP combined) 
is essentially flat (State/CAAP Chart 1), and the overall trend in the frequency 
is distinctly downward (R2=.413) (State/CAAP Chart 2). 
Even a tough critic of punitive damages would be hard pressed to find in 
the data any alarming indications of skyrocketing or even increasing numbers 
of awards. The historical state court high of 8 punitive damages judgments 
(an annual rate of21.62%) was in 1988, over 12 years ago, and subsequent 
years reached a high of only half that amount (4 judgments in 1992, in a year 
with an unremarkable annual rate of6.78%) (State Charts 1 & 2). The highest 
number of CAAP punitive damages awards in any year was 3 (1988 and 
1992) and the highest historical rate was only 4.62% (in 1988, the same year 
as the historical high for state court awards), with no year above 3% since that 
time (CAAP Charts 1& 2). 
Comparing the Hawaii results to national studies shows that Hawaii's 
mean annual rates of punitive damages judgments (CAAP at 1.30%, 
State/CAAP combined at 3.18%, the federal court at 3.53%, and state courts 
at 5.29%) fall well within the range of national rates, reinforcing the 
conclusion ofmany empirical scholars that, nationwide, punitive damages are 
less frequently awarded than commonly believed. A 1996 RAND Institute for 
Civil Justice study by Eric Moller found a frequency range of 1_7%.461 In the 
landmark 1995 study by Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, punitive 
461 MOLLER,supra note 43, at 33 (comparing awards in fifteen counties in five states from the 1985-
1989 and 1990-1994 time periods). 
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damages were awarded in 4.5% of civil cases.462 A 1995 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Report found a rate of 6%.463 A study by Peterson, Sharma, and 
Shanley found juries awarded punitive damages in only 1-2% of personal 
injury cases.464 Although each of these studies derives the frequency data in 
different ways, making direct comparisons difficult, the Hawaii rates appear 
unremarkable in comparison to, and well in line with, these national rates. 
2. Routinely Requested? Requests for Punitive Damages 
Compared to the Total Number of Tort Judgments 
Punitive damages reform bills, such as S.B. 328 introduced in the Hawaii 
Legislature in 2003, are commonly premised on the assertion that "in recent 
years the number of punitive damages claims asserted has increased 
dramatically.'.465 Are tort reform proponents correct in their claim that 
plaintiffs, or more accurately plaintiffs' lawyers, "routinely," i.e. abusively, 
request punitive damages in tort cases? The Hawaii data indicate that 
punitive damages during the seventeen-year study period were requested in 
about 15% of all CAAP awards reported, 22.4% of all state tort judgments 
(state court and CAAP combined), 37% of all state court only judgments, and 
at the highest rate, 43%, in federal court cases. 
a. State Circuit Court Judgments 
The number of reported state court judgments in which plaintiffs requested 
punitive damages awards ranged from an annual high of28 (in 1985, before 
CAAP) to a low of 5 (2001, the last year of the study), with a total for the 
seventeen-year period of260, an annual mean of 15.29, and an annual median 
of 16. One striking trend in the data is the steady decrease in the number of 
judgments each year in which plaintiffs requested punitive damages awards, 
dropping from the annual high of 28 in 1985 to the annual low of 5 in 2001, 
with two earlier dips to 6 (1989) and 8 (1996). The overall trend is steadily 
downward (R2=.612) (State Chart 1). This gradual decline parallels the 
general downward trend in overall tort judgments (R2=.044) (State Chart 1). 
The relationship is not entirely parallel, however, with substantial deviation in 
1991-1992, when tort judgments increased substantially but requests for 
punitive damages did not. In general, the decline over time in requests is less 
dramatic than the more noticeable decline in tort judgments for the past 
462 Daniels & Martin, supra note 7, at 214. 
m DEFRANCES, supra note 42, at 6 (analyzing civil verdicts from the 75 most populous counties in 
1991-1992). 
4M Robbennolt, supra note 56, at 162. 
46S See supra note 424 and accompanying text. 
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seventeen years. State Chart 4 examines the overall frequency of plaintiffs' 
requests for punitive damages in light of the total number of state court tort 
judgments reported during the seventeen-year period covered in PIJH. 
Ranging from an annual high of59.46% in 1988 to an annual low of23.08% 
in 1989 (a precipitous 36% drop in a one-year period), the mean annual 
request rate was 37.14%, and the annual median was 37.04%. Thus, Hawaii 
plaintiffs requested punitive damages in a little more than one-third of all 
reported tort cases that went to judgment in Hawaii state courts each year. 
The overall trend in frequency appears to be distinctly downward over time 
(R2=.223) (State Chart 4). 
b. CAAPAwards 
CAAP Chart 1 indicates that the number of reported CAAP awards in 
which plaintiffs requested punitive damages has averaged about 13 a year 
since 1987, with an annual high of 25 in 1997. The overall trend in the 
number of requests appears flat (R2=.007). In contrast, the number of annual 
CAAP awards increased steadily since the program's inception (R2= .071) 
(CAAP Chart 1), then steadily declined since a peak of 130 in 1995 until the 
latest low count of76 in 2001. This divergence is reflected in the trendline in 
CAAP Chart 4, which shows that the overall frequency of requests has slowly 
declined over time (R2=.0322). Specifically, CAAP Chart 4 indicates the 
annual frequency of plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages, ranging from an 
annual high of29.23% to an annual low of7.14%, with a mean annual request 
rate of 15.47%, and a median annual rate of 16.25%. 
For the past two years, the annual request rate has hovered around 20%, 
rising from a dip of about 10% in 1998. Overall, the mean annual request rate 
for CAAP awards is about one out of seven cases. This is less than half the 
mean rate reported for the state circuit courts. 
c. Federal Judgments 
Federal Chart 1 indicates that the number of requests for punitive damages 
in reported federal court tort judgments since 1985 has fluctuated between 0 
and 14 per year, with an annual mean of 5.65, and an annual median of 6. 
The overall trend in the number of requests, like for CAAP, seems flat (but 
R2=.00 1) (Federal Chart 1). Over the same period, however, the overall trend 
in the number of federal tort judgments reported each year was downward 
(R2=.117) (Federal Chart 1). Federal Chart 4 shows in detail the frequency of 
plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages in federal court. Ranging from a 
remarkable annual high of 87.50% in 1998, when punitive damages were 
requested in 7 of the 8 tort judgments reported, to an annual low of 0% the 
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year before, the mean annual request rate was 43.52%, with a median of 
42.86%. In relative terms, there appears to be a gradual upward trend in the 
rate at which punitive damages are requested in federal court (Federal Chart 
4), however, the data are highly variable and forecasting is not possible 
(R2=.026). 
d. Summary: Routinely Requested? 
Of the three Hawaii systems, the federal court experienced the highest 
mean annual request rate for punitive damages--43.52%, slightly higher than 
the annual mean of 37.14% for state courts, and three times higher than the 
CAAP annual mean of 15.47%. In short, punitive damages claims are most 
often requested in the high-value federal court cases in Hawaii,466 "often 
requested" (i.e. about one-third of the time) in Hawaii state courts, and not 
very often sought in the lower-value CAAP cases. Thus, characterizing the 
tendency to request punitives as either "routine" or as "exceptional" would 
exaggerate the data. The best overall characterization is that punitive 
damages are "moderately often" requested in Hawaii. Whether that is too 
often or not often enough is a subject for further policy debate. 
The assertion in bills such as S.B. 328 that punitive damages claims are 
increasing "dramatically" is, however, flatly contradicted by the data. As 
State Chart 4 indicates, in the past five years, the annual state court request 
rate dropped steadily each year, from 44.12% in 1997 to only 26.32% in 
200 l. The spike of an annual 44.12% request rate in 1997 was, indeed, a 
dramatic increase from the prior year (1996, at 25.81 %), but it was the only 
year since 1992 to have a rate over 40%; in contrast, during the first seven 
years of the study period (1985-1991), the annual rate exceeded 40% in every 
year except 1989. Thus, overall, the trend in the frequency of plaintiffs' 
requests for punitive damages based on this examination of judgments 
reported in state circuit courts is slightly downward over time (State Chart 4, 
R2=.223), and certainly does not show a dramatic increase. On the other 
hand, the annual request rate in CAAP awards has about doubled in the past 
four years, from 9.62% in 1998 to 2l.05% in 200l. Yet, the 2001 rate is 
lower than the rate in 1997, and the overall trend since 1987 is slightly 
downward as well (CAAP Chart 4, R2=.032). The only jurisdiction with an 
upward trend is the federal courts (Federal Chart 4, R2= .026), over which the 
state legislature has no direct authority. A fundamental premise of reform 
bills aimed at punitive damages in Hawaii - that such claims are dramatically 
increasing - appears, therefore, unfounded and quite misguided. 
466 
See supra Part IV C 2 (discussing request rates for federal judgments in the study). 
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3. Meritorious Requests? Frequency of Plaintiffs' Requests for Punitive 
Damages A wards Compared to Punitive Damages Judgments 
Are plaintiffs making meritorious requests for punitive damages awards or, 
as critics assert, are they throwing in a punitive damages claim regardless of 
their chances of winning on the claim? By comparing the frequency of 
plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages to their rate of success on punitive 
damages claims, this criticism can be analyzed. The data indicate that, in state 
court, plaintiffs obtained punitive damages judgments about once in every 
seventh request; in CAAP, once in every twelfth request; and in federal court, 
once in every fourteenth request. Thus, assuming that this success rate 
reflects the underlying merit of the claim, plaintiffs' assertion of punitive 
damages claims in state court cases may be characterized as more often 
meritorious and less ofa "shotgun" approach than in CAAP or federal court. 
a. State Circuit Court Judgments 
State Chart 1 indicates the number of punitive damages judgments each 
year compared to the number of plaintiffs' requests for such awards. State 
Chart 3 focuses on this "request success rate" by translating into percentages 
the annual number of punitive damages judgments compared to the number of 
times a request were made. The fluctuations in this success rate over the 
seventeen-year period are large and erratic, varying from an annual high 
success rate of 36.36% in 1988 (when 8 of 22 requests were successful) to 
lows of 0% in five years (1989,1991,1994,1995, and 2000, years in which a 
total of 60 requests were made but no judgments were entered). The mean 
annual success rate over the study period was 13.65%, with an annual median 
success rate of 16%. Looking at the trend over time, the annual request 
success rate appears to be decreasing (R2=.04), suggesting either that 
plaintiffs' attorneys are less able to predict which of their cases are "winners" 
for punitive damages awards (the pleading is more random) or that the triers 
offact are simply becoming less inclined to make punitive damages awards in 
cases where the plaintiffs request them. The fact that plaintiffs' attorneys had 
no success in the five years noted above also suggests that the triers of fact are 
exercising a substantial amount of independent judgment when faced with a 
request for punitive damages. On the other hand, given the very low R2, the 
trendline fit is poor, and this fluctuation could also be simply a result of the 
particular facts in the various cases. 
b. CAAP Awards 
The number of CAAP awards reported in which plaintiffs requested 
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punitive damages ranged from an annual high of 25 (1997), with a total for 
the fifteen-year period of 195, an annual mean of 13, and an annual median of 
12 (CAAP Chart 1). Unlike the steady decline in the annual number of state 
court requests for punitive damages, the annual number of requests in CAAP 
cases appears relatively steady over time (R2=.007). 
CAAP Chart 3 portrays the "request success rate" of plaintiffs for punitive 
damages. As with the state courts (see State Chart 3), the fluctuations in the 
CAAP annual "success rate" over the study period are large and erratic, 
varying from a high annual success rate of 20% to lows of 0% in four of 
fifteen years. The mean and median annual success rates over the fifteen-year 
CAAP study period were about half that experienced in the state courts, with 
an annual mean of 8.39%, and an annual median of 7.14%. The lower 
success rate in CAAP could mean either that, in these lower value cases, 
plaintiffs' attorneys are being too aggressive in asserting punitive damages 
claims or that the CAAP arbitrators (local attorneys themselves) are much less 
willing to award punitive damages in these cases than circuit court juries or 
judges. 
c. Federal Judgments 
Federal Charts 1 and 3 present the parallel "request success rate" for the 
federal court in Hawaii. As discussed above (Part IV C 2 c), the number of 
requests for punitive damages in federal court has been highly erratic over 
time (Federal Chart 1). Similarly, the fluctuations in plaintiffs' annual 
punitive damages request success rate in federal court are large and erratic, 
varying from peak rates of 33.33% that book-end the study period in 1985 
and 2001, to lows of 0% in 12 years out of 15 (Federal Chart 3). The mean 
annual success rate over the seventeen-year study period was 6.61 %, with a 
median annual success rate of 0%. As with the highly fluctuating success 
rates in state court and CAAP, the erratic annual federal success rates 
(R2=.01) can reflect either on the poor predictive ability of the plaintiffs' 
attorneys or the skepticism of the triers of fact. 
d. Summary: Meritorious or Overly Aggressive Requests? 
Are plaintiffs' attorneys, as critics claim, overly aggressive in requesting 
punitive damages or are they making some meritorious rational prediction of 
the likelihood ofsuccess of such claims? The data as to "request success rate" 
are highly erratic in all three systems studied and are subject to contrary 
interpretations. Plaintiffs' attorneys have tended to fare best in state court, 
with a mean annual request success rate of 13.65%, compared to 8.39% in 
CAAP, and 6.61% in federal court. Put another way, in state court, viewing 
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the pool of tort cases that eventually went to judgment, plaintiffs obtained 
punitive damages judgments in about 1 of7 cases where a request was made; 
in CAAP, plaintiffs succeeded in about 1 of 12 such cases; and in federal 
court, in about 1 of 14 such cases. 
In their study of reported tort verdicts in Florida, Vidmar and Rose found 
that the overall "frequency of punitive damages was strikingly low,,,467 but 
they also found that when such claims were "put to the jury," the plaintiffs 
had very high "success rates" ranging from a high of 100% in one year to a 
low of81% in another, with a mean annual rate of89.5%.468 Unfortunately, 
these results cannot be readily compared to the Hawaii data because PIJH 
does not report whether punitive damages claims were "put to" the jury, only 
whether the request was initially made (in the complaint).469 Thus, the mean 
Hawaii "success rate" of 13.65%, which is substantially (6.5 times) lower 
than that reported in Florida, may indicate that the requests of Hawaii 
plaintiffs were substantially less well targeted by plaintitTs counsel than those 
in Florida, that pleading requests often did not blossom into tried claims 
before the jury, or that Hawaii juries are simply much less inclined to award 
punitive damages than Florida juries. 
4. A Lottery? Frequency of Winning Plaintiffs' Success 
in Securing Punitive Damages Judgments 
In addition to understanding the relationship between punitive damages 
requests and success, it is also useful to examine punitive damages "success" 
in the restricted context of the pool of cases in which judgments were 
rendered for plaintiffs ("winning plaintiffs,,).47o This approach refines the 
"request success rate" discussed in Part IV C 3 above by eliminating those 
cases in which plaintiffs made a request for punitive damages but never won 
their underlying case. The data indicate that the average annual winning 
plaintiffs' success rate on punitive damages was highest in state court (13%), 
with federal court about half that rate (6.36%), and a CAAP rate about 8 times 
lower (1.60%). 
467 Vidmar & Rose. supra note 71, at 487. 
468 This mean annual rate was calculated based on Vidmar and Rose's Table I. 
469 Vidmar and Rose derive the percentages from comparing the "number of cases" in which punitive 
damages claims were "put to the jury," id. at 492 (Column I, Table I), and the percentage oftimes that the 
jury returned a punitive award. Id. (Column 2. Table I). The Hawaii study derived the percentage from 
comparing the number of cases in which punitive damages were requested (usually in the complaint but 
also otherwise communicated to the reporter when the parties were interviewed), and it is not known how 
many of these claims were "put to the jury" for trial or the number that fell by the wayside as the case was 
tried. 
470 See Vidmar & Rose. supra note 71, at 493 & n.17 (reporting only verdicts of successful plaintiffs). 
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a. State Circuit Court Judgments 
State Chart 5 indicates a "winning plaintiffs' success rate" that compares 
the number of state court torts judgments in which punitive damages were 
entered to all state tort judgments in which plaintiffs prevailed. The winning 
plaintiffs' annual success rate ranged from a high of 57 .14% (1988) to lows of 
0.0% in five years (1989, 1991, 1994, and 2000), with a mean annual rate of 
12.19%, and a media annual rate of 6.25%. Overall, the data fluctuated often, 
but the trend over time was slightly downward (R2=.126). 
Looking at the entire seventeen-year period, 1988 truly stands out as an 
unusual year, the pinnacle of plaintiffs' success in securing punitive damages 
awards. In that year, punitive damages were awarded in 8 of the 14 cases 
(57%) in which plaintiffs prevailed. As further detailed in Part V, those cases 
involved: a violent high school fight ($4,000 punitive damages judgment-
Case S 19); a hit-and-run our (punitive damages judgment totalling 
$15,000-Case S 15); a speeding our driver (punitive damages judgment 
totaling $3.00-Case S 17); an admitted our accident (punitive damages of 
$25,000 awarded-Case S 18); a medical professional defamation case 
(punitive damages judgment of $50,000 Case S20); an attorney malpractice 
case (punitive damages of$800,000 entered-Case 22); a second malpractice 
and fraud case against the same attorney (punitive damages of $250,00 
judgment-Case S21); and the landmark Masaki case (punitive damages 
judgment of $11.25 million, later reversed by the Hawaii Supreme Court-
Case SI6). The following year, 1989, plaintiffs' success rate plummeted to 
0% (0 of8 cases), a low that reoccurred in 5 of the last 13 years covered in the 
study. 
b. CAAP Awards 
CAAP Chart 5 indicates a "winning plaintiffs' success rate" for CAAP, 
ranging from an annual high of 5.26% (also in the banner year 1988) to lows 
of 0.0% in four years (1987, 1990, 1993, and 1998), with a mean annual rate 
of 1.63%, and a median annual rate of 1.14%. The overall trend was 
downward over time (R2=.019). 
c. Federal Judgments 
Federal Chart 5 indicates a "winning plaintiffs' success rate" ranging from 
an annual high of33.33% (1996, 3 of9 cases) to lows of 0% in 12 years, with 
an mean annual rate of 6.62%, and a median annual rate of 0%. The overall 
trend for this success rate appears to be upward (R2=.077), but is highly 
erratic, reflecting the very low numbers of tort judgments and punitive 
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damages awards in federal court each year. 
d. Summary: A Lottery? 
Comparing the three different systems, the average annual plaintiffs' 
punitive damages success rate in cases where they were winners on the merits 
of their underlying claim was highest during the study period in state court 
(12.19%), with federal court rates about half that amount (6.62%), and CAAP 
rates about 8 times lower (l.63%). The comparison between state court and 
CAAP is particularly noteworthy. Winning plaintiffs in CAAP cases were 
considerably less likely to win punitive damages awards than winning 
plaintiffs in state tort cases. This may be a random event, a result of the state 
courts' hearing the higher-value tort cases, or an indication that CAAP 
attorney-arbitrators are more conservative than state court triers of fact. 
Compared to national studies, the mean annual success rate for the Hawaii 
state courts (12.19%) at first appears high. In the landmark 1995 study by 
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, punitive damages were awarded in 8.3% 
of the verdicts in which the plaintiff prevailed.471 The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Report in 1995 found success rate of 6% in the cases in which the 
plaintiff prevailed.472 The Hawaii rate is much more in line with these 
national rates, however, when CAAP awards are mixed back in the state pool. 
This aggregation of "all state tort judgments" results in a mean annual 
success rate of 5.49% and a median annual success rate of 2.83% 
(State/CAAP Chart 3), lower than both of the rates found in the national 
studies. In short, in Hawaii state tort cases where plaintiffs win a judgment, 
plaintiffs receive punitive damages in approximately lout of 18 of these 
successful cases. Calculating the average punitive damages "winning odds" 
for successful plaintiffs, however, is only one way of responding to the 
criticism that punitive damages are a "lottery." Both proponents and critics of 
punitive damages reform can argue that the odds favor their policy position, 
because the underlying issue is not the odds themselves but rather the link 
between the awards made and the merits of the awards, an issue further 
considered in Part V. 
5. Grossly Excessive? The Amounts of Punitive Damages Judgments 
Another common rallying cry of punitive damages critics is that the 
amounts awarded are grossly excessive. To examine this criticism, the 
Hawaii study reviewed the total amount of the awards over time as well as 
411 
DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 7. 
412 
De Frances, supra nole 42, al 8 Ibl. 8. 
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other indicators of size. The overall mean award of punitive damages 
awarded was, surprisingly, about the same in federal court ($536,429) and 
state court ($552,457), when the reversed high-end Masaki judgment was 
included. When Masaki was not included, however, the overall mean was 
dramatically lower in state court ($270,943). CAAP awards averaged only 
about $21,780, 8% of the overall state non-Masaki mean, and 4% of the 
overall state mean including Masaki. 
a. State Circuit Court Judgments 
State Chart 6 shows the total amount of punitive damages awarded by state 
courts during the seventeen years of the study was $21,545,838, with an 
aberrational annual high of$12,394,003 (the year of the Masaki judgment) to 
the next largest high of $4,785,794 in 2001, and lows of $0 in five years 
(1989, 1991, 1994, 1995, and 2000), with a total of only $1 in 1998. 
Excluding the Masaki judgment (the outlier punitive damages verdict that was 
reversed on appeal by the Hawaii Supreme Court),473 the total is cut about in 
half to $10,295,838. The overall mean award including Masaki was 
$552,457; the overall mean award excluding Masaki was $270,943; and the 
overall median (regardless of Masaki) was $88,500. 
State Chart 7 plots the mean value annually. The annual mean award 
ranged from a high of $4,785,794 in 200 I, far above the next highest annual 
mean of $1,529,20 (including Masaki) in 1988, or $163,429 (excluding 
Masaki), to lows of$O-$1 in six years (1989,1991,1994,1995,1998, and 
2000). These means are based on small annual numbers of awards, with the 
dramatic high mean in 2001 resulting from only one case. That case, Takaki 
v. Tavares, involved a notorious arson conspiracy admittedly committed by 
the chief of Hawaii's leading movie production company against his 
competitors (see Appendix B, Case S39). Both the primary plaintiff and 
another of the defendant's competitors lost specially rigged trucks and trailers 
in the fire. The primary plaintiff claimed it ruined him financially, forcing 
him into bankruptcy. Further, he claimed that defendant had tried to hide his 
assets by laundering them through his (defendant's) parents. Ultimately, 
although the trial judge reduced the jury's award in other areas, the jury's 
award of $4,785,794 in punitive damages was confirmed. The Takaki 
punitive damages judgment was the second largest reported during the study 
period in state court (Masaki was $11.25 million), and only one other state 
judgment (Parnar v. Americana Hotels, $1.5 million) was over the one 
million mark. 
473 
Masaki, 780 P.2d 566, discussed supra notes 253-259 and 267-271. 
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Using the annual median value, Chart 8 indicates that the Takaki case 
resulted in a very high annual median of $4,785,794 in 2001, with the next 
highest median of$453,291 occurring in 1992 (four judgments), a median of 
$37,500 in 1988 (the year of the Masaki award), and lows of $0-$1 in six 
years. Calculated on this annual basis, the "overall mean of the medians" was 
$356,343. 
b. CAAP Awards 
CAAP Chart 6 shows that the total amount of punitive damage awards for 
the fifteen years ofCAAP awards studied was $370,252, with an aberrational 
annual high of$250,000 (in 1992, a total of three awards). The next largest 
annual CAAP high of $32,000 occurred in 2000, with annual lows of $0 in 
four years (1987, 1990, 1993, and 1998). The overall mean punitive damages 
award was $21,779, with a median of$5,000. 
CAAP Chart 7 plots the mean value annually. The annual mean award 
ranged from a high of$83,333 (in 1992), to lows of$O in four years (1987, 
1990, 1993, and 1998). The overall mean of the annual means was $12,890. 
Using the annual median value, CAAP Chart 8 indicates a high median of 
$100,000 (in 1992), a low median of$O in four years (1987, 1990, 1993, and 
1998). Calculated on this annual basis, the overall mean median for the 
fifteen-year CAAP period was $13,977. 
c. Federal Judgments 
Federal Chart 6 shows a total amount of punitive damage awards for the 
federal courts for the study period of$3,755,000, with an annual high of 
$3,000,000 (in one case in 1990), dropping significantly to the next largest 
annual high of only $205,000 (in 2001, based on 3 cases), and annual lows of 
$0 in 12 years. The overall mean federal award was $536,429, and the 
median federal award was $0. 
Federal Chart 7 plots the mean value annually. The annual mean punitive 
damages judgment in federal court ranged from a high of $3,000,000 (in 
1990) to lows of $0 in twelve years, with an overall mean of the means of 
$212,843, and a median of$O. 
Using the annual median value, Federal Chart 8 indicates a high median of 
$3,000,000 (in 1990), and a low median of$O in twelve years. The overall 
"mean median" for the seventeen-year period was $212,647. 
d. Summary: Grossly Excessive or Small Comfort? 
The total amount of punitive damage judgments in Hawaii for the 
seventeen years of the study was just over $25 million: $21,545,838 in state 
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court (84% of the total); $3,755,000 in federal court (15%); and $370,252 in 
CAAP (1 %). The overall mean award was about the same in state court 
($552,457, including Masaki) and federal court ($536,429). with CAAP 
awards averaging about 4% of that mean ($21,780). The overall median 
values in each of the three systems were substantially lower than the means, 
suggesting a pattern of a large number of moderate awards and a smaller 
number of high awards.474 For the entire period, the state court overall 
median was highest, at $88,500, followed by CAAP at $5,000, and the low 
federal median of $0. Examining the "overall mean medians" for all three 
systems, the state courts had the highest, at $356,343, next was the federal 
court at $212,647, and CAAP was last at $13,976. 
In short, the state court system has awarded approximately $21.5 million in 
punitive damages judgments between 1985 and 2001, about 5.7 times the 
amount awarded in federal court, and about 58 times the amount awarded by 
the CAAP system. Average awards were about the same in state and federal 
court, but the average state court award was about 25 times larger than 
average CAAP award. 
Are punitive damages awards in Hawaii "grossly excessive"? The 
quantitative data alone cannot answer this value-laden question. Only by 
reviewing the narratives (Part V below) can ajudgment about "excessiveness" 
be determined by the reader. It also must be remembered that the $25 million 
in total awards does not mean that plaintiffs actually collected that amount. 
Indeed, actual collections probably were substantially lower. Yet, tort reform 
proponents also argue that, even if awards are never collected, punitive 
damage requests alone have a "shadow" impact on parties' settlement 
negotiations and pose an unfair threat to defendants. Moreover, proponents of 
state allocation schemes-whereby part or all of punitive damages awards are 
diverted into state or special public funds-can claim that this $25 million is a 
"windfall" to already compensated plaintiffs and is lost revenue to the state. 
Plainti ffs would, of course, argue that despite the public nature of the award, 
the judgment belongs to them, as victims and protagonists, not to the general 
fund. 
A comparison to other studies provides some indication that the amounts 
of Hawaii awards are again within the national range. Studies conducted by 
the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") found that "only 8% of all 
jury awards were greater than $1 million.,,475 The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
474 See Robbennolt, supra note 56, at 164. 
475 Id. (citing Brian J. Ostrom et aI., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profileo/the Civi/Juryin the I 990s, 79 
JUDICATURE 233, 237 (1996». 
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("BJS") study found that "less than 25% of punitive damage awards were 
greater than $250,000 and less than 12% were greater than $1 million. ,,476 In 
the Hawaii study, only three of the 39 total state court punitive damages 
judgments (approximately 8%) exceeded $1 million,477 exactly the same rate 
as found by the NCSC study and below the rate found in the BJS study. 
Several studies have found that the median punitive damages award tends 
to be "relatively low," approximately $50,000.478 Daniels and Martin found 
that "fifteen of the twenty counties with more than ten punitive damage 
awards for the period studied had median punitive damage awards below 
$40,000 and thirteen of the twenty counties had median awards below 
$30,000.'.479 
Hawaii's median state court award amounts were generally higher than 
those found in other studies (State Chart 8 indicates that the annual median 
average was $356,343), but considering the much lower CAAP medians 
(CAAP Chart 8 shows an overall mean median of$13,976), the "state system" 
(state circuit court and CAAP combined) would be much lower and more in 
line with these national studies. While data alone cannot determine if the 
average Hawaii court punitive damages judgment ofhalf a million is "grossly 
excessive" or "small comfort" to plaintiffs, the remarkably similar mean 
awards in state and federal court can be seen as one indication of regularity 
between the two parallel judicial systems. Moreover, the large differential 
between the means and much lower medians for the three systems suggests 
even less cause for alarm over the amounts being awarded. 
Finally, while the average award may seem high to an outside observer, 
only 3 state punitive judgments in the seventeen-year study exceeded $1 
million. Looking at the low end of the awards, 21 % of the state punitive 
damages judgments did not exceed $5,000 (53% ofCAAP awards); 38% did 
not exceed $20,000 (71 % ofCAAP awards); and 54% did not exceed $50,000 
(88% ofCAAP awards) (see Table 1 inJra). 
6. Irrational Amounts? Ratios oj the Amounts oj Punitive Damages 
Judgments Compared to the Compensatory Awards 
Another common criticism of punitive damages judgments is that they 
476 Id. (citing DeFrances, et al. supra note 42, at 6). 
m See Table 12 infra (Parnar, $1.5 million; Masaki. $11.5 million; and Takaki, $4.8 million). None 
of the CAAP and only one of the federal punitive damages awards (Mitchell, $3 million) exceeded $1 
million. Id. 
478 Robbennolt, supra note 56, at 163 (citing De Frances et ai, supra note 42, at 6; Ostrom, supra note 
475, at 239, reporting a median of$38,000). 
479 Robbennolt, supra note 56, at 163 (citing Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in 
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 42 (1990)). 
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often grossly exceed the compensatory awards and lack proportionality to the 
injury.48o A popular legislative proposal in Hawaii, other states, and in 
Congress, is to "cap" punitive damages awards at some ratio level, typically 
either 2: 1 or 3: 1.481 This Part focuses on the impact these caps would have in 
Hawaii using past awards as a basis for comparison. The data indicate that a 
3: 1 cap would have affected the awards in 43% of the federal cases in which 
punitive damages were awarded, but in only 18% ofthe state court cases, and 
in only 6% of the CAAP cases. CAAP cases actually had the highest mean 
punitive-to-compensatory ratio for the period, 6.72, with federal courts 
averaging 2.7, and a much lower 0.90 for state court. 
a. State Circuit Court Judgments 
State Chart 9 presents the number of judgments over the seventeen-year 
study period where the punitive damages judgment in the 39 state court cases 
exceeded (by any amount) the compensatory damages award. As indicated, 
the annual "exceedance rate" fluctuated wildly, ranging from a high of 1 00% 
(in 1999,2/2 cases, and 2002, 111 case), to 0% in seven years (1989, 1991, 
1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, and 2000). The overall mean exceedence rate for the 
entire period was 46.15% (18/39 cases), the mean annual rate was 34.36%, 
and the median annual exceedence rate was 40%. In other words, the amount 
of punitive damages judgments in Hawaii state court cases exceeded the 
amount of compensatory damages in less than half of the cases, on average in 
only about 1 in 3 cases each year. 
The ratio of the amount of punitive damage judgments compared to the 
amount of compensatory damage judgments is indicated in State Chart 10. 
The four highest ratios are 25.68: 1 (Lessary v. Lessary); 19.32: I (Rodman v. 
Appell); 17.24:1 (Wilderv. Brown), and 11.96:1 (Takakiv. Tavares). The 
facts of theses cases indicate the unusual context for these high ratios. In 
Lessary (Case S22), the jury awarded the victim of attorney malpractice an 
award of$181 ,000 in general damages and $800,000 in punitive damages. In 
that case, the defendant attorney Leonard Appell, a convicted felon who was 
the subject of a second punitive damages award in state court that same year 
(Case S21, discussed next), had attempted to coerce Mrs. Lessary into 
withdrawing charges against Mrs. Lessary's brother, the alleged rapist of Mrs. 
480 The American Tort Reform Association (A TRA), a leading national proponent of tort reform, 
contends that "excessive punitive damages awards continue to be a major problem in many states," and 
supports a cap oftwo-times-compensatories or $250,000, whichever is greater. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, 
Punitive Damages Reform, available at http://www.atra.org/show17343 (last accessed June 20, 2004). 
481 See discussion of state legislative reform efforts, supra Part Ill; for the congressional proposal, see 
Introduction, supra note 8. 
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Lessary's minor daughter. Appell, who later filed for bankruptcy, also sent a 
defamatory letter to Mrs. Lessary's employer. In Rodman (Case S21), the 
same attorney, Leonard Appell, was sued for malpractice and other claims 
resulting from Appell's misuse of his client's retainer in the attorney trust 
account. In a verdict rendered five days before the Lessary verdict, the jury in 
Rodman awarded no general damages, but did award $12,943 in special 
damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages. The Wilder case (S37) involved 
a sexual harassment claim by a single woman against her employer, Paul 
Brown, a famous Honolulu hair stylist. Circuit Court Judge Kevin Chang 
reduced the jury award of punitive damages from $100,000 to $50,000, and 
left intact a compensatory award of $2,901. The Takaki case was the 
notorious film-industry arson case discussed earlier, where George Cambra 
admittedly burned and destroyed his competitor's trucks (see supra Part IV C 
5 a). 
The only other ratios greater than 3: 1 were in three cases: 7.50 in Vidmar 
v. Kan (Case S24, domestic violence); 4.57 in Sigler v. City & County of 
Honolulu (Case S 1 0, assault and battery by arresting police officers); and 3.38 
in Kim v. Nova Int 'I Hawaii Co. (S32, bar fight). The ratios are otherwise 
clustered heavily below 3: 1. Of the 38 state punitive damages judgments 
considered (excluding the case of Schmidt v. AOAO Marco Polo 
Condominium. (S29), where no compensatory damages were awarded), only 
seven of the 38 exceeded the 3: 1 ratio, leaving 31 (82%) below 3: 1. Thus, a 
3:1 cap would have affected the judgment in only seven of the 38 cases 
(18%). With Schmidt included (because a cap would also prohibit any award 
of punitive damages in cases where no compensatory damages were 
awarded), the cap would have affected 21 % (8/39) of the cases. The overall 
mean ratio for the seventeen-year period was 1.11, well below 3: 1; while the 
mean of the individual case ratios was 3.03;482 and the median ratio was .98, 
substantially below 3: 1. 
Looking at the ratios more closely, State Chart 11 shows an enlarged scale 
and more clearly the impact of a 2: 1 cap. A 2: 1 cap would have affected 
punitive damages awards in 10 cases (11, including Schmidt, approximately 
28% of the cases), only three more cases than the seven affected by the 3: 1 
cap (18% of the cases). 
b. CAAP Awards 
CAAP Chart 9 portrays the number of awards over the fifteen-year CAAP 
482 The overall mean ratio was calculated from the overall total punitive damages awards compared to 
the total amount of compensatory awards; the mean of the individual case ratios was calculated by summing 
the individual case ratios and dividing by 38. See supra note 458. 
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study period where the punitive damages award in the 17 cases exceeded (by 
any amount) the compensatory damages award. As with the comparable state 
court data, the "exceedance rate" showed substantial variation, ranging from a 
high of 1 00% in two years to lows of 0% in ten years. The overall mean 
exceedence rate for the entire period was 35.29%; the mean of the annual 
rates was 23.33%; and the median annual exceedance rate was 0%. These 
rates are much lower than those reported for state court. 
The ratio of the amount of punitive damage awards compared to the 
amount of compensatory damage awards is indicated in CAAP Chart 10. The 
only ratio above four is the outlier DeGuiar v. Logan case (Case C2), a case 
involving a "missed punch" assault against a security guard, which like 
Schmidt, involved a judgment with no compensatory award but a small 
punitive award. Excluding this case, CAAP Chart 10 shows that the mean 
annual ratio is .894, with a median of .84, both substantially below both the 
3: 1 and the 2: 1 cap ratios. 
The only ratio over 3: 1 in a CAAP case was 3.20 in Doe v. Harrison Mew 
(Case CI4), which involved a punitive damages award of $32,000 and a 
compensatory award of$1 0,000. In Doe, the defendant, a businessman, lured 
a married woman, who had visited defendant's shop with her husband, into 
modeling for his jetski business and then sexually assaulted her. These data 
suggest that the most popular ratio cap proposals in Hawaii would have 
affected only two of the 17 reported CAAP awards (Doe and DeGuiar), about 
12%, both of which primarily involved emotional injuries. 
c. Federal Judgments 
Federal Chart 9 portrays the number of federal judgments over the 
seventeen-year study period where the punitive damages award in the seven 
cases exceeded (by any amount) the compensatory damages award. As 
indicated, the annual "exceedance rate" for 16 of the 17 years (94% of the 
time) was 0%. The only year that showed a detectable ratio was 1996, when 
all three of the punitive damages verdicts reported exhibited exceedence. The 
overall mean exceedence rate for the entire period, however, was 57% (4/7); 
the mean annual rate was 11.76%; and the median annual exceedance rate was 
0%. 
The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in each of the judgments is 
indicated in Federal Chart 10. The three highest ratios are 7.0 (Pulse v. City 
& County oJHonolulu, F7), 5.0 (Mano v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers 
Union, Local 996, F5), and 4.1 (Arceneaux v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant 
Employees, Local 5 Union, F4). The facts of these three cases explain the 
unique context for these awards. 
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In Pulse, the plaintiff, a carpenter's apprentice who lived on a sailboat in 
Keehi Lagoon, was arrested for terroristic threatening and incarcerated for 
three years (see infra Appendix B). In his subsequent federal court action for 
malicious prosecution and false arrest, the jury found that he had been 
illegally convicted because the search that located his gun was illegal. The 
jury awarded him $350,000 in punitive damages and $50,000 in general 
damages. Mano involved a dispute between the plaintiff, a union senior 
business agent, and her employer, the union president. She claimed that the 
union president had wrongfully terminated her because she did not support his 
re-election bid. The jury found for plaintiff, awarding her $100,000 in 
punitive damages and $163,750 in compensatory damages. Finally, the third 
case, Arceneaux, included a punitive damages award of $60,000 and a 
$12,000 general damages award. The jury upheld the claims of the plaintiff, a 
female labor organizer, that her union employer had sexually harassed and 
wrongfully terminated her. 
Four of the seven ratios (57%) fell below 3: I and 2: 1. Thus, a 3: 1 or 2: 1 
cap would have affected the awards in three of the seven federal cases, or 
43%. The mean of the ratios was .55; the overall mean ratio was 2.7; and the 
median ratio was 1.5. 
d. Summary: Irrational or Proportional Awards? 
Looking at all three systems, the mean annual exceedence rate for the 
entire period studied ranged from the highest of 34.36% in state court cases, 
to 23.33% in CAAP cases, and 11.76% in federal court cases (with overall 
means, respectively, of 46.15%; 57%; and 35.29%; and annual medians of 
40%; 0%; and 0%). In terms ofthe ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages, the state courts had the highest mean ratios (3.03, compared to .894 
for CAAP, and .55 for the federal courts), but the federal court has the highest 
ratio when overall means were considered (2.7, compared to 1.11 for state 
court, and .043 for CAAP). Median ratios were again highest for federal 
court (1.5, compared to .98 for state court, and .84 for CAAP). A 3: 1 cap 
would have affected the award in 43% of the federal cases in which punitive 
damages were awarded, 18% of the state court cases, and 12% of the CAAP 
cases. A 2: I cap would have affected 28% of the state cases, 12% of the 
CAAP cases, and 43% of the federal cases. 
In short, ifadopted by the Hawaii State Legislature, a 3: 1 cap would have 
affected about 1 in every 5 state court cases in which punitive damages were 
-awarded and about 1 in 8 CAAP cases; a 2: I cap would have limited recovery 
in about I in 4 state court cases and I in 8 CAAP cases. If adopted by 
Congress, a 3:1 or 2:1 cap could have a large impact on punitive damages 
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recovery in Hawaii federal court cases; about 1 in every 2-3 federal judgments 
in the study involved a punitives-to-compensatory ratio above these caps. 
Even though the effect in state courts and CAAP would have been in a 
minority of the cases, the cap would have limited the larger verdicts, which is 
perhaps the main goal of tort reform advocates. 483 However, a cap of any 
kind is a blunt instrument, tending to sweep within its prohibitions cases with 
no or low physical injury but high mental harm, or publicly injurious conduct 
that provokes ajury's strong condemnation of the defendant's conduct.484 In 
retrospect, a cap would have reduced the punitive damages recovery of 
Hawaii plaintiffs in cases (described above) involving claims ranging from 
attorney fraud to assault and battery and sexual harassment, and from 
wrongful incarceration to wrongful termination. 
The impact of one other kind of cap often proposed, a flat monetary limit 
(e.g., $250,000), is worth analyzing as well. As indicated in Table 1, a flat 
$250,000 cap would have affected eight of the 39 state punitive damages 
judgments reported, or 21 %; none of the CAAP cases; and 2 of the 7 federal 
cases (29%).485 Of the eight affected state cases, the total reduction in 
punitive damages would have been $18,175,974. For the two federal cases, 
the reducation would have totaled $2,850,000. Thus, comparing the impact of 
the two most popular cap proposals, state court plaintiffs would have been 
about equally affected by the 3: 1 and the $250,000 cap (in terms of the 
percentage of judgments affected); tort reformers, on the other hand, might 
prefer the 3: 1 cap because it would also limit some of the punitive damages 
recoveries in the lower-value CAAP cases. In the federal context, the flat cap 
is the least painful overall for plaintiffs. In light of specific case results, of 
course, the preferences can reverse. For example, in the federal Mitchell v. 
Physicians Health Plan of Minnesota (F2) judgment, the 3: 1 cap would have 
had no impact on the punitives award ($3 million) because the compensatory 
award was high ($9.2 million); whereas, the flat cap would have eliminated 
92% of the punitives award. Thus, while the analysis does not answer the 
483 National studies have similarly found that punitive damages tend to be closely related to the size of 
the compensatory damages award. See Eisenberg, Predictability. supra note 44; Michael Rustad, In 
Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data. 78 IOWA 
L. REV. 1,50 (1992); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig. Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical 
Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations. Not "Moral Monsters." 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1009 
( 1995). 
484 See. e.g .. Development of the Law: Jury Determination of Punitive Damages, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
1534 (1997) ("Overall, statutory caps provide a certain and administratively easy solution to the perceived 
problem of excess in punitive damages awards, but they may prove to be too crude a reform measure, 
sacrificing flexibility and precision in the imposition of punishment and deterrence for the sake of greater 
control over the size of awards."). 
485 Table I-II are included at the end of this article, before Appendix A. 
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question of whether caps should be imposed, it does detail the specific impact 
that these popular proposals would have had on past judgments in Hawaii and 
reveal that the different proposals can have wildly different impacts on the 
same judgment, revealing the arbitrary nature of such proposals. 
7. Are Juries "Out of Con trol" ? Differences in Punitive Damages 
Judgments by Decisionmaker: Juries, Judges, and CAAP Arbitrators 
Another common assertion of tort reformers is that overly sympathetic 
"runaway" juries are the driver of large and frequent punitive damages 
awards.486 One popular proposal for reform of punitive damages, which has 
been often touted in Hawaii, is to take the decisionmaking out of the hands of 
juries and place it in under the control of judges, who are perceived to be 
more conservative and less prone to passion. The role of juries in awarding 
punitive damages is highly complex and this study does not attempt the type 
of behavioral analysis covered in major studies such as those by Eisenberg 
and Viscusi.487 Nonetheless, the Hawaii data do indicate some interesting 
differences in decisionmaking tendencies of state court juries compared to 
state court judges, which can inform the debate. In light of the Hawaii CAAP 
system, comparisons can also be made to quasi-judicial CAAP arbitrators, and 
to a lesser extent, with federal juries and judges in Hawaii. 
a. State Decisionmakers 
State Chart 12 examines the allocation of the fifty-six state court and 
CAAP awards reported during the study period by decisionmaker: jury, 
judge, and CAAP arbitrator. Of the total number of awards, thirty-one were 
made by juries (an overall mean of 1.82 per year); eight were made by judges 
(jury-waived cases) (an overall mean of 0.47 per year); and seventeen were 
made by CAAP arbitrators (an overall mean of 1.13 per year). 
The relative percentage of judgments by decisionmaker is examined in 
State Chart 13. Over the seventeen-year period, 55.36% of the state cases in 
which punitive damages were awarded were decided by juries, 30.36% by 
arbitrators, and 14.29% by judges. 
State Chart 14 shows the total, mean, and median punitive damages 
judgments by state decisionmaker over the study period. Juries awarded a 
total of $21,198,838 or 96.73% of the total state amount awarded, with an 
486 See Jeffry Jontz, Business Community Troubled by Excessive Punitive Damage Awards, 
ORLANDO Bus. J., Aug. 9, 1996, available at 
http://www.bizjournals.comlorlando/storieslI996/08/12/editoriaI2.html(last accessed June 20, 2004); 
see also Olson. Myth, supra note 32. 
487 See supra notes 44 & 51 and accompanying text. 
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overall mean award of $683,833, and an overall median award of $20,000. 
Judges awarded a total of $347,000, or 1.58% of the total amount awarded, 
with an overall mean award of$43,375, and an overall median of$15,000. 
CAAP arbitrators (assigned only cases valued at $150,000 or less) awarded a 
total of $370,252, or 1.69% of the total amount awarded, with an overall 
mean award of $21,780, and an overall median of $5,000. 
A comparison of the means-$683,833 for juries, $43,375 for judges, and 
$21,780 for arbitrators-suggests that juries do award substantially higher 
punitive damage judgments than either judges or arbitrators. Using the mean, 
juries award amounts sixteen times higher on average than do judges, and 
about thirty-one times higher than arbitrators. Judges award amounts about 
two times greater than arbitrators. Comparing the medians-$20,000 for 
juries, $15,000 for judges, and $5,000 for arbitrators-brings the overall 
differences down dramatically, with juries awarding amounts only 1.3 times 
higher than judges and four times higher than arbitrators. Judges award 
amounts three times higher than arbitrators. 
Most important, the substantially lower median than mean for jury awards 
compared to judge awards indicates that the bulk of jury awards are similar to 
the awards by judges but that a few high jury awards increased the mean 
much higher than the median. These statistics do not, ~owever, account for 
the important differences in the types of cases that flow to each kind of 
decisionmaker. 
In order to probe deeper into these numbers, it is helpful to examine the 
facts of the cases that were decided by judges and arbitrators, instead of by 
juries.488 The eight cases decided by judges included: Ofisa v. Navarette 
(Case S3, brutal beating of woman by kick boxer; defendant proceeded pro se 
after his counsel withdrew and the judge held a one-day trial); Caris v. Ludloff 
(Case S4, a severe assault and battery case against a female TV executive; the 
judge held a two-day trial); Sorrell v. Lynn (Case S5, where a psychiatrist 
fraudulently advised a court about the plaintiffs mental status, resulting in the 
forcible eviction of plaintiff and her infant grandson; judge held a two-day 
trial); Batangbacal v. Carlton Young (Case S8, in which a police officer with 
a prior assault conviction broke plaintiffs nose over a parking space spat; 
judge held a three-day trial); Cuson v. Agag (Case S 13, a DUI case where the 
defendant drove into crowd of high school students and then fled the scene; 
defendant defaulted; judge held one-day tria\); Uyeoka v. Kinkaid (Case S 18, 
a drunk driving accident with severe injuries to plaintiff; the defendant 
admitted liability at a one-day trial); Santiago v. King (Case S28, defendant 
488 See Appendix B. illfra. for case narratives. 
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inmate stabbed plaintiff inmate in eye with a sharp pencil; judge held seven 
days oftrial, finding both the State and defaulting defendant inmate liable, but 
entering punitive damages against the inmate only); and Mohr v. Kaan (Case 
S30, a defamation claim by one attorney against another; judge held a one-
day trial). 
Although there is no single common element to these cases, several do 
involve admissions ofliability, defaulting, or pro se defendants (Ojisa, Cuson, 
Uyeoka), cases in which defendants may have been more willing to put their 
fate in the hands ofa seasoned judge than an outraged community jury. All 
but one case involved relatively short trials. In four cases, both parties may 
have sought to avoid the adverse publicity of a jury trial (Caris, Sorrell, 
Batangbacal, and Mohr). Four cases involved assault or battery claims; two 
involved DUI defendants. None of these groupings fully explains, however, 
why judges' valuation of the punitive award would be substantially lower 
than ajury's assessment. 
b. Federal Decisionmakers 
Federal Charts 11 and 12 indicate the allocation of the seven federal 
punitive damages judgments during the study period by decisionmaker: jury 
or judge. All of the seven awards were made by juries and none by ajudge. 
Because of the lack of federal judge awards, no analysis of the differences by 
decisionmaker is possible for this set of data. 
c. Summary: Does the Decisionmaker Make a Difference? 
Overall, the study data are too limited to permit a confident comparison 
among the proclivity of judges, juries, and arbitrators in Hawaii to award 
punitive damages. The most useful finding is that, while a comparison of the 
mean awards suggests that state juries do award substantially higher (about 
sixteen times higher) punitive damage amounts than either judges or 
arbitrators, the median award of juries is only 1.3 times higher than that of 
judges and four times higher than that of arbitrators. In addition, under 
current Hawaii law, any punitive damages award found by a jury can be 
reviewed by the trial court judge and, if appropriate, a remittitur can be 
ordered.489 Therefore, judges already exert ultimate control over "excessive" 
jury awards in Hawaii courts. On the other hand, the standard of review 
favors deference to the jury,490 and therefore some constriction of awards is 
possible with a judge-only system. On balance, however, the data do not 
489 See supra notes 276-283 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Wilder v. Brown (Case S3 7), Appendix 
B (50% reduction by remittitur). 
490 See supra Part II E discussing the standard of review for punitive damages awards. 
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predict whether a statutory shift in decisionmaking authority of judges would 
have a meaningful impact on the bulk of punitive damages awards in Hawaii. 
D. Macro Trends: Comparing Punitive Damages Trends to Tort 
Caseload, Population, and Economic Changes in Hawaii 
The "caseload trends" portion of this study examined Hawaii tort caseloads 
for approximately the same period of time as the PIJH data, from fiscal year 
1984/85 through 1999/00, based on information contained in the State of 
Hawaii Judiciary's Annual Report. 49 I Some variations in caseload trends are 
simply beyond scholarly explanation-varying, one might suspect, with the 
natural vagaries of life on isolated islands hosting a resident population of 1.2 
million and up to six times that many visitors each year, and also reflecting 
Hawaii's large economic fluctuations since the mid-1980s.492 Some overall 
trends are apparent, however, providing an additional lens through which to 
view the punitive damages data. 
1. Hawaii Trends: Tort Case Filings Increasing Slowly 
Over the sixteen-fiscal-year period from 1984/85-1999/2000, Hawaii 
experienced an overall increase in the number of tort cases filed each year, 
although the numbers fluctuated annually.493 In 1984/85, a total of 1 ,676 tort 
cases were filed, compared to 1,706 in 2000, a net overall increase of only 
thirty cases (or 1.76%). In the interim years, however, tort caseloads climbed 
steadily, peaking during 1991192-1994/95, and falling since then. The 
average of the four-year peak from 1991192-1994/95 was 2,770, compared to 
the 1,676 filed in the first year of the study period 1984/85 (a 65.27% 
increase). After the peak, tort filings steadily decreased each year back to the 
mid-1980s level. Overall, the trend was positive (Trends Chart 1, R2=.089), 
and the average annual increase in tort filings for the sixteen-year period over 
the 1984/85 level was 515 cases per year (or 30.72% of the starting caseload 
in 1984/85). Trends Chart 1 also compares the trends in the filing of tort 
cases, including motor vehicle ("MY") and non-motor vehicle ("NMV") torts 
491 See. e.g., State of Hawaii Judiciary, Annual Report: July I, 1979 to June 30, 1980,70 tbl. 7( 1980). 
The Annual Reports provide information on case load activity for each fiscal year in all four circuit courts 
in the broad categories of civil actions (contract, torts, condemnation, other civil actions, and district court 
transfers), probate proceedings, guardianship proceedings, miscellaneous proceedings (land court, 
naturalization, liens, and other special proceedings), as well as criminal actions and supplemental 
proceedings. 
492 In the late I 980s, Hawaii's economy boomed from an influx of Japanese investment. When the 
Japanese economy went sour at the end of the decade, Hawaii's economic "bubble" burst, stagnating at 
only 0.5% growth per year in the 1990s. The State the Boom Forgot, THE ECONOMIST, June 18, 1998, at 
29. 
49J See Trends Chart I, infra. 
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categories, to all civil cases (contract, tort, condemnation, and other civil 
actions). Tort filings have increased more slowly than overall civil filings in 
Hawaii state courts. Examining the percentage of tort cases filed each year 
and comparing that result to all civil cases filed (Trends Charts 2), the relative 
percentage of tort cases in the state courts' annual civil docket is only slightly 
higher in 1999/00, the last year studied, than in 1984/85, the first year of the 
study (28.3% compared to 25%).494 Over the entire study period, tort case 
filings constituted an annual average of32.5% of the civil filings.495 
This comparison of tort and all civil case filings for the study period can be 
characterized by tort reform proponents as indicating both an "explosion" in 
tort filings and civil litigation generally, reinforcing their claims that Hawaii 
has become increasingly litigious. The plaintiffs' bar, on the other hand, can 
argue that, despite the overall increase in tort filings since 1984/85, tort filings 
have steadily decreased for the past several years. Moreover, this decrease 
occurred during some years when civil filings were steadily rising. Thus, they 
can point the finger at other types of civil litigation as the "true culprit" for 
increasing litigiousness. One way to further refine this discussion is to 
examine the tort filing increases in light of the changes in the Hawaii 
popUlation and economy over this same period of time. 
2. Hawaii's Per Capita Tort Filings Declined Despite Population Growth 
Some national studies claim that the increase in state tort cases merely 
tracks population growth,496 while others suggest that filings have grown 
faster than the population.497 For Hawaii, the correlation is not evident. 
During the same period covered by the trends study (1984/85-1999/2000), 
Hawaii experienced a steady moderate increase in population (Trends Chart 
3).498 Beginning with less than 1.04 million people in 1985, the population 
grew steadily until it peaked in 1998 at 1.19 million and then dropped slightly 
in 1999 to 1.185 million people. The net increase between 1985 and 1999 in 
494 The Hawaii data indicating steady increases in tort filings is comparable to a 1994 study by Thomas 
B. Marvell, which compared the tort caseloads of fifteen states, including Hawaii, for the 1983 - 1993 
decade. Marvell, supra note 40, at 195. The year Marvell's study ended, however, marked the beginning 
of the big decline in Hawaii tort filings, rendering his finding of a high 61 % increase in Hawaii tort filings 
in one decade, the second highest he found for all states, now inaccurate. 
,.s The percentage of tort cases filed compared to civil filings increased steadily from 1984/85 until a 
four-year peak period (1990/91-1993/94) when it averaged 39.8% (Trends Chart 2). The percentage oftort 
filings then steadily decreased for the following six years until the last period studied (1 999/00), dropping 
to a low of 26% (1998/99) and resting in 1999/00 at 28.3%. See Trends Chart 2, infra. 
496 Marvell, supra note 40, at 193 (citations omitted). 
497 Id. (citations omitted) . 
•• 8 Population data in Trends Chart 3 is reported by calendar year; tort filings are reported by second 
applicable fiscal year. 
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Hawaii's population was 145,000, or 14%. Tort filings for this same period 
show a substantial increase early on--peaking in the early 1990s--but then 
declining to earlier levels. As a result, there is no evident relationship 
between population and tort filings in the state (Trends Chart 3). 
Another approach to determining the relationship between population and 
tort filings is to look at the data in terms of changes over time in per capita 
filings per 100,000 people. Trends Chart 3, which reports Hawaii tort filings 
per 100,000 people from 1985-1999, indicates an increase from the starting 
point in 1985 of 168.70 cases per 100,000; a peak of 255.74 in 1992; and a 
distinct decline from 249.91 in 1994 to a low of 143.97 in 1999. The mean 
for the 1985-1999 period was 193.16. These results parallel the findings of 
Judge Richard Posner's 1997 article on tort caseload trends in the United 
States and England.499 His data indicated a "tort case filings per 100,000 of 
population" rate for Hawaii of219.6 (mean for the period 1985-1994).500 If 
truncated at 1994, the data on Trends Chart 3 indicate a similar mean of 
202.80 for this same period, but because the per capita rate began to fall 
distinctly after 1994, the ending year of the Posner study, the longer range 
mean (until 1999) is a much lower rate of 193.16.501 
Thus, when the increase in tort filings is considered in light of population 
data, two important observations can be made. First, perhaps unlike some of 
the states examined in other studies, Hawaii's tort filings are not evidently 
linked to population growth in the state. Second, the per capita rate of Hawaii 
tort filings decreased in recent years, most notably since 1994. Thus, the 
overall increase in tort filings, when viewed in context of a growing 
population, actually represents a decline in tort litigation per capita. 
3. Economic Context: Boom and Bust 
In addition to population changes, economic changes may playa role in 
499 Richard A. Posner, Explaining the Variance in the Number of Tort Suits Across U.S. States and 
Between the United States and England, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 477 (1997). 
soo [d. at 479, tbl. I. For 1986, Posner found a per capita rate for Hawaii of 191.4 per 100,000 
population. [d. In contrast, the study for this article found a lower rate for 1986 of 169.67. Posner, 
however, included in his data federal tort filings, which inflated the results. See id. at 479 n.8 (n<;lting the 
inclusion offederal cases, which, while "not well correlated" with state case filings, were on average "less 
than 10%" of the state figure). The Hawaii study found in 1986, a total of 10 tort judgments in federal 
court (Federal Chart I), but did not examine tortjilings for federal court. Assuming, generously, that 90% 
of all cases do not reach judgment, then there would have been roughly 100 federal tort cases filed in 
Hawaii in 1986. This would change the total tort filings to 1,885 instead of 1,785, resulting in a per capita 
rate of 179.18, closer to Posner's results. 
SOl Compared to 33 other states and England/Wales, Posner found that Hawaii had the 14th lowest per 
capita rate of tort filings. Posner, supra note 499, at 478, tbl. I. 
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tort litigation.5Ol During the last fifteen years, Hawaii has undergone a 
dramatic economic boom and bust cycle. In the late 1980s, the economy was 
flourishing, primarily due to Japanese investments in real property.50) When 
the Japanese economy turned sour just before the end of the decade, it burst 
Hawaii's economic bubble. Personal bankruptcy cases and unemployment 
skyrocketed between 1990 and 1997, the same period when Japanese 
investment dried Up.504 
The overall trend in tort case filings mirrored this general economic trend. 
As Trends Chart 1 indicates, state tort filings peaked in 1992/93 and then 
steadily decreased. Although a more extensive economic analysis was outside 
the scope of this article, considering the data in light of an expected lag from 
incident to filing, even this rough view of the data suggests that there may be 
a strong relationship between the state of the economy in Hawaii and tort case 
filings. 
E. Conclusion: Relationship o/Trends in Tort Filings, Population, and 
Economy to Hawaii's Punitive Damages Judgments 
Comparing the results of the Hawaii punitive damages study and the data 
on state trends in tort filings, population, and the economy, suggests that the 
general decline over time in the number of tort judgments, requests for 
punitive damages, and punitive damages judgments in Hawaii is more 
dramatic than when viewed in isolation. Since 1985, the annual number of 
state court tort judgments has declined, despite a rebound in 1992-1993, and 
remained below the annual mean of 41.18 for the last seven years of the study 
(State Chart 1). The annual number of requests for punitive damages declined 
in a similar pattern, also dropping below the annual mean of 15.29 for the last 
seven years of the study (State Chart 1). In parallel with these declines, the 
annual number of punitive damages judgments in state court also declined, 
and was below the annual mean of 2.29 for the last eight years of the study 
(State Chart 1). In contrast, the annual number of tort filings has increased 
steadily over time (although filings also show a significant decline in the past 
six years of the study (State Chart 15)). Hawiai's population has steadily 
increased at a rate that generates a decline in per capita tort filing rates even 
though overall filings increased, and this is especially evident in the last six 
years of the period studied (Trends Chart 3). 
S02 [d. at 477 (noting in his study of ton trends that economic variables "such as income. education, 
and urbanization. can explain much of the variance among these jurisdictions and that cultural factors are 
less imponant"). 
SO) The State the 800m Forgot. supra note 492. 
504 [d. 
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These recent trends, taken together, suggest a distinctive period of "tort 
litigation decline" in Hawaii beginning in approximately 1995 and evident 
through 1999-2001, seen in tort filings, tort judgments, requests for punitive 
damages, punitive damages awards, and per capita filings of tort cases. 
Hawaii's economic implosion that unfolded in the 1990s is a suggestive factor 
that merits further research. If the average jury member is "hurting" 
economically, is she less inclined to award punitive damages? Although the 
reasons why tort litigation and punitive damages activity would fall with the 
economy may, however, be too complex to untangle, further research is 
warranted 
An equally interesting factor worth exploration is whether all of the 
negative publicity over tort litigation and punitive damages generated by the 
Hawaii tort reform efforts that commenced in earnest in the late 1980s (see 
supra Part III) somehow dampened the enthusiasm of plaintiffs and their 
attorneys for seeking, and of juries and judges for awarding, punitive 
damages. Are plaintiffs' attorneys more hesitant to ask for punitive damages 
to avoid the popular aversion to punitive damages? 
The data in Trends Chart 4 suggest that, during the 1990s, there were 
distinctive changes in how state court tort cases were resolved, perhaps 
reflecting changes in plaintifflitigation strategies. For example, the number 
of cases terminated as a result of dismissal or stipulation (settlement) rapidly 
climbed after 1990 (almost doubling), then fluctuated dramatically until this. 
kind of termination seemed to decline steadily at the end of the decade, while 
the other methods of termination (by notice, by judge, by jury verdict, and by 
non-jury trial) were much less frequently used and remained relatively more 
stable." Could the increasing resort to settlement explain the decline in 
punitive damages judgments? These questions deserve further research. 
In summary, viewing the punitive damages data in light of the macro 
trends data enriches our understanding of the claim that Hawaii has recently 
experienced an "explosion" in punitive damages awards. There are many 
lenses with which one can view the problem, some of which lead to varying 
conclusions even with the same data. However, on the whole, the data show 
that punitive damages judgments (both in number and amount) have fallen 
steadily despite a slow rise in tort caseloads and a general increase in 
population.505 Ironically, the same adverse economic conditions that have 
helped fuel the tort reform movement in Hawaii, and the adverse publicity 
505 The long decline in the average annual amount of punitive damages judgments since 1988 was, 
however, drastically upset by the one high award in the Takaki case (S39) in 200 I (see State Chart 6 and 
Part V C I, infra). 
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generated by the movement itself, might be more effective brakes on punitive 
damages awards than any successful legislative reform. These "soft" 
indicators could be explored with extensive interviews but not through any 
existing quantitative data. Qualitative data on the specific facts ofthe cases in 
which punitive damages were reported, however, is a critical additional tool 
that can be used to reach a more refined understanding of the nature of the 
punitive damages system in Hawaii. The next Part analyzes the extensive 
qualitative data available for the study period through the detailed reports in 
PUH. 
V. THE QUALITATIVE CONTEXT: THE REAL STORIES 
BEHIND HAWAII'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENTS 
Takaki v. Cambra (Case S39): Defendant George Cambra conspired to 
bum the trucks of his only competitors in the cut-throat Hawaii movie 
production business. Plaintiff William Takaki's truck was burned to 
the ground, destroying his family financially and forcing him into 
bankruptcy. A State court jury awarded Takaki, his wife, and daughter 
$400,000 in emotional distress damages and $4,785,974 in punitive 
damages. 
This Part examines the past seventeen years of Hawaii punitive damages 
judgments in qualitative terms and presents the real stories behind the 
statistics. Analyzing the judgments in detail and by case category provides 
some valuable insights into the accuracy of the popular conceptions about 
punitive damages awards. The coding analysis also allows some useful 
comparisons between Hawaii judgments and those reported in the Florida 
study. This "micro" examination of the judgments presents a portrait of 
punitive damages judgments that is very different from the rhetorical 
criticisms, both locally and nationwide. 
A. The Value o/Qualitative Scholarship 
Qualitative scholarship "is a growing enterprise worldwide,,,so6 particularly 
in the fields of sociology and anthropology of education.507 Although it 
506 PAMELA MAYKUT & RICHARD MOREHOUSE, BEGINNING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A 
PHILOSOPHIC AND PRACTICAL GUIDE viii (1994). 
507 [d. For a general guide to qualitative research, see DAVID SILVERMAN, ED., QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH: THEORY, METHOD AND PRACTICE (1997). See also MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL 
HUBERMAN, AN EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS I (Sage Publications 2d ed. 
1994) (noting the shift toward the qualitative research paradigm); STEVEN I. MILLER & MARCEL 
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suffers from the misguided perception that it is less serious than quantitative 
methods, qualitative research, if done properly, can be equally rigorous, 
involve extensive data analysis, and offer a transparent research process.508 
For the qualitative researcher, the phenomenological and perspective-based 
approach captures "people's stories [and] the particulars of people's lives and 
what they mean," while the positivist paradigm of the quantitative approach 
"seeks to transcend the particular by higher and higher reaching for 
abstraction, and in the end disclaims in principle any explanatory values at all 
where the particular is concerned.,,509 The definitions of qualitative research 
vary, including such "diverse expressions" as "analytic induction, content 
analysis, semiotics, hermeneutics, elite interviewing, the study of life 
histories, and certain archival, computer, and statistical manipulations.,,5Io 
The qualitative approach should be familiar to the legal scholar, given the 
tradition of interpreting legal texts and of a "tolerance for ambiguity.,,511 The 
presentation of the case narratives in this study also draws on the growing 
scholarship of legal narrative or "storytelling.,,512 This scholarship has 
focused largely on the narrative of "outsiders" such as minorities and 
women,513 and tort victims similarly can be seen as a class whose "voice and 
perspective ... have been suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized."sI4 These 
"torts stories,,515 seem rarely to be considered in the public policy debate, but 
that should change. They should be illuminating to those considering 
modifying the punitive damages system in Hawaii and elsewhere. The 
FREDERICKS, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS: SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRACTICAL INQUIRY 
(1994). 
508 See MA YKUT & MOREHOUSE, supra note 506. 
509 Id. at 18 (quoting JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 13 (1986». 
510 JEROME KIRK & MARC L. MILLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 10 
(\986). 
511 MA YKUT & MOREHOUSE, supra note 506, at 35 (noting the difficulty for researchers ofletting the 
data speak for themselves because "it requires a tolerance for ambiguity"). 
512 See. e.g., GARY BELLOW & MARTHA MINOW, Eds., LAW STORIES (1996); PETER BROOK & PAUL 
GEWIRTZ, EDS., LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (1996); ROBERT L. RABIN & 
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, TORTS STORIES (2003); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call o/Stories, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 97\ (1991); Jean C. Love, The Value o/Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J. GENDER 
RACE AND JUST. 87 (1998). 
m See Love, supra note 512, at 87 n.2 (,"Outsider' scholarship is often written by feminists and 
members of racial minority groups."). See also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out 0/ 
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 824 (\993); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bol/om: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-26 (1987). 
514 Richard Delgado, Storytelling/or Oppositionists and Others: A Plea/or Narrative, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2411, 2412 (1989) (defining outsiders, whom he calls "outgroups"). See also Mary I. Coombs, 
Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1992) (describing the rise of 
outsider scholarship within legal scholarship). 
515 RABIN & SUGARMAN, supra note 512. 
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victims and defendants are not strangers; especially in a small state like 
Hawaii, they are our neighbors. 
B. Hawaii Case Narratives: Overview 
The stories underlying the sixty-three Hawaii punitive damages judgments 
(state, CAAP, and federal) from 1985 through 2001 provide important 
insights into charges that the tort system is out of control. Although it is 
difficult to categorize cases with multiple causes of action, even a basic 
sorting of the cases by their primary allegation reveals some notable patterns 
about what kinds of cases are "drivers" of punitive damages awards.516 
This study divided the cases into eight categories, attempting to join 
together cases with similar themes and facts. The eight categories designated 
were: 1) Violent Aggressors: assault, battery, and arson; 2) Abusers of 
Power: sexual harassment, wrongful termination, retaliatory discharge; 3) 
Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers: drunks and speeders; 4) Gross Negligence: 
dog bites, shorebreak accidents, medical fraud, workplace injury; 5) Offenses 
Against Mental and Physical Freedom: intentional/negligent emotional 
distress, defamation, false arrest, malicious prosecution; 6) Dishonesty: fraud, 
conversion, breach of contract; 7) Unsafe Products; and 8) Turning the 
Tables: cases in which defendants won reverse punitive damages. (Tables and 
appendicies referenced in this section may be found at the conclusion of this 
article, and on the author's website.517) Table 2 displays the overall 
distribution of the cases among the categories. As indicated in Table 2, of 
sixty-three518 punitive damage judgments reported in Hawaii during the study 
period, thirty-nine were state court judgments (62% of the total); seventeen 
were CAAP awards in which judgment was entered (27% of the total); and 
seven were federal court judgments (11%). The predominant type of case in 
which punitive damages were awarded was Category 1: Violent Aggressors, 
which included twenty-three cases, or 37% of the total judgments. Category 
2: Abusers of Power included eleven cases, 17% of the total judgments. 
Category 3: Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers, included ten cases, 16% of the 
516 This study provides limited comparative information within each case category. See infra Part V C. 
Other studies with larger numbers of judgments probe these questions more deeply. See, e.g., Robbennolt, 
supra note 56, at 165 n.284 (finding, for example, that rates of punitive damage awards "are higher in cases 
involving fraudulent or intentional misconduct and in cases involving slander or libel, employment 
harassment or discrimination, or unfair business practices"). 
SI7 See http://www2.hawaii.edul-antolini. Due to layout constraints, some tables are not printed in this 
article but are available on the author's website. 
518 In one of these judgments (Vidmar v. Kall, Case S24, verdict sheet available from author upon 
request) both the plaintiff and the defendant (on his counterclaim) were awarded punitive damages. For 
ease of analysis, the case is counted as one case, unless otherwise indicated. 
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total judgments. The next largest category was Category 5: Offenses Against 
Mental and Physical Freedom, which included eight cases, or 13% of the 
total. Together then, Categories 1,2,3, and 5 (violent aggressors, abusers of 
power, reckless/intoxicated drivers, and defendants who distressed, defamed, 
falsely arrested, and maliciously prosecuted plaintiffs) constituted a total of 
83% of all punitive damages judgments in Hawaii for the seventeen years 
studied. The remaining categories were each under 10% of the cases: 
Category 4: Gross Negligence: five cases or 8%; Category 6: Dishonesty: two 
cases, or 3%; Category 7: Unsafe Products: two cases, or 3%; and Category 8: 
Reverse (Defendants') Punitive Damages: two-three cases, or 3%. 
Case category distribution was highly related to jurisdiction. Seventy-nine 
percent of all state punitive damages judgments fell into Categories 1, 2, 3, 
and 5. All of the CAAP cases fell into Categories 1,2,3, and 4 (not 5), and, 
of those, 59% fell into Category l. There were no CAAP punitive damages 
awards for the study period in Categories 5-8 (Offenses Against 
Mental/Physical Freedom, Dishonesty, Unsafe Products, and Reverse 
Awards). The federal cases arrayed very differently than the CAAP cases 
(which reflects the different jurisdictional foundation of federal court): almost 
half (three or 43%) of the federal punitive damages judgments were in 
Category 5 (Defamation, False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution, and Emotional 
Distress); two (29%) fell into Category 2 (Abusers of Power), and one each 
(14% each) fell into Categories 4 (Gross Negligence) and 8 (Reverse 
Punitives). None of the federal punitive damages judgments involved 
Category 1 (Violent Aggressors), which is not surprising given that assault 
and battery is a classic state tort claim with no direct federal nexus (and, 
because of Hawaii's isolation, unlike in many states, there are not as many 
state tort cases in federal court under diversity jurisdiction). Similarly, there 
were no federal punitive damages judgments in Categories 3, 6, or 7. 
Appendix B contains the summary narratives of all 63 punitive damages 
judgment cases analyzed in this study. The following parts analyze common 
themes in these narratives, present selected case narratives, and provide 
relevant statistical information. 
C. Hawaii Case Narratives 
1. Category 1: Violent Aggressors 
The common element of the twenty-three cases in Category 1 is defendants 
who are violent aggressors.519 All but one case involved claims of assault and 
battery, most often with severe injuries resulting to the plaintiff. In seven of 
519 See Table I and Appendix B, infra. 
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the cases,520 women were abducted, beaten, raped, assaulted, abused, and 
abandoned. One case (Hubert v. Spotts Cleaning, C12) involved sexual 
assault on a sleeping man by another man. In four of the cases,521 the abuse 
came from the hands of police officers or security guards. Conversely, police 
officers and security guards were the victims of violence in two cases 
(DeGuiar v. Logan, C2, and Du Pont v. Pichay, C8). Two cases involved 
fights between children or teenagers (Niesl v. Statnon, S9; Rod v. Fanel/, 
SI9). Three cases involved brawls at bars (KJentzis v. Azubu U.S.A .. S27; 
Kim v. Nova International Hawaii Co., S32; Mcauley v. Sonke. S34). The 
remaining cases involved: inmate violence on another inmate (Santiago v. 
King, S28); arson (Takaki v. Tavares, S39); a domestic shooting (Gregory v. 
Ah Loy, C6); a sports injury (Armstrong v. Childress, C7); and assault on a 
disabled man (Ching v. Yan-To Wong. ClO). 
In one representative assault-and-battery case, Mcauley v. Sonke (S34), 
three men at a beachside bar in Waikiki were rating passing females by 
holding up scores on napkins. Plaintiff Mcauley, a 30-year-old female visitor, 
insulted by the men's actions toward her, tossed her shoe at them. When 
Mcauley attempted to retrieve the shoe, defendant Sonke punched her, pushed 
her to the ground, and continued to abuse her until strangers came to her aid. 
Mcauley suffered back injuries, black and blue eyes, and trauma after the 
incident. The jury apportioned fault 20% to Mccauley, 55% to Sonke, and 
25% to the bar, awarding general damages of $49,600, special damages of 
$16,000, and punitive damages against Sonke of $62,000. 
Of the twenty-three cases in Category I, the state cases predominate, 
consisting of thirteen or 57% of the cases (Table 2). Compensatory damages 
awards in the state cases totaled $1,216,713, with a mean of$93,593, and a 
median of $40,000 (Table 4). Punitive damages awards in the state cases 
totaled $5,292,514, with a mean of$407,116, and a median of$20,000. The 
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio in these cases ranged from a low of 
.02 ($40: $2493 - Niesl v. Stanton, S9, kids' fight) to a high of 11.9 
($4,785,974: $400,000 - Takaki v. Tavares, S39, the arson case), with a mean 
ratio of2.43, and a median ratio of 0.79. Either a 2:1 or 3:1 cap would have 
affected four of the cases. 
520 These seven Category I cases were: Ofisa v. Navarette (S3), Caris v. Ludloff(S4), Vidmar v. Kan 
(S24), Harper v. Freitas (C5), Panganiban v. Faulise (C9), and Doe v. Mew (CI4). Summaries of cases 
discussed in Part V are provided in Appendix B, infra; PIJH verdict sheets available from author upon 
request. 
521 Batungbacal v. Young (S8), Sigler v. City & County of Honolulu (SIO), Oakes v. Ohio (SI2), and 
Rosette v. Caling (CII). 
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Gregory v. Ah Loy (Case C6): Defendant Ah Loy admitted that, 
without provocation, he shot Gregory, who was visiting his former 
girlfriend's home to retrieve personal property. The bullet entered the 
base of Gregory's penis and traveled to his right femur. The CAAP 
Arbitrator awarded $317,316 in general damages and $100,000 10 
punitive damages. 
In Category 1, there were ten CAAP cases, or 43% of the total (Table 2). 
As expected, because of the lower threshold value in CAAP cases, 
compensatory awards in the CAAP cases were much lower than in the state 
cases, totaling $483,762, with a mean of $48,376, and a median of$20,895 
(Table 4). (Notably, the median for the CAAP cases and the state cases was 
almost the same.) Punitive damages awards in the CAAP cases were also 
substantially lower, totaling $321,850, with a mean of$32, 185, and a median 
of $14,375 (about 113 that of the state median). The punitive-to-
compensatory ratio in these CAAP cases ranged from "infinite" ($100:0 -
DeGuiar v. Logan, C2, missed punch) to a high of2.67 ($32,000: $12,000-
Doe v. Mew, C14, woman lured and sexually assaulted), with a mean ration of 
1.02, and a median ratio of 0.96. If a 2: 1 cap were imposed on CAAP cases, 
it would have affected two of the CAAP cases (Deguiar v. Logan, C2 and 
Doe v. Mew, CI4). A 3:1 cap would have affected only DeGuiar, the case 
with no compensatory award. 
There were no federal cases in Category 1. 
For all cases in Category 1, compensatory damages totaled $1,700,475, 
with a mean of $73,934, and a median of $20,949 (Table 4). Punitive 
damages totaled $5,614,364, with a mean of $244,103, and a median of 
$20,000. The punitive-to-compensatory ratio mean was 1.82, the overall 
mean ratio was 3.30,522 with a median of 0.84, below the proposed 2: 1 cap. 
A prominent characteristic of Category 1 cases is that they 
overwhelmingly involved lawsuits by individuals against individuals. This is 
also true of Category 3 cases (Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers) discussed in 
subpart 3 below. When all of the sixty-three punitive damages judgments are 
examined for the type of defendants involved in the case,m twenty-two of 
them (35%) involved only individual defendants. All but one of these cases 
were Category 1 (eleven cases) or Category 3 cases (ten cases).524 Thus, even 
m See supra notes 458 for an explanation of how these means were calculated. See also supra notes 
459 & 482. 
52) See Table 13, available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/-antolini. 
524 This count underestimates cases involving primarily individuals as defendants because cases with 
mixed defendants (e.g., an individual and even a dismissed business named as a defendant) were not 
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though it contradicts the characterization of tort reformers that punitive 
damages judgments are of greatest concern to businesses as potential 
defendants, the debate about punitive damages reform should acknowledge 
that the typical punitive damages case in Hawaii involves individual victims 
suing individual defendants who are either violent aggressors or reckless 
intoxicated drivers. This dominant type of "torts story" is not, however, 
mentioned in the rhetoric of reform. The general public may be much more 
sympathetic to punitive damages in general if they were aware of the 
frequency of awards in the context of this kind of personal violence. 
2. Category 2: Abusers of Power 
The eleven judgments in Category 2 involved defendants who abused their 
power relationship with the plaintiff through sexual harassment, wrongful 
termination, or retaliatory discharge. 525 In eight of those cases (73%), the 
plaintiff was female. In six of the cases, the plaintiff was fired or forced to 
quit by employers who were: seeking to prevent plaintiff from testifying to a 
grand jury that would incriminate defendant (Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 
Inc., S 11, a $1.5 million judgment, upheld on appeal by the Hawaii Supreme 
Court) 526; punishing a whistleblower (Calleon v. Miyagi, S25); replacing the 
older female plaintiff sales manager with younger male sales agents (Sullivan 
v. South Seas Motors, Inc., S33); discriminating against an older male 
(Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency Ltd., S35); requiring the plaintiff to 
work on Sabbath, against her religion (Floyd v. Wakenhut of Hawaii, CI6); 
and defaming the employee (Mano v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers 
Union, Local 996, F5). Three of the cases involved sexual harassment by 
male supervisors on the job (Wilder v. Paul Brown International, Ltd., S37; 
Laronal v. Hopper, Cl; Arceneaux v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant 
Employees Local 5 Union, F4), and one involved a male employee harassed 
by a homosexual supervisor (Awai v. Interstate Cleaning Corp., S38). The 
final case involved a male psychiatrist whose fraudulent testimony resulted in 
the forced eviction of a woman and her children (Sorrell v. Lynn, S5). 
Awai v. Interstate Cleaning Corp. (Case S38): Plaintiff, a young male 
night janitor, claimed that his male supervisor sexually harassed him on 
the job. Plaintiffs wife also suffered emotional distress when the 
supervisor made outrageous remarks directed at her and to her over the 
counted. See id. 
S25 See Table 5 and Appendix B, infra. 
526 See supra note 280. 
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phone. The state court jury awarded plaintiff husband and wife 
$50,607 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in punitive damages. 
In Category 2, there were seven state cases, or 64% of the total (Table 2). 
Compensatory awards in the state cases totaled $3,100,600, with a mean of 
$442,942, and a median of$504,892 (Table 5). Punitive damages awards in 
the state cases totaled $2,545,000, with a mean of$363,571, and a median of 
$150,000. The punitive-to-compensatory ratio in these state cases ranged 
from a low of 0.23 ($150,000: $644,510, Calleon v. Miyagi, S25 -
whistleblower) to a high of 17.24 ($50,000:$2,900 - Wilder v. Paul Brown, 
S37, hair salon employee sexually harassed by owner), with a mean ratio of 
3.45, and a median ratio ofO.59. If a 2: 1 cap were imposed on state cases, it 
would have affected three of the state cases in this category (Sorrell v. Lynn, 
S5; Pamer v. Americana Hotels, Inc., S 11; and Wilder); a 3: 1 cap would have 
affected only one case, Wilder (S37), noted above, which had the 17.24 ratio. 
In Category 2, there were two CAAP cases, 18% of the total. In the first 
case (Laronal v. Hopper, C 1), the compensatory award was $13,318, and the 
punitive award was $5,000, with a ratio of .38 (Table 5). In the second case 
(Floyd v Wakenhut, CI6), the compensatory award for the woman forced to 
work on her religious Sabbath was $3,114, and the punitive award was 
$5,000, generating a ratio of 1.61. Overall, the mean compensatory award for 
Category 2 CAAP judgments was $8,216, the mean punitives award was 
$5,000, and the mean ratio was .995. 
There were two federal cases in Category 2, 18% of the total, both 
involving female union employee plaintiffs (Table 5). In those cases 
(Arceneaux v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 5 Union, F4, 
and Mano v. Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Local 996, F5), the 
total compensatory award was $175,750, with a mean and median of$87,875; 
the total punitive damages award was $160,000, with a mean and median of 
$80,000. The mean and median ratio was 2.8. 
Wilder v. Paul Brown IntematiOilal, Ltd, (Case S37): Plaintiff, a 38-
year-old single woman who was the cosmetics director for Honolulu 
hairstylist Paul Brown, alleged she was subjected to sexual harassment, 
such as touching, exposing, and verbal comments, on and off work 
premises, resulting in emotional distress and a hostile work 
environment that caused her constructive discharge and clinical 
depression. After a six-day trial, the jury found for plaintiff on the 
assault count only, and for defendant on the other counts, awarding 
about $4,000 in compensatory damages and punitive damages of 
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$100,000, which Judge Kevin Chang reduced to $50,000. 
Considering all judgments in Category 2, the total of the compensatory 
damages awarded was $3,292,782, with a mean of$299,343. and a median of 
$50,607 (Table 5). Punitive damages judgments totaled $2,715,000, with a 
mean of $246,818. and a median of $60,000. The mean ratio for this 
Category was 2.88, the overall mean was .82, and the median was 0.61. A 2: 1 
cap would have reduced four of the eleven awards in Category 2 (36%), 
although a 3:1 cap would have affected only two cases (18%) (the 17.24 ratio 
in Awai v. Interstate Cleaning Corp., S37, involving a $50,000 punitives 
award already cut in half by the trial court judge, and the 5.0 ratio in 
Arveneaux v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 5 Union, F4, a 
$60,000 punitive damages award). 
A common element of nine of the eleven cases in this category527 was that 
they involved punitive damages judgments assessed in whole or in part 
against an employer of the plaintiff employee, for claims ranging from 
wrongful termination to sexual harassment. Seven of these cases involved 
private business defendants and two involved unions as employers. These 
types of employee cases, therefore, are a dominant arena for the assessment of 
punitive damages against "Hawaii businesses," yet they are not the 
prototypical story employed by the tort reform movement. Given the facts in 
these cases, it would indeed be difficult to find sympathetic allies for these 
aberrant "business defendants." 
3. Category 3: Drunk Drivers and Speeders 
The ten cases in Category 3 involved defendants who were reckless or 
intoxicated drivers (Table 6).528 Seven of the cases involved a drunk driver. 529 
In seven cases,530 the driver admitted liability. In two cases, the driver fled 
the scene (Cuson v. Agag, S 13, and Reder v. Seyler, S 15). Edward Agag, the 
defendant driver in case S13, described below, had his friend's car crashed 
into children on a school lawn before fleeing. One case involved two minors 
who hit an elderly woman plaintiff when they were speeding on the freeway 
527 See Table 13. The defendants in these cases were: S II (Americana Hotels and Flagship 
International); S25 (MTL, Inc.); S33 (South Seas Motors); S35 (Pacific Medical Collections, Inc.); S37 
(Paul Brown Int'l Ltd.); S38 (Interstate Cleaning Co.); CI6 (Wackenhut); F4 (Local 5 Union); and F5 
(Teamsters Union). 
528 See Table 6 and Appendix B, infra. 
529 Sananikone v. Large, S2; Cuson v. Agag, S 13; Reder v. Seyler, S 15; Tilton v. Rivera, S 17; Uyeoka 
v. Kinkaid, S 18; Ito v. Esias, C4; and Subia v. Batula, C 15. See Appendix B, infra. 
5JO Nakagawa v. Chevas, S I; Sananikone v. Large, S2; Reder v. Seyler, S 15; Tilton v. Rivera, S 17; 
Uyeoka v. Kinkaid, S 18; Searles v. Sweeny, C3; and Subia v. Batula, C 15. See Appendix B, infra. 
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after returning home from Hawaii Raceway Park (Yuson v. Thi Bui, C13). 
Cuson v Agag (Case S13): Defendant Agag drove his friend's black 
Toyota onto the sidewalk and lawn of Farrington High School, running 
down plaintiff children, who were walking on the lawn. Agag then fled 
the scene, traveling through the hallway, the lawn, and soon crashing 
into a fence. Agag had a BAC of .271, more than 3 times the legal 
limit. Then Circuit Court Judge Ronald Moon awarded plaintiffs 
$275,000 in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $7,500. 
In Category 3, there were six state cases, 60% of the total. Compensatory 
awards in the state cases totaled $5,765,915, with a mean of$960,985. and a 
median of $161,010 (Table 6). Punitive damages awards in the state cases 
totaled $128,000, with a mean of $21,333. and a median of $11,250. The 
punitive-to-compensatory ratio in these state cases ranged from a low of 0 in 
three cases ($2,500: $1,212,810, Nakagawa v. Chevas, S 1; $4,110: $3, Tilton 
v. Rivera, S 17; and $4,212,000: $25,000, Uyeoka v. Kinkaid, S 18) to a high of 
1.6 ($75,000: $47,020, Sananikone v. Large, S2), with a mean ration of .44, 
and a very low median ratio of 0.02. If either a 2: 1 or 3: 1 cap were imposed 
on state judgments, it would have affected none of them 
In Category 3, there were four CAAP cases, 40% of the total (Table 6). In 
these cases, the total compensatory award was $148,432, with a mean of 
$37,108, and a median of $25,000. The total punitive award was $29,001, 
with a mean of$7,250, and a median of $7,000. The mean ratio was 0.195 
and median was 0.13. Viewed collectively, these cases were well below the 
proposed ratio caps. 
There were no federal cases in Category 3. 
Uyeoka v. Kinkaid (SIS): Plaintiff Jon Oshiro, a 23-year-old single 
man, was driving along Kalanianaole Highway when he was hit by 
defendant William Kinkaid driving the opposite direction in the wrong 
lane. Kinkaid was attempting to pass traffic across the center line and 
hit Oshiro head on, causing plaintiff catastrophic injuries, including 
severe brain damage and confinement to a wheel chair. Kincaid had a 
blood a1cohollevel three times the legal limit; he was speeding, fleeing 
the scene of another vehicle collision that he had caused, and uninsured; 
and he had ignored a friend's warning not to drive. In a jury-waived 
trial, Judge Marie Milks awarded to Oshiro and his mother Mildred 
Uyeoka compensatory damages of $4,212,000 in compensatory 
damages and punitive damages of $25,000. 
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Considering all "Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers" cases, the total of the 
compensatory damages awarded was $5,914,347, with a mean of $591 ,435 
(about twice the mean in Category 2, and almost eight times higher than the 
mean in Category 1), and a median of$37,010 (about $13,000 less than the 
median in Category 2, and about $17,000 higher than in Category 1). 
Punitive damage judgments totaled $154,004, with a mean of $15,400 
(sixteen times lower than the means in Categories 1 and 2), and a median of 
$9,750 (about halfofCategory 1, and 116 of Category 2). The mean ratio for 
this Category was .34 (compared to 1.82 for Category 1, and 2.88 for 
Category 2), with a median of .05 (0.84 for Category 1; 0.61 for Category 2). 
A 2: 1 cap or 3: 1 cap would have had no effect on the awards in Category 3. 
4. Category 4: Gross Negligence 
The five judgments in Category 4: Gross Negligence involved a variety of 
factual settings.53l Two cases (Chase v. State o/Hawaii, S23 and Mitchell v. 
Physicians Health Plan 0/ Minnesota, F2) involved lawsuits against Maui 
hotels by tourists for severe injuries resulting from shorebreak accidents. In 
one case (Kanehe v. Brisebois, S6), an Akita with a history of attacking 
people bit the walking plaintiff multiple times. In the notorious fourth case, 
the only major medical malpractice case in the study, a plastic surgeon 
severely botched a breast implant procedure (Ditto v. McCurdy, S26). In the 
last case (Hart v. Pierner, C 17), an allegedly inebriated chiropractor 
negligently conducted a cervical adjustment and inappropriately touched the 
plaintiff. 
Ditto v. McCurdy (Case S26): Plaintiff, a 32-year-old married bar 
hostess sued Dr. McCurdy, a surgeon who performed breast implant 
surgery on plaintiff. Because of the botched procedure, plaintiff 
underwent three more breast surgeries under general anesthesia the 
same day; contracted a breast infection; underwent four breast 
manipulations and surgeries to break up scar tissue; developed a 
hematoma; was improperly sutured by defendant's unlicensed medical 
assistant; and ultimately had other physicians remove her implants 
because of complications. A state court jury awarded plaintiff 
$1,403,500 in compensatory damages and $600,000 in punitive 
damages. 
SJI See Table 7 and Appendix B, infra. 
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In the three state cases in Category 4, the compensatory awards totaled 
$1,716,550, with a mean of$572,183, and a median of$282,750 (Table 7). 
Punitive damages awards in the state cases totaled $1,115,000, with a mean of 
$371,667, and a median of$440,000. The punitive-to-compensatory ratio in 
these state cases ranged from a low of.43 to a high of2.48, with a mean ratio 
of 1.49, and a median ratio of 1.56. The 2: 1 cap would have affected only one 
of the three cases (Kanehe v. Brisebois, S6); the 3: 1 cap would not have 
affected any of these cases 
There was only one CAAP case in Category 4. For the inappropriate 
chiropractic treatment in Hart v. Pierner (C 17), the arbitrator awarded $9,465 
in compensatory damages and about the same amount, $9,400, in punitive 
damages, generating a ratio of .99. 
In the only federal case in Category 4, the compensatory award totaled 
$9.2 million and the punitive award totaled $3 million, yielding a ratio of .32. 
This case (Mitchell v. Physicians Health Plan o/Minnesota, F2) involved the 
Mauna Kea Beach Hotel's failure to warn a guest ofa dangerous shorebreak 
in front of the hotel. The plaintiff Norman Mitchell was rendered a 
quadripJegic by the swimming accident. Plaintiff claimed that the hotel was 
aware of 137 prior accidents, including three that resulted in quadriplegia. 
After a 13-day trial, the jury found the hotel 53% at fault, and plaintiffs 47% 
at fault, awarding $3.7 million in special damages, $2 million in general 
damages, and $3 million in punitive damages. Norman's wife Miriam 
received $2.5 in compensatory damages for her claims. 
Considering all cases in Category 4: Gross Negligence, the total of the 
compensatory damages awarded was $10,926,015, with a mean of 
$2,185,203, and a median of $282,750 (about two times the total 
compensatory awards in the next highest category, Category 3: Gross 
Negligence; a mean about four times higher than Category 3; and a median 
almost eight times higher than Category 3). Punitive damages judgments 
totaled $4,124,400 (less than the $5.6 million total of all awards in Category 
1: Violent Aggressors), with a mean of$824,880 (about three times the mean 
award in both Categories 1 and 3: Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers), and a 
median of $440,000 (more than seven times the next highest median of 
$60,000 for Category 2: Abusers of Power). The mean ratio for this 
Category was l.16 (lower than Category 2, 2.88, and Category 1, 1.82, but 
higher than Category 3, .34), with an overall mean ratio of .38 (third lowest of 
the first four categories), and a median of .99 (the highest median of the four 
categories). A 2: 1 cap would have.affected only one judgment in Category 4, 
the Kanehe v. Brisebois case (S6), where defendant's Akita bit the plaintiff 
multiple times, puncturing his left testicle, left thigh, and palm. The dog had 
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a history of biting five other people, including the plaintiffs grandson. The 
2: I cap would have reduced the punitive damages award from $75,000 to 
$60,600. The 3: I cap would have had no impact on the awards in Category 4. 
5. Category 5: Violations oj Mental and Physical Freedom 
The eight cases in Category 5 involved a variety of abuses of the mental 
and physical freedom of plaintiffs.532 Ironically, Dr. McCurdy, one of the 
defendants who secured a punitive damages award in this Category by suing 
another surgeon for defamation (McCurdy v. Schlesinger, S20) was the 
subject of the very large punitive damages award in Category 4 (Gross 
Negligence) four years later (described above, Ditto v. McCurdy, S26). One 
case (Lessary v. Lessary, S22) involved coercion by an attorney, Leonard 
Appell, who was also the subject ofa punitive damages award in Category 6: 
Dishonesty (Rodman v. Appell, S21). Two other cases involved attorneys: 
one where an attorney maliciously defamed another attorney (Mohr v. Kaan, 
S30) and one (Locricchio v. Legal Services Corporation oj Hawaii, FI) 
involving the former head of Legal Services Corporation of Hawaii 
("LASH"), Anthony Locricchio, who won a substantial judgment against 
other lawyers in the LASH office for defamation, interference with contract, 
and wrongful termination. Three cases involved false arrest or malicious 
prosecution: one by a large merchant (Clawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
S 14), one by officers who incarcerated and abused a woman who had claimed 
she had been raped (Carnell v. Grimm, F6), and one where an unlawful search 
and seizure by defendant police officers resulted in plaintiffs incarceration 
for three years (Pulse v. City & County oj Honolulu, F7). The following case 
(Schmidt v. AOAO Marco Polo Condominium, S29) involved a very heated 
personal feud that led to a punitive damages verdict despite the lack of 
compensatory damages: 
Schmidt v. AOAO Marco Polo Condomillium (Case S29): Plaintiff 
Schmidt, a realtor who lived and had an office at the Marco Polo 
Condominiums, heard conversations between the security officer and 
AOAO president referring to shooting plaintiff, hiring a big Samoan" 
"to kill him, calling plaintiff and his wife crooks ... liars ... Nazis," 
and over 200 other similar statements. After a twenty-two-day trial, the 
jury held for defendants on all substantive counts, but nonetheless 
awarded punitive damages of$35,000. 
m See Table 8 and Appendix B, infra. 
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In the five state cases in Category 5, the compensatory awards totaled 
$244,352, with a mean of $48,870, and a median of $25,000 (Table 8). 
Punitive damages awards in the state cases totaled $906,500, with a mean of 
$181,300, and a median of $35,000. The punitive-to-compensatory ratio in 
these state cases ranged from "infinite" (S29, the Schmidt case, described 
above), to a high of 4.42 ($800,000:$181,000, in Lessary, S22, attorney 
coercion), with a mean ratio of 1.69, and a median ratio of 1.5. The 2: 1 and 
the 3: 1 cap would have affected two cases of these five state judgments 
(Schmidt, S29 and Lessary, S22). No CAAP cases appeared in Category 5. 
Pulse v. City & COUllty of HOllolulu (Case F7): Plaintiff Pulse, a 
carpenter apprentice who lived on a sailboat in Keehi Harbor Lagoon, 
was arrested by two Honolulu police officers who were called to the 
scene by a report of terroristic threatening. The officers claimed that 
plaintiffs gun was in plain view. Pulse was incarcerated for three 
years. A federal court jury found that the search and seizure were 
illegal, resulting in wrongful incarceration. The jury awarded $50,000 
in general damages and $350,000 in punitive damages. 
In the three federal cases in Category 5, the compensatory awards totaled 
$509,000, with a mean of $169,667, and a median of $50,000. Punitive 
damages awards in the federal cases totaled $515,000, with a mean of 
$171,667, and a median of$100,000. The punitive-to-compensatory ratio in 
these federal cases ranged from a low of .23 ($427,000:$100,000, 
Lochricchio, Fl) to a high of7.0 ($350,000: $50,000, Pulse, F7), with a mean 
ratio of3.09 and a median ratio of2.03. The 2: 1 cap would have affected two 
of these federal judgments (Carnell v. Grimm, F6; and Pulse, F7), and the 3: 1 
cap only one (Pulse). 
Considering all of these Offenses Against Mental and Physical Freedom 
judgments in Category 5, the total of the compensatory damages awarded was 
$753,352, with a mean of$94,169, and a median of$34,500 (the lowest of the 
first five categories, less than half of the total of$l. 7 million total in Category 
1: Violent Aggressors). Punitive damages judgments totaled $1,421,500, with 
a mean of$I77,688 (the fourth lowest), and a median of$57,500 (the second 
lowest). The mean ratio for this Category was 2.22 (the second highest), with 
an overall ratio of 1.89 (second highest), and a median ratio of 1.75 (the 
highest, more than twice that of the next highest median ratio of .84 for 
Category 1). A 2:1 cap would have impacted halfofthe awards in Category 
5, and the 3: 1 cap would have affected three of them. The most dramatic 
impact of a cap would have been in two cases: Schmidt (S29), where punitive 
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damage would have been barred entirely because of the lack of a 
compensatory award for the repeated verbal harassment of the defendants (see 
narrative supra), and the Pulse case (F7), in which plaintiff was unlawfully 
incarcerated for three years in federal prison (reducing the punitive award 
from $350,000 to $100,000 under a 2:1 cap andto $150,00 under a 3:1 cap). 
6. Category 6: Dishonesty 
Critcher v. Critcher (Case S7): A mother sued her adult son (a savings 
and loan executive) for breach of contract, fraud, emotional distress, 
breach of confidential trust, constructive trust, and wanton and reckless 
acts resulting from the sale of real property. The son's counterclaims 
for malicious prosecution, libel/slander, and abuse of process were 
dismissed as frivolous, and attorneys' fees were granted to the mother. 
The state court jury awarded the mother $95,000 in compensatory 
damages and $10,000 in punitive damages. 
Only two cases fell into Category 6, and both involved extraordinary levels 
of dishonesty.S33 The Critcher v. Critcher judgment (S7), described above, 
and Rodman v. Appell (S21), another case involving the attorney Leonard 
Appell, who was also hit with an $800,000 punitive award in a Category 5 
case (Lessary, S22): 
Rodman v. Appell (Case S21): Plaintiff had retained attorney Leonard 
Appell, who had been denied a license to practice law in New 
Hampshire for lack of moral integrity, to represent him in a malpractice 
action, when Appell removed all or most of a $10,000 retainer provided 
by plaintiff from the attorney trust account without his consent. 
Appell's counterclaims were dismissed. He failed to answer the 
complaint, took a default judgment, and filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
After the bankruptcy stay was lifted, the state court jury awarded 
plaintiff special damages of$12,943 and punitive damages of$250,000. 
In these two cases, the compensatory awards totaled $107,943, with a 
mean and median of $53,972. The punitive damages awards totaled 
$260,000, with a mean and median of $130,000. The punitive-to-
compensatory ratios in these two state cases were 0.10 (Critcher, S7) and 
19.32 (Rodman, S21), resulting in a mean and median ratio of9.71. The 2:1 
533 See Table 9 and Appendix B, infra. 
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or 3: 1 cap would have greatly affected the Rodman case (19.32 ratio), cutting 
the plaintiffs punitive damages award from $250,000 to either $26,000 or 
$39,000, but not the mother-son Critcher fraud case (0.10 ratio). As with 
Category 5, no CAAP cases appeared in Category 6. There were also no 
federal cases in Category 6. 
Compared to the categories already discussed, in terms of compensatory 
damages, Category 6: Dishonesty, had the lowest total and the lowest mean, 
but had the second highest median. For punitive damages, this category had 
the lowest total, the second lowest mean, and the second highest median 
($130,000 compared to the median of $440,000 for Category 4: Gross 
Negligence). The mean punitives-to-compensatory ratio for this category was 
substantially higher than for other categories (9.71), but this was driven up by 
the 19.32 ratio in Rodman, and the overall mean ratio was 2.40 (less than 
Category 1: Violent Aggressors). 
7. Category 7: Unsafe Products 
Masaki v. General Motors Corp. (Case S 16): Stephen Masaki, a 28-
year-old auto mechanic, was sent to fix a starter on a GM van. While 
Stephen was under the van removing a cable on the remote starter, the 
van jolted from Park and went into Reverse, crushing his head and 
rendering him a quadriplegic. His parents claimed emotional distress 
from seeing him in the hospital and loss of their son's consortium. 
Plaintiffs alleged that GM was aware of hundreds of deaths and injuries 
from the same PRNDL defect, yet failed to fix the problem or issue a 
warning. After forty-nine days of trial, a state court jury found Stephen 
40% comparatively negligent, and GM 60% at fault. The total verdict 
included $5,284,000 in compensatory damages and a record 
(unreduced) punitive damages award of$II.25 million. On appeal, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed that punitive damages can be awarded 
in product liability cases, but adopted a clear and convincing standard 
for all Hawaii punitive damages awards, and remanded for a new 
award. The case ultimately settled for a confidential amount. 
Only two cases fell into Category 7, both involving judgments against 
national products manufacturers, Masaki and Tabieros and in both cases the 
punitive damages judgments ($11.25 million and $52,000) were ultimately 
reversed by the Hawaii Supreme Court on appeal.534 In, Tabieros v. Matson 
534 Masaki was reversed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1989. See supra note 78. The jUdgment 
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Navigation Co .. Inc. (S31), the injuries were as horrific as the severe injuries 
in Masaki. The defendants' defective dock straddler, a massive piece of 
equipment used to move shipping containers at the Honolulu docks, collided 
with the plaintiffs vehicle, crushing his legs and causing other severe 
injuries. A state court jury awarded the plaintiff $479,400 in compensatory 
damages and $52,000 in punitive damages (only against the product 
manufacturer). 
In these two cases, the compensatory awards totaled $5,763,400, with a 
mean and median of $2,881,700 (Table 10). The punitive damages awards 
totaled $11,302,000, with a mean and median of$5,651 ,000. The punitive-to-
compensatory ratios in these two state cases were 0.11 (Tabieros, S31) and 
2.12 (Masaki. SI6), resulting in a mean and median ratio ofl.15. The 2:1 cap 
(but not a 3: 1 cap) would have reduced the Masaki case (2.12 ratio) by about 
$650,000 ($11.25 million to $10.6 million); the caps would not have affected 
the Tabieros case (0.11 ratio). 
Compared to the other categories mentioned above, Category 7: Unsafe 
Products, had the third highest total compensatory awards awards, the second 
highest mean (slightly less than Category 4: Gross Negligence), and the 
highest median (ten times higher than the median of$282,750 in Category 4). 
For punitive damages, Category 7 had the highest total amount awarded ($11 
million, about twice that of the next highest category, Violent Aggressors, 
which had twenty-three total cases compared to the two for Category 7); and 
the highest mean and median award (about seven times higher than the mean 
of$824,880 in Category 4: Gross Negligence, and thirteen times the median 
in that category). The mean ratio for Category 7 of 1.15 was lower than six of 
the categories, and the median of 1.15 was lower than only two other 
categories. The overall mean ratio was third highest. 
No CAAP and no federal cases appeared in Category 7. 
Thus, of the thirty-nine Hawaii state court punitive damages judgments, 
only two, or 5% of these judgements, involved products liability. When 
combined with the CAAP and federal categories, the percentage falls to 3% 
(2/63). 
Tort reform proponents often claim that a primary reason for limiting or 
eliminating punitive damages verdicts is that they fall too heavily on the 
manufacturers of products and are, therefore, unduly burdensome on business 
_against Clark Manufacturing in Tabieros was reversed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1997. See supra 
note 405 and Appendix B, § 7. Clark had lost an earlier appeal by plaintiffs to the Hawaii Supreme Court, 
which found that Clark should not have been granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' punitive 
damages claim at the first trial. Tabieros v. Diaz, 827 P. 2d 1148 (Haw. 1992) (Mem. Op.). 
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and stifle innovation.535 To respond to this criticism, Vidmar and Rose's 
Florida study examined the frequency of punitive damages in products 
liability cases. Vidmar and Rose concluded that, contrary to the popular 
claims, "with the exception of asbestos cases, punitive damages were almost 
never given in products liability cases.,,536 Of the 225 Florida punitive 
damages verdicts they studied, only 16537 were in products liability cases, 
about 7% of all verdicts.538 The numbers, as indicated above, are similarly 
small for Hawaii: 5% of state punitive damagesjudgments and 3% of all such 
judgments studied. Further comparisons with the results of the Florida study 
are discussed in E, below. 
8. Category 8: Reverse Punitive Damages 
The last category of coded narratives involves three highly unusual cases 
where the defendant counterclaimed and won punitive damages. In one of 
these cases (Vidmar v. Kan, S24 a domestic violence case also reported in 
Category 1), both the plaintiff and defendant were awarded punitive damages 
($7,500 for the plaintiff and $750 for the defendant). Another case involved a 
prominent trial of a university professor for sexual harassment claims by a 
student. In Gretzinger v. University of Hawaii Professional Assembly (F3), a 
female University of Hawaii student, Michelle Gretzinger, claimed that the 
defendant, her professor Ramdas Lamb, subjected her to unwelcome sexual 
advances, including sixteen rapes, and that he bribed other students into 
sexual relationships through his advisor position. Lamb counterclaimed. 
After a fourteen-day trial, a jury found in favor of Lamb, awarding him 
$40,000 in general damages, $12,750 in special damages, and $80,000 in 
punitive damages. 
In these three cases, the compensatory awards totaled $453,053, with a 
mean of $151 ,017, and median of $300 (Table 11). The punitive damages 
awards totaled $80,751, with a mean of$26,917, and median of$750. The 
punitive-to-compensatory ratios in the three cases ranged from a low of 0.18 
(Gretzinger v. Lamb, F3), to .33 (Kikumoto v. HTH Corp., S36), to 2.5 
(Vidmar v. Kan, S24), with a total mean ratio of 1.00 and median of.33. The 
2:1 cap but not the 3:1 cap would have affected only the Vidmar case 
(reducing the award from $750 to $600), but not the other two cases. 
m See, e.g., supra notes 364-368 and accompanying text. 
S3b Vidmar & Rose, supra note 71, at 487. 
537 Compare Vidmar & Rose, supra note 71, tbl. 2 (noting 20 products liability cases in which punitive 
damages were presented to the jury) with text, id. at 496 (explaining that awards were made in 16 of those 
20 cases). 
538 [d. Table 2. 
2004] Hawaii Punitive Damages 263 
Kikumoto v. HTH Corporation (Case S36): In what plaintiff alleged as 
a whistlebIowers' case, the plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully 
terminated for opposing defendant corporation's policies on race 
discrimination, and for drawing attention to building-code and worker-
safety violations. The plaintiff told the defendant he was also 
substantially underpaid. The defendant HTH Corporation 
counterclaimed, contending the plaintiff had obtained confidential 
records, was extorting a salary increase, and had been justly terminated. 
The jury found for the defendant on all counts and awarded the 
defendant symbolic damages of $3.00 for the breaches and $1.00 in 
punitive damages. 
These "reverse punitives" cases are so unusual that comparing them with 
cases in other categories is not illuminating. They do demonstrate, however, 
that punitive damages claims by plaintiffs can backfire, and that juries (and 
courts) will sometimes tum the tables on a misguided or unsympathetic 
plaintiff. Only in the Gretzinger case, however, was the reverse punitive 
damages award substantial ($80,000). 
D. Tort Reform Rhetoric: Undue Burden on Certain Defendants? 
A common complaint made by tort reformers is that the unfair burden of 
punitive damages falls most heavily on businesses, landowners, and medical 
professionals.539 A review of the narratives in the Hawaii cases discussed 
above suggests that these criticisms lack substantial support. 
Other than the seven cases mentioned in Category 2: Abusers of Power, in 
which private Hawaii businesses were sued as employers of the plaintiff(e.g., 
for wrongful termination or sexual harassment) (11% of all judgments), 
businesses were held liable for punitive damages in only five of the sixty-
three cases (8%).540 In Clawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (SI4), Sears 
unlawfully initiated a false arrest and was found liable for $20,000 in punitive 
damages (but was granted a motion for a new trial). In Masaki v. General 
Motors Corp. (S 16), the punitive damages verdict for GM's defective van set 
a record at $11.25 million (but this was reversed on appeal). In Tabieros v. 
539 Five cases in the study involved legal professionals as defendants for claims ranging from fraud, 
malpractice, and defamation (see Table 13, available on author's website: Critcher v. Critcher, S7; Rodman 
v. Appell, S21; Lessary v. Lessary, S22; Mohr v. Kaan, S30; and Locricchio v. Legal Services Corp. of 
Hawaii, F I), but punitive damages judgments against legal professionals never seem to be mentioned as an 
inspiration for tort refonn. 
S40 See Table 13 on author's website. 
264 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XX: 143 
Matson Navigation Co., Inc. (S31), Clark Equipment was found 34% at fault 
and assessed punitive damages of$52,000 (also overturned on appeal).541 In 
Kim v. Nova International Hawaii Co., Ltd. (S32), the defendant dba 
Maharaja nightclub was hit with punitive damages of $25,000 for failure to 
stop or intervene in a bar fight. Lastly, in Mitchell v. Physicians Health Plan 
of Minnesota (F2), Westin Hotels dba Mauna Kea Beach Hotel hotel was 
found 53% negligent to a hotel guest rendered a quadriplegic when it knew of 
137 prior incidents at its beach (punitive damages totaled $3 million). 
Of these five defendants, four were major national corporations (Sears, 
General Motors, Westin, and Clark Equipment) and one (Nova International 
Hawaii Co., Ltd.) was a Japanese company that purchased the large Waikiki 
nightclub in 1989.542 Thus, although economic contributions ofnon-Hawaii-
based corporations are undoubtedly important to Hawaii's economy, it cannot 
be said that "local Hawaii businesses" have been hit hard, or even touched, by 
punitive damages judgments during the study period for their business 
activities. On the other hand, local Hawaii businesseshave certainly been 
found culpable in the context of employee-employer discrimination cases 
(such as the $1.5 million punitive damages judgment in Parnar, as described 
in Part V C 2 above). This unusual disparity in the "business impact" of 
punitive damages, however, never seems to be explained in the public debate. 
Hawaii "landowners," either individuals or businesses, were assessed 
punitive damages judgments in three cases (5%): Kanehe v. Brisebois (S6), 
where the defendant individuals and their farm, Wainiha Valley Farms, were 
all assessed punitive damages for their dog's attack on the plaintiff; Chase v. 
State of Hawaii (S23), a case in which the AOAO of the Whaler on Kaanapali 
Beach was assessed $440,000 in punitive damages for failure to warn of the 
dangerous shorebreak that injured the plaintiff visitor (where the AOAO knew 
of20-22 similar incidents in front of the beachside property); and Mitchell v. 
Physicians Health Plan of Minnesota (F2), mentioned above, involving the 
Mauna Kea Hotel. 543 
Medical professionals were held liable for punitive damages in three 
judgments (5%): the two cases involving plastic surgeon Dr. McCurdy-
McCurdy v. Schlesinger, S20, where he sued another Maui surgeon who had 
impugned his qualifications and forced him to relocate to Honolulu (winning 
an award of$50,000 in punitive damages) and Ditto v. McCurdy, S26, where 
S41 See supra note 535. 
S42 For infonnation on Nova. see State of Hawaii. Department of Business Economic Development and 
Tourism, Selected Foreign Commercial Activities. 1954-1998. Japan (l 988-1 989}. available at 
hUp://www.hawaii.gov/dbedtlfia98/alpha-j88.html) (last accessed June 20, 2004). 
l43 See Table 13 on author's web site. 
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Dr. McCurdy was sued by a breast surgery patient for malpractice and was hit 
with a $600,000 punitive damages judgment that he has, to date, successfully 
appealed multiple times on procedural grounds, although the appellate courts 
clearly agree with plaintiff on the merits.544 In the only other medical 
professional case, Hart v. Pierner (C17), a chiropractor negligently adjusted 
plaintiffs back, causing her cervical injury. He had allegedly had been 
drinking and touched plaintiff inappropriately, leading to a $9,400 punitive 
damages award. Thus, only two claims actually involved medical 
malpractice, and in the only one with a major award, McCurdy, the plaintiff 
has to date not yet recouped any part of that punitive damages judgment more 
than ten years after the favorable judgment. 
In short, the qualitative data on Hawaii punitive damages judgments do not 
support some of the most commonly made assertions by reform proponents 
about who is hit hardest by such awards. As discussed above, the typical 
defendant assessed a punitive damages verdict in Hawaii is not a private 
business, landowner, or medical professional but rather an individual violent 
aggressor or reckless/intoxicated driver. On the other hand, Hawaii juries, 
judges, and arbitrators have entered a handful of punitive damages judgments 
against some national and international corporations that do business in 
Hawaii for their business-related activities or products, but not against any 
businesses that might fairly be called "local Hawaii businesses." Local 
businesses have been hit with punitive damages, however, in their roles as 
employers in lawsuits won by harassed or wrongfully discharged employees. 
Awards have also been issued against a few Hawaii landowners and two 
medical professionals. These awards have tended to be much larger than 
those imposed on individuals, but several of the largest ones (Masaki, 
Tabieros, and, to date, Ditto) were successfully appealed by the corporate or 
professional defendants, nullifying the awards. 
Those wishing to select the poster children for tort reform in Hawaii might 
be well served to examine the details of the actual judgments and the 
identities of the defendants, and whether such judgments actually were ever 
upheld or paid, before seeking the sympathy of legislators or the public. As 
the data from the case narratives shows, the tragic torts stories that form the 
bulk of the punitive damages judgments in Hawaii involved neither terribly 
appealing defendants nor compelling demonstrations of unfairness. To the 
contrary, the ordinary person might find -- as the juries, judges, and 
arbitrators did in these cases -- that the defendants in these cases well 
-deserved the sting of a punitive damages award. 
S44 
See infra Appendix B for a summary of the complex appeals in this case. 
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E. Comparisons to Vidmar and Rose's Florida Study 
The Florida study by Vidmar and Rose is the only published study to date 
that similarly presents case narratives in punitive damages judgments sorted 
into categories in order to more deeply probe the question of what types of 
cases generate what types of punitive damages awards.545 To compare the 
results ofthe two state studies,s46 some of the categories used by the Florida 
study were combined to more closely match the Hawaii categories (e.g., the 
Florida premises liability and professional negligence cases were matched 
with the Hawaii gross negligence category). The Hawaii study did not use 
two of the categories used in the Florida study (workplace injuries and 
improper treatment of the dead) because there were no such reported Hawaii 
judgments, and the Florida study did not have the "reverse punitive damages" 
category included in the Hawaii study. Otherwise, the similarities in case 
groupings are more striking than the differences. 
Comparisons of the data are, of course, quite difficult given the differences 
in: the periods of time studied, the court systems, the state doctrinal 
backgrounds, the number of judgments studied, total population, and myriad 
other factors. 547 Nevertheless, there are some interesting similarities. 
Focusing on punitive damages awards in the matched categories, for Category 
1: Violent Aggressors (Hawaii, n=23)/Assaults (Florida, n=43), the median 
punitive damages award in Hawaii was $20,000, compared to the Florida 
median of $59,832. In Category 2: Abusers of Power (II )/Discrimination-
Harassment (13), the median punitive damages award in Hawaii was $60,000, 
compared to $1,0320 in Florida. For Category 3: Drunk Drivers and Speeders 
(1 O)/Motor Vehicle Accidents (63), the Hawaii median was $9,570 compared 
to the Florida median of $21,579. For Category 4: Gross Negligence 
(5)/Premises Liability & Professional Negligence (29), the Hawaii median 
punitive damages award was $440,000 and the Florida median was 
$1,006,172. For Category 5: Mental and Physical Freedom(8)/Inforrnation 
Violations & False ImprisonmentiArrest(40), the Hawaii median was $57,500 
and the Florida median was $139,814. In Category 6: Dishonesty(2)/Fraud, 
Contract Violations, Financial Damages(47), the Hawaii median was 
$130,000, compared to $318,055 in Florida. Finally, in the last comparable 
54S The 1999 study of Ohio products liability and medical malpractices cases uses a similar categorical 
technique, but does not focus on punitive damages awards. See Merritt & Barry, supra note 47, at 328-29. 
546 See Table 12, available on author's web site. 
547 The Hawaii study did not, for example, adjust the dollar values for inflation, as did the Florida 
study. This would tend relatively to overweight the value of earlier verdicts and the Hawaii verdicts for 
purposes of comparison. 
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category, Category 7: Unsafe Products(2)/Products Liability(20), the Hawaii 
median was $5,561,000, compared to the Florida median of$669,936. 
Thus, in six of the seven categories, the median punitive damages award in 
Hawaii was substantially lower than the median punitive damages award in 
Florida. Only in the last category, unsafe products, did the Hawaii median 
exceed that of Florida, but the Hawaii median was based on only two cases, 
and in both of those cases (Masaki and Tabieros) the punitive damages 
verdict was ultimately reversed. 
For Hawaii, the top three median awards categories were (in order) 
Category 7: Unsafe Products, Category 4: Gross Negligence, and Category 6: 
Dishonesty. For Florida, Discrimination/Harassment was the highest 
comparable category, followed by Professional Negligence, and then Products 
Liability. (Improper Treatment of the Dead had the highest median in 
Florida, $3 million, but there were no comparable Hawaii cases reported.) 
Thus, the two states were similar in sharing high median values in two out of 
three of these categories: Unsafe Products and Gross Negligence. 
For Hawaii, the three lowest median categories were, Category 1: Violent 
Aggressors, Category 5: Mental and Physical Freedom, Category 3: Drunk 
Drivers and Speeders, and Category 1: Violent Defendants. For Florida, the 
three lowest median categories were Motor Vehicle Accidents (similar to 
Hawaii Category 3), Assaults (similar to Hawaii Category 1), and Information 
Violations (similar to part of Hawaii Category 5). Interestingly, the two states 
show near-complete overlap in these three low-end categories. 
Comparing the Florida and Hawaii data suggests several observations 
relevant to the punitive damages debate. Even though punitive damages 
judgments due to unsafe products were a small percentage of the pool (3-5% 
in Hawaii, and 7% in Florida, as noted above), these cases generated the 
highest median award among all eight categories in Hawaii and the fourth 
highest median in Florida among the eleven categories used by the Florida 
study. On the other hand, while Professional Negligence generated a high 
median in Florida ($1 million) (n= 12), the median in Hawaii was much lower 
($304,700 when only the two medical malpractice cases are selected from 
Category 4). Although the Hawaii numbers are small, it can be said that 
punitive damages verdicts involving negligent, large, out-of-state corporations 
in Hawaii and negligent professionals in Florida are each state's respective 
"high end" punitive damages awards. Whether it is the verdicts themselves, 
the severity of the injury to the plaintiffs, the callous nature of defendants' 
behavior, or a geographical-cultural factor that "drives" the award is still, 
however, open to debate. 
Both studies also examined the ratio of punitive damages awards to the 
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compensatory awards in the judgments covered during the study periods. For 
Category 1: Violent Agressors / Assaults, the median ratio in Hawaii was 0.84, 
compared to the Florida median ratio of 0.4. In Category 2: Abusers of 
Power/Discrimination-Harassment, the median ratio in Hawaii was 0.61, 
compared to 2.3 in Florida. For Category 3: Drunk Drivers and 
Speeders/Motor Vehicle Accidents, the Hawaii median ratio was .05, 
compared to the Florida median ratio of 0.1. For Category 4: Gross 
NegligencelPremises Liability & Professional Negligence, the Hawaii median 
ratio was 0.99, compared to a merged value of the two-component Florida 
median ratio of 1.5. Category 5: Mental and Physical Freedom/Information 
Violations & False Imprisonment/Arrest, the Hawaii median ratio was 1.75, 
compared to a merged value for Florida of 0.75. In Category 6: 
Dishonesty/Fraud, contract violations, financial damages, the Hawaii median 
ratio was 9.71, compared to 1.0 for Florida. Finally, in the last comparable 
category, Category 7: Unsafe ProductslProducts Liability, the Hawaii median 
ratio was 1.15, compared to the Florida median ratio of 0.8. 
In three of the four categories, the Hawaii median ratio was higher than 
that of Florida. Hawaii experienced the highest ratio in Category 6: 
Dishonesty (which was ranked fourth among th~ Florida categories), while 
Florida's highest ratio was in the Discrimination/Harassment category (ranked 
sixth among the Hawaii categories). No meaningful relationship is evident 
from this comparison. 
The hypothetical effect of a 3: 1 or 2: 1 cap on both states in each category 
yields an interesting result. Using the median values,548 for Hawaii 
(combining all state and federal cases), the 3: I cap or the 2: 1 cap would affect 
in the aggregate only Category 6: Dishonesty. Using the mean values, a 3:1 
cap would affect in the aggregate only Category 2: Abusers of Power, and 
Category 6: Dishonesty. A 2: 1 cap would additionally affect Category 5: 
Mental and Physical Freedom, but no other category. For Florida, which 
provided only the median ratio for each category, a 3:1 cap would have 
affected only the category involving improper treatment of the dead (a 
category not relevant to the Hawaii study), but none of the comparable 
categories. A 2:1 cap would have affected only two of the eleven categories 
covered in the Florida study (the morbid one noted above, and the 
Discrimination/Harassment category). 
Thus, in both states, the proposals to cap punitive damages using a ratio 
548 Using the median values provides a better indication of how the entire category would be affected, 
but masks the effect on individual cases that comprise the category. Thus, even though the median value 
for Category I shows no effect of a 2: I or 3: I cap on the category as a whole, 4-5 ofthe 23 individual cases 
would be affected (see Table 4, infra). 
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would affect primarily only two to three of the major categories of punitive 
damages judgment cases, with the commonality being Category 2: Abusers of 
Power and Florida's Discrimination/Harassment category. This comparison 
suggests that the burden of ratio caps may fall disproportionately on the 
plaintiffs in those cases that involve no physical, but high mental injury, 
typically a discrimination or harassment claim by an employee against an 
employer. In addition, as noted above, in Hawaii, eight of these ten cases in 
Category 2 involved a female plaintiff. Is a cap that has a highly 
disproportionate impact on women who have been subject to harassment or 
discrimination by their employers the end policy result desired by tort 
reformers? Caps in Hawaii would also have the most impact in cases 
involving violent defendants and dishonest defendants. On the other hand, 
drunk drivers and speeders would be the most protected from the impact of 
caps. Policy makers could, and should, consider the specific impacts of the 
blunt tool of caps in past judgments like these before enacting such a crude 
solution to the perceived problem of high punitive damages awards. 
VI. CONCLUSION: RHETORIC, REALITY, AND INTEGRATED EMPIRICISM 
An integrated empirical analysis of Hawaii's experience with punitive 
damages over the past seventeen years provides some new realistic insights 
into the national and local rhetoric surrounding the punitive damages debate. 
Four major contextual factors provide a fertile ground for high and frequent 
punitive damage awards in Hawaii. First, the State's political-social history is 
distinctly liberal, big-D Democratic, and supportive of individual rights. 
Second, modem tort law developments in Hawaii have been predominantly 
pro-plaintiff, and in many areas, have led the country in expanding victims' 
access to the tort law system. Third, Hawaii's punitive damages 
jurisprudence is one of the most expansive in the country. Aside from the 
adoption of the clear and convincing standard of proof in 1989, the Hawaii 
courts have broadly interpreted the purpose and application of punitive 
damages, and have almost uniformly endorsed jury awards using a relaxed 
standard of review. Fourth, the Hawaii Legislature has not, despite 
considerable pressure from tort reform proponents over the past two decades, 
adopted any specific restrictions on punitive damages awards. The relatively 
weak interest of the Hawaii Legislature in tort reform compared to other states 
reflects a strong plaintiffs' bar and a deep-seated resistance to measures that 
- would restrict the tort remedies of Hawaii residents. These four factors, taken 
together, would suggest that Hawaii should have a very high rate of punitive 
damages awards and high award amounts. Indeed, these are exactly the 
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allegations made by proponents of tort reform and stated year after year in the 
preambles and hearings for proposed legislative restrictions on punitive 
damages. But these claims tum out not to be true. 
The quantitative data derived from seventeen years of reports in Personal 
Injury Judgments Hawaii do not support these popular critiques of Hawaii 's 
tort law system. After surveying 2,250 tort judgments and, in more detail, the 
63 punitive damages judgments rendered in the Hawaii state courts, the 
CAAP system, and the Hawaii federal court, this article concludes that many 
of the most commonly held beliefs about punitive damages awards in Hawaii 
are not based on fact. 
Contrary to popular opinion, the annual number of punitive damages 
judgments is "puttering along," even declining, and certainly not 
"skyrocketing" in Hawaii. The average annual rate of punitive damages 
judgments in the Hawaii state courts is 5.29%; the federal court rate was 
3.53%; the combined state/CAAP rate was 3.18%; and CAAP had the lowest 
rate of 1.3%.549 Viewed longitudinally, judgments are also not rapidly 
increasing. To the contrary, the number of punitive damages judgments over 
time averages only about two per year in state court. In five of the past 
seventeen years, the Hawaii state courts reported no punitive damages 
judgments. CAAP awards per year have never exceeded three, and have been 
either one or zero in eleven of the fifteen years studied. 
Punitive damages awards are "moderately often" but not "routinely" 
requested in Hawaii. Surprisingly, the highest mean annual request rate for 
punitive damages (43%) found in the study occurred in federal not state court. 
In state court, in those cases that resulted in judgment, plaintiffs requested 
punitive damages about 37% of the time, substantially higher than the 15% 
annual mean for CAAP, but in less than one-third of the reported judgments 
when state and CAAP cases are combined.550 The trend over time in the rate 
of requests is downward. 
Hawaii plaintiffs are not usually successful on their requests for punitive 
damages. In cases that went to judgment, plaintiffs had a mean annual 
success rate (an award of punitive damages in the reported j udgments where a 
request was made) of 13.65% in state court, compared to 8.39% in CAAP, 
and 6.6% in federal court. 55 1 This success rate appears to be much lower than 
that uncovered in a similar study of Florida punitive damages judgments. 
Even winning plaintiffs in Hawaii face long odds on their punitive damages 
549 See supra Part IV C I. 
sso See supra Part IV C 2. 
S5' See supra Part IV C 3. 
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claims. In cases where plaintiffs prevailed at judgment, they won punitive 
damages only 12.19% of the time in state court, in 5.49% of the combined 
state/CAAP cases, about 6.62% of the time in federal court, and 1.60% in 
CAAP.552 In short, in Hawaii, for state tort cases that go to judgment, winning 
_ plaintiffs receive punitive damages in approximately lout of 18 of their 
successful cases, lower than the comparative national rates of success. 
The amount of Hawaii punitive damages awards do not appear to be 
grossly excessive as often claimed. The mean state award was about the same 
in federal and state court-$552,457 and $536,429, but much lower in CAAP 
($21,780)-with a total of $21.5 million in state punitive damages awards, 
about 5.7 times the amount awarded in federal court, and about fifty-eight 
times the amount awarded by CAAP.553 The median awards were, however, 
much lower for each forum, indicating a handful of high awards but a larger 
base of more modest awards. The Hawaii median award amounts-$88,500 
for state court, $5,000 for CAAP, and $0 for federal court-fell within the 
national range found in comparative studies. In Hawaii, only three of the 
thirty-nine total state court punitive damages awards (approximately 8%) 
exceeded $1 million, the same rate as found by two national studies. Two of 
these three high awards were reviewed by the Hawaii Supreme Court, which 
upheld one (Parnar, $1.5 million) and reversed the largest one (Masaki, 
$11.25 million). 
When the "proportionality" of punitive damages judgments in Hawaii is 
viewed in terms of the relationship between the compensatory and the 
punitive awards, the study results indicated a mean annual exceedence rate of 
34.36% in state court cases, 23.33% in CAAP cases, and 11.76% in federal 
court cases.554 Thus, in Hawaii, the amount of punitive damages usually does 
not exceed the compensatory damages award. In terms of the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages, the state courts had the highest mean of a 
3.03 (calculated as a mean of individual cases compared to 1.11 as an overall 
mean), compared to .894 for CAAP, and .55 for the federal courts. When we 
consider individual judgments instead of the mean, a 3:1 cap would have 
affected the awards in 43% of the federal cases, 20% of the state court cases, 
and 12% of the CAAP cases. A stricter 2: 1 cap would have additionally 
affected only 8% more of the state cases. 
Even though it would have less impact in state court than in federal court, 
a state ratio cap would limit some (but not all) of the larger verdicts. If the 
552 See supra Part IV C 4. 
m See supra Part IV C 5. 
SS4 See supra Part IV C 6. 
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often-proposed flat cap of $250,000 were adopted, it would have affected 
21 % of the state judgments, none of the CAAP judgments, and 29% of the 
federal judgments, resulting (presumably as intended) in a significant 
reduction in punitive damages totaling $18,175,974. 
Such formulaic reform is a blunt instrument, dampening punitive damages 
judgments in cases with no or low physical injury but high mental harm or 
publicly injurious conduct, a disproportionate impact that should be 
considered in the debate. As demonstrated in the Florida and Hawaii studies, 
the different caps can have very disparate impacts on specific cases and may 
limit recovery in cases with unusually compelling facts. Some of the kinds of 
cases that would be hurt most by caps would be cases involving female 
employees winning lawsuits against employers, lawsuits by individuals hurt 
by violent defendants, and plaintiffs injured at the hands of dishonest 
defendants. On the other hand, drunk drivers and speeders would be the most 
protected from the impact of caps. These consequences should be considered 
by policymakers while considering such reform. 
Should the decisionmaking on punitive damages awards be taken away 
from Hawaiijuries and become the exclusive province of judges? When used 
to compare the mean awards for juries, judges, and arbitrators, the data 
indicate that juries do award substantially higher amounts (about sixteen times 
higher) of punitive damagejudgments than either judges or arbitrators, but the 
median award of juries is only 1.3 times higher than of judges, and four times 
higher than of arbitrators. 555 The study suggested, however, that the 
difference needs to be considered in light of the different kinds of cases that 
end up in front of juries. Juries tended to hear the more complex severe injury 
cases, while judges tended to have shorter and "easier" cases involving 
defaulting defendants or admissions of liability. By definition, CAAP 
arbitrators hear the lowest value cases, but these non-jury attorney-arbitrators 
have also issued many punitive damages awards, usually small amounts but 
also up to $100,000 (DuPont v. Pichay, C8, in favor of police officer 
wounded by an automatic weapon). Moreover, given the existing system of 
trial court review of jury awards, it is not clear whether removing punitive 
damages awards from jury decision making would make a substantial 
difference in the amounts awarded. 
Thus, the quantitative analysis of the data from the Hawaii tort and 
punitive damages judgments creates a portrait of punitive damages in Hawaii 
that provides little or no support for some of the most commonly asserted 
claims about the infirmities of the punitive damages award system. Viewing 
SSS See supra Part IV C 7. 
2004] Hawaii Punitive Damages 273 
the data in light of the macro trends in Hawaii tort filings, population, and 
economic data strengthens this conclusion. 556 Over the study period, despite 
an overall increase in tort filings and rise in population, there has been a 
general decline over time in per capita tort filings, the number of tort 
judgments, requests for punitive damages, and punitive damages judgments. 
Moreover, Hawaii has experienced a distinctive period of "tort litigation 
decline" beginning in approximately 1995 and evident through the final years 
of the study. From this macro perspective, the trends in the Hawaii punitive 
damages data appear even more subdued, and even dull. 
Similarly, qualitative analysis of the stories behind Hawaii's punitive 
damages awards indicates that the types of cases that result in such awards are 
not the typical "poster children" of the national tort reform movement.557 
When the Hawaii cases are categorized, the results indicate that the 
predominant type of cases in which punitive damages were awarded in 
Hawaii involved Violent Agressors (twenty-three cases, or 37% of the total 
judgments); Abusers of Power (eleven cases, or 17%); Reckless and 
Intoxicated Drivers (ten cases, 16%); and Offenses Against Mental and 
Physical Freedom (eight cases, 13%). Together, these cases constituted 83% 
of all punitive damages judgments, typically involved individuals suing 
individuals, and should be regarded as the "typical" story of punitive damages 
cases in Hawaii. 
In contrast, the commonly used examples of punitive damages gone 
awry-medical malpractice and products liability-represent very small 
proportions of the total judgment pool in Hawaii. Interestingly, the most 
common type of case involving a punitive damages judgment against a local 
Hawaii business results from employment discrimination, where the vast 
majority of the victims are women. In the non-employment context, non-local 
Hawaii businesses (four mainland corporations and one Japanese company) 
were held liable for punitive damages in only five of the sixty-three cases 
(8%). Hawaii "landowners," either individuals or businesses, were assessed 
punitive damages judgments in three cases (5%), and Hawaii medical 
professionals were held liable for punitive damages in three cases (5%), only 
two of which involved malpractice. On the one hand, it is true that Hawaii 
juries,judges, and arbitrators have entered some large awards against Hawaii 
businesses, landowners, and medical professionals. On the other hand, when 
the tragic facts and appellate history of these cases is examined, they do not 
appear to be the kinds of cases with which to raise the red flag of punitive 
SS6 See supra Part IV D. 
m See supra Part v. 
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damage reform. A prime example is the judgment involving the painful 
multiple botched surgeries suffered by a female plaintiff because of the 
medical malpractice of defendant Dr. McCurdy (see supra Part V C 4). 
Although the jury's $600,000 punitive damages award was overturned by the 
Hawaii Supreme Court for procedural reasons (and is still, apparently, unpaid 
pending retrial by the defendant who filed for bankruptcy after the verdict), 
the Court went to some length to condemn the defendant's unprofessional 
misdeeds.558 Moreover, in an earlier case, McCurdy himself sought and won 
$350,000 in punitive damages (reduced by the judge to $50,000) against a 
fellow physician for defamation (McCurdy v. Schlesinger, Case S20), 
undercutting the credibility of any protestations on his behalf against the 
"unfair" use of punitive damages. 
Comparing the qualitative portion of the Hawaii study to similar 
categorical analysis of Florida verdicts suggests some notable patterns in 
awards.559 In six of the seven comparable categories, the median punitive 
damages award in Hawaii was substantially lower than the median punitive 
damages award in Florida. The two states shared high median values in two 
out of three of these categories, Unsafe Products and Gross Negligence, and 
in the former category, the Hawaii median exceeded that of Florida; however, 
this was based on punitive damages judgments in only two Hawaii cases, both 
of which were reversed on appeal. When the two state studies were compared 
in terms of the potential impacts of ratio caps, in both states, only two to three 
of the major categories of punitive damages judgment cases would be 
affected, with the commonality being Hawaii's Abusers of Power and 
Florida's Discrimination/Harassment categories typically involving a claim by 
an employee against an employer and, in Hawaii at least, predominantly 
female plaintiffs. If this impact were considered, ratio caps might be a less 
attractive "solution" to high punitive damages awards. As in other areas of 
the analysis, the more closely the data are examined, the more the results 
appear to contrast with the popular rhetoric of tort reform. 
In conclusion, the Hawaii study attempted to create a new, more accurate 
picture of the entirety of one state's experience with punitive damages 
judgments. Like a mosaic, when the fragmented pieces of data are cohesively 
organized and presented, new perspectives emerge that are not accessible 
when the viewer either stands too close or too far from the detail. Using the 
many-layered contexts of Hawaii'sjurisprudential, doctrinal, and legislative 
m See Dillo case narrative inji'a Appendi1\ B. 
SS9 See supra Part V E. 
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history, together with the rich quantitative and qualitative data gathered from 
all of the 2,250 Hawaii tort judgments over a seventeen-year period, 
empiricism is merged with narrative, law, and real life. Complete integration 
of the available, excavated, and sifted data in the complex and constantly 
changing world of tort law is an almost impossible task, yet this article 
suggests the effort is worthwhile and offers a framework for this new kind of 
empirical approach. If those most involved in the ongoing national and state 
policy debate over punitive damages are willing to probe the complexities ofa 
more comprehensive range of information than is usually considered on this 
issue, then this kind of approach can help bridge the communication gap 
between the vigorous ongoing research of the legal academy and the other 
equally important considerations of the legislative participants in the punitive 
damages polemic. Through a more rational discussion, agreement perhaps 
can be found on how best to modify the tort system. That discussion should 
be grounded on the two areas of apparent consensus among the warring 
factions: first, that punitive damages are an extreme remedy best suited for 
extreme torts, and second, that reality and not rhetoric should be the 
foundation for any future changes in tort law policy, in Hawaii and 
nationwide. 




State Chart 1 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i State Circuit Courts: 1985-2001 
Tort Judgments (#T JGT), Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REQ), 
and Punitive Damages Awards (#PD JGT) 
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State Chart 2 
Tort Judgments In Hawal'l State Circuit Courts: 1985·2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Tort Judgments (#T JGT) 
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State Chart 3 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i State Circuit Courts: 1985·2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) Compared to 
Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REQ) 
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State Chart 4 
Tort Judgments In Hawal'l State Circuit Courts: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Requests for Punitive Damages (# PD REQ) 
Compared to Tort Judgments (#T JGT) 
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State Chart 5: 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i State Circuit Courts: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Judgments for Plaintiffs (#P JGT) 
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State Chart 6: 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i Circuit Courts: 1985-2001 
Punitive Damages Awards ($PD AWD) 
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State Chart 7 
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State Chart 8 
Tort Judgments In Hawarl State Circuit Courts: 1985·2001 
Median Punitive Damages Judgments (MD $PD AWD) 
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State Chart 9 
Tort Judgments in Hawari State Circuit Courts: 1985 - 2001 
Percentage of Judgments Where the Punitive Damages Award Exceeded the 
Compensatory Damages Award ($PD AWD>$CD AWD) 
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State Chart 10 
Tort Judgments in Hawarl State Circuit Courts: 1985·2001 
Ratio of Punitive Damages Judgments ($PD JGT) to 
Compensatory Damages Judgments ($CD JGT) 
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State Chart 11: 
Tort Judgments in Hawai State Circuirt Courts: 1985 - 2001 
Ratio of Punitive Damages Judgments ($PD JGT) to 
Compensatory Damages Judgments ($CD JGT) Excluding Outliers 
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State Chart 12 
Tort Judgments in Hawari State Circuit Courts: 1985 - 2001 
Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) by Decisionmaker: 
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State Chart 13 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i State Circuit Courts: 1985 - 2001 
Total and Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT), by 
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State Chart 14 
Tort Judgments In Hawai'i State Circuit Courts: 1985 - 2001 
Total (TTL $PD JGT), Mean (MN $PD JGT), and Median (MD $PD JGT) Punitive Damages 
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State Chart 15 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i State Circuit Courts: 1985.2001 
Tort Filings (#TF), Tort Judgments (#T JGT), Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REO), 
and Punitive Damages Awards (#PD JGT) 
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CAAP Chart 1 
Tort Awards In Hawari State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Tort Awards (#T AWD), Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REQ), and Punitive Damages 
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CAAP Chart 2: 
Tort Awards in Hawai'i State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Awards (#PO AWO) 
Compared to Total Tort Awards (#T AWO) 
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CAAP Chart 3 
Tort Awards in Hawaii State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Awards (#PD AWD) 
Compared to Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REQ) 
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--Linear Trendline 
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CAAP Chart 4 
Tort Awards in Hawaii State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Requests for Punitive Damages (#PO REQ) 
Compared to Tort Awards (#T AWO) 
17.07% 
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CAAP Chart 5 
Tort Awards in Hawai'i State CAAP: 1985·2001 
Punitive Damages Awards (#PO AWO) 
Compared to Awards for Plaintiffs (#P AWO) 
__ 'I. #PD AWDI#PAWD; Mean Annual 'I.: 1.63%; 
Overall Mean: 1.61%; Median: 1.14% 
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CAAP Chart 6 
Tort Awards in Hawaii State CAAP: 1985·2001 
Punitive Damages Awards ($PD AWD) 
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CAAP Chart 7 
Tort Awards In Hawai'i State CAAP: 1985·2001 
Mean Punitive Damages Awards (MN $PD AWD) 
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CAAP Chart 8 
Tort Awards in Hawai'i State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Median Punitive Damages Awards (MD $PD AWD) 
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$13,976.73; Median: $5,000 
J A$23,750 i\ 
l 
$0 $2~00 $1,501 
~ $5,000 
$0 ~,~-;t"~\ $0 . $4,000 $5,000 $0 $12,000 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
(0) (0) (0) (3) (2) (0) (1) (3) (0) (1) (2) (1) (1) (0) (1) (1) (1) 


























CAAP Chart 9 
Tort Awards in Hawai'i State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Awards Where the Punitive Damages Award ($PO AWO) 
Exceeded the Compensatory Damages Award ($CO AWO) 
.. 100.00% 
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CAAP Chart 10 
Tort Awards in Hawari State CAAP: 1985-2001 
Ratio of Punitive Oamages Award ($PO AWO) to 
Compensatory Award ($CO AWO) 
• $PD AWD>$CD AWD/#PD AWD: Overall Mean Ratio: 
. 043: Mean of Annual Ratios: .894 (DeGuiar case [#2]. 
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Federal Chart 1 
Tort Judgments for Hawari Federal District Courts: 1985·2001 
Number of Tort Judgments (#T JGT). Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REO). 
and Punitive Damages Awards (#PD JGT) 
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Federal Chart 2 
Tort Judgments in Hawaii Federal District Court: 1985·2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Tort Judgments (#T JGT) 
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Federal Chart 3 
Tort Judgments In Hawal'l Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REQ) 
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Federal Chart 4 
Tort Judgments in Hawai'i Federal District Court: 1985·2001 
Percentage of Requests for Punitive Damages (#PD REQ) 
Compared to the Tort Judgments (#T JGT) 
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Federal Chart 5 
Tort Judgments In Hawari Federal District Courts: 1985·2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Judgments for Plaintiffs (#P JGT) 
___ % #PD JGT/#P JGT; Mean Annual %: 6.62%; Overall 
Mean: 6.36%; Median: 0 
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Federal Chart 6 
Tort Judgments in HawsI'! Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
Punitive Damages Awards ($PD AWOl 
$3,000,000 
~ __ $PO AWO: Total: $3,755,000: Overall Case Mean: 
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Federal Chart 7 
Tort Judgments In Hawarl Federal District Court: 1985·2001 
Mean Punitive Damages Awards (MN $PD AWDI 
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Federal Chart 8 
Tort Judgments In Hawai'i Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
Median Punitive Damages Judgments (MD $PD JGT) 
53,000,000 
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Federal Chart 9 
Tort Judgments In Hawarl Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Judgments Where the Punitive Damages Award Exceeded 
the Compensatory Damages Award ($PD AWD>$CD AWD) 
-% $PD AWD>$CD AWD; 17-year Total: 4/7; 
Mean Annual %: 11.76%; Overall Mean: 
.57%; Median: 0 
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Federal Chart 10 
Tort Judgments in Hawarl Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
Ratio of Punitive Damages Award ($PD JGT) 
to Compensatory Damages Award ($CD JGT) 
"$PD AWD:$CD AWD; Mean of Case Ratios: .55; 
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Federal Chart 11 
Tort Judgments In Hawarl Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) by Declsionmaker: Jury and Judge 
~#PO AWO by Jury; H-yea, Total: 7; Ove,all Mean: .41; Median: 0 
-# PO AWO by Judge; H-yea, Tolal: 0; Ove,all Mean: 0; Median: 0 
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Federal Chart 12 
Tort Judgments in Hawai"i Federal District Court: 1985-2001 
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State/CAAP Chart 1: 
Tort Judgments In Hawaii State Courts and CAAP: 1985-2001 
Tort Judgments (#T JGT) and Punitive Damages Awards (#PD JGT) 
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State/CAAP Chart 2: 
Tort Judgments in Hawaii State Courts and CAAP: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Tort Judgments (#T JGT) 
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State/CAAP Chart 3: 
Tort Judgments in Hawaii State Courts and CAAP: 1985-2001 
Percentage of Punitive Damages Judgments (#PD JGT) 
Compared to Judgments for Plaintiffs (#P JGT) 
--# PD JGTI#P JGT 
Mean Annual %: 5.49%; 
Overall Mean: 4 05%; 
Median: 2.83% 
--Linear Trendline 
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Trends Chart 1 
Total Number of Tort Cases 1 Filed Compared to Total Number of Civil Cases2 Filed 
in Hawaii Circuit Courts 1984·2000 
Civil Cases Linear Trendline: y = 82.853x + 5955.5 Tort Case Trendline: y = 27.782x + 1923.5 
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Trends Chart 2 
Percentage of Tort Cases 1 Filed Compared to 
Total Civil Cases2 Filed in Hawaii Circuit Courts 1984-2000 
Mean of Annual %: 32.52% 































Trends Chart 3 
Hawaii Tort Filings Per Capita: 1985-1999 
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Trends Chart 4 
Case Disposition By Dismissal/Stipulation, Notice, Judge/Motion, Jury Verdict, NonJury Trial 
I 
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Table I: 
A liP uDltlve D amages J d U Igments: mpact 0 f$250 000 C , ap 
Case Plaintiff Compensa Punitive AfI"ect Loss to P 




SI Nakagawa $1,212,810 $2,500 n 
S2 Sananikone $47,020 $75,000 n 
S3 Ofisa $40,000 $20,000 n 
S4 Caris $16,370 $\0,000 n 
S5 Sorrell $\0,691 $30,000 n 
S6 Kanehe $30,300 $75,000 n 
S7 Critcher $95,000 $10,000 n 
S8 Batungbacal $98,269 $3,000 n 
S9 Niesl $2493 $40 n 
SIO Sigler $10,950 $50,000 n 
SII Parnar $575,000 $\.5111 Y $1.25 m 
SI2 Oakes $6,306 $5,000 n 
SI3 Cuson $275,000 $7,500 n 
SI4 Clawson $37,352 $20,000 n 
SI5 Reder $14,975 $15,000 n 
SI6 Masaki $5,284,000 $1 1.25m Y $11 m 
SI7 Tilton $4,110 $3.00 n 
SI8 Uyeoka $4,212,000 $25,000 n 
SI9 Rod $55,893 $4,000 n 
2004] Hawaii Punitive Damages 321 
S20 McCurdy $25,000 $50,000 n 
S21 Rodman $12,943 $250,000 n 
S22 Lessary $181,000 $800,000 Y $550,000 
S23 Chase $282,750 $440,000 Y $190,000 
S24SCl() Vidmar $1000 $7,500 n 
[S24]SClI Vidmar v. $300 $750 
Kan (for Kan) (for Kan) (n) 
S25 Calleon $644,510 $150,000 n 
S26 Ditto $1,403,500 $600,000 Y $350,000 
S27 Kfentzis $262,072 $70,000 n 
S28 Santiago $250,000 $250,000 n 
S29 Schmidt None $35,000 n 
S30 Mohr $1,000 $1,500 n 
S31 Tabieros $479,400 $52,000 n 
S32 Kim $7,400 $25,000 n 
S33 Sullivan $I.312m $500,000 Y $250,000 
S34 Mcauley $65,600 $62,000 n 
S35 Schefke $504,892 $300,000 Y $50,000 
S36 Kikumoto v. $3.00 $1.00 
HTH Corp. (for HTH) (for HTH) n 
S37 Wilder $2900 $50,000 n 
S38 Awai $50,607 $15,000 n 
500 This case is also listed under Category 8 because punitive damages werc also awarded to the 
defendant. 
"" This case was also counted in Category I. 
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S39 Takaki $400,000 $4,785,974 Y $4,535,974 




CI Laronal $13,318 $5,000 n 
C2 DeGuiar None $100 n 
C3 Searles $27,000 $2,000 n 
C4 Ito $19,252 $1.00 n 
C5 Harper $2779 $3000 n 
C6 Gregory $317,316 $100,000 n 
C7 Armstrong $27,559 $50,000 n 
C8 Du Pont $52,190 $100,000 n 
C9 Panganiban $3,561 $3,000 n 
CIO Ching $20,849 $5,000 n 
CII Rosette $20,940 $23,750 n 
CI2 Hubert $26,568 $5,000 n 
CI3 Yuson $79,180 $15,000 n 
CI4 Does $12,000 $32,000 n 
CI5 Subia $23,000 $12,000 n 
CI6 Floyd $3,113.89 $5,000 n 
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FI Locricchio $427,000 $100,000 n 
F2 Mitchell $9.201 $301 Y $2,750,000 
F3 Gretzinger $452,750 $80,000 
v. Lamb (for Lamb) (for Lamb) n 
F4 Arceneaux $12,000 $60,000 n 
F5 Mano $163,750 $100,000 n 
F6 Carnell $32,000 $65,000 n 
F7 Pulse $50,000 $350,000 Y $100,000 




D· ·b . Istrl utlon 0 fP umhve D C ama2es ases A mon2 C • 562 ate20nes 
Cat. # St. %of # %of # % of Total %of 
Cat.! CAAP Cat.! Fed Cat./ # total 
%of %of % 
Ss Cs ofFs 
1 13 57% 10 43% 0 0% 23 36.5 
33% 59% 0% % 
2 7 64% 2 18% 2 18% II 17.4 
18% 12% 29% 6% 
3 6 60% 4 40% 0 0% 10 15.8 
15% 23% 0% 7% 
4 3 60% 1 20% 1 20% 5 7.9 
8% 6% 14% 0/0 
5 5 62% 0 0% 3 38% 8 12.6 
13% 0% 43% 9% 
5.2 Parentheses indicate percentage ir all three cases in Category 8 are counted (one of which is also 
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2 100'Yo 0 0% 0 0% 2 3.17 
5% 0% 0% 0/0 
2 100% 0 0% 0 0% 2 3.17 
5% 0% 0% % 
1 50% 0 0% 1 50% 2(3) 3.17 
(2) (67%) 0% (33%) % 
3% 14% 
39 62% 17 27% 7 11% 63 2 
(40) (64) 
Table 3: 
Summary of Judgment Amounts & Ratios, By Category 
Omitted due to layout constraints; available at author's website: 
www2.hawaii.edu/-antolini 
Table 4: 
Category 1: Violent Aggressors: Assaulters, Batterers, and Arsonists 
(Mean of Ratios calculated from total of all ratios. divided by 23 = 1.82. 
Overall Mean Ratio calculated from Total Pdsrrotal CDs = 3 30) 
Case Plaintiff Compens- Punitive Narrative Ratio 
Code Name atory PO: 
CO 








S8 Batung- $98,269 $3,000 police officer .03 
bacal beat P over 
parking space 
dispute 
S9 Niesl $2493 $40 boy pushed boy .02 
into ditch 
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SIO Sigler $10,950 $50,000 police officers 4.57 
arrested and 
beat P 
SI2 Oakes $6,306 $5,000 police officer .79 
beat P in front 
of wife/children 
over traffic spat 
SI9 Rod $55,893 $4,000 high school .07 
beating 
S24563 Vidmar $1000 $7,500 sexual abuse, 7.5 
assault, battery 
of woman 
S27 Kfentzis $262,072 $70,000 nightclub brawl .27 
S28 Santiago $250,000 $250,000 fellow inmate 1.0 
drove pencil 
into P's eye 
S32 Kim $7,400 $25,000 bar fight 3.38 
S34 Mcauley $65,600 $62,000 woman beaten .95 
and abused by 
Waikik bar 
customers 





S (13) Subtotal $1,216,713 $5,292,514 31.58 
57% MN $ 93,593 $ 407,116 2.43 
MD $ 40,000 $ 20,000 .79 
C2 DeGuiar none $100 missed punch 0 
by illegal parker 
mistaken 
S6J Note this case is also listed under Category 8 because punitive damages were also awarded to the 
defendant. 
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C5 Harper $2779 $3000 identity beating 1.08 
of young 
woman 
C6 Gregory $3317,316 $100,000 bullet to groin .32 
in confrontation 
over girl fiend 
C7 Arm- $27,559 $50,000 football battery 1.81 
strong 




C9 Pangan- $3,561 $3,000 woman .84 
iban kidnapped, 
raped, beaten, 
left in field by 
former 
boyfriend 
CIO Ching $20,849 $5,000 unprovoked .24 
tackling 
disabled P 
CII Rosette $20,940 $23,750 high school 1.\3 
security guard 
beat student 





CI4 Does $12,000 $32,000 woman lured 2.67 
and sexually 
assaulted 
C Subtotal $ 483,762 $321,850 10.20 
(10) MN $ 48,376 $ 32,185 1.02 
43% MD $ 20,895 $ 14,375 .96 
F(O) - - - -
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0% 
All Total $1,700,475 $5,614,364 Overall Mean 41.78 
Table MN $ 73,934 $ 244,103 Ratio = 3.30 1.82 
3 MD $ 20,940 $ 20,000 .84 
N=23 
Table 5: 
Category 2: Abusers of Power: Sexual Harassers, Wrongful 
Terminators, Relatiatory Dischargers 
(Mean Ratio 01'2.88 calculated by totaling all n1tios in colulllnthcn dividing by II. Thc Ovcnlil Mcan 
Ratio ($2.715 divided by $3.292) is .82. Thc Mean Ralio is much highcr because orlhe Wilder casc, 
h· h h d 17 24 . h· hi· dd .. h h 0 II R .. I I d W IC a a rallo, W IC I gets" 11 en W cn I e ver.! allo IS ca cu ate .) 
Case Plaintiff Compens- Punitive Narrative Ratio 
Code Name atory PD:CD 








S25 Calleon $644,510 $150,000 wrongful .23 
temlination 
wh.-blower 












328 Journal of Law & Politics [Vo1.XX: 143 






S38 Awai $50,607 $15,000 homosexual .30 
supervIsor 
MD harassed P 
on the iob 
S(7) Subtotal $3,100,600 $2,545,000 24.14 
64% MN $ 442,942 $ 363,571 3.45 
MD $ 504,892 $ 150,000 .59 




CI6 Floyd $3, 113.89 $5,000 woman 
constructive 1.61 
discharge 
for refusal to 
work on 
sabbath 
C(2) Subtotal $16,431.89 $10,000 1.99 
18% MN $ 8,215.95 $ 5,000 .995 
MD $ 8,215.95 $ 5,000 .995 
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F(2) Subtotal $175,750 $160,000 5.6 
18% MN $ 87,875 $ 80,000 2.8 
MD $ 87,875 $ 80,000 2.8 
All Total $3,292,781.89 $2,715,000 Overall 31.73 
Tabl MN $ 299,343.8 $ 246,818 Mean Ratio 2.88 
e2 MD $ 50,607 $ 60,000 =.82 .61 
N=11 
Table 6: 
Category 3: Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers: Drunks and Speeders 
(Mean of Ratios calculated from total of all case ratios. divided by 10= .34. 
Overall Mean Ratio calculated from Total Pdsffotal CDs = 026 ) 
Case Plaintiff Compensa Punitive Narrative Ratio 
Code Name tory PD:C 
D 
SI Naka- $1,212,810 $2,500 driver admitted .00 
gawa liability for instant 
death ofP 
S2 Sana- $47,020 $75,000 drunk driver 1.6 
nikone admitted liabilty 
for rear-ending P 
SI3 Cuson $275,000 $7,500 drunk driver hit .03 
kids on school 
lawn and fled 
SI5 Reder $14,975 $15,000 drunk driver 1.00 
admitted he hit P 
and infant 
daughter, then fled 
S17 Tilton $4,110 $3.00 drunk driver .00 
admitted rear-
ending van with 
three children 
SI8 Uyeoka $4,212,000 $25,000 drunk driver .00 
admitted crashing 
head-on into P, 
catastrophic 
injuries 
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S (6) Subtotal $5,765,915 $128,000 2.63 
60% MN $ 960,985 $ 21,333 .44 
MD $ 161,010 $ 11,250 .02 
C3 Searles $27.000 $2.000 o admitted rear- .07 
ending P and 
fleeing scene 
C4 Ito $19.252 $1.00 o drank, fell .00 
asleep at wheel, 
rear-ended P 
Cl3 Yuson $79.180 $15.000 minors speeding on .19 
freeway crashed 
into elderly P 
driver 
CI5 Subia $23.000 $12.000 drunk driver .52 
admitted rear-
ending P on 
highway 
C (4) Subtotal $148,432 $29,001 .78 
40% MN $ 37,108 $ 7,250 .195 
MD $ 25,000 $ 7,000 .13 
F (0) Subtotal - - -
0% MN 
MD 
All Total $5,914,347 $154,004 Overall Mean 3.41 
Tabl MN $ 591,435 $ 15,400 Ratio = .026 .34 
e3 MD $ 37,010 $ 9,750 .05 
N=IO 
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Table 7: 
Category 4: Gross Negligence: Dog Bites, Shorebreak Accidents, 
Medical Fraud, Workplace Injury 
(Mean of Ratios calculatcd from total of all ratios. dividcd by 5= 1.156. 
Overall Mean Ratio Calculated from total Pds/total CDs = 38) 
Case Plaintiff Compensato Punitive Narrative Ratio 
Code Name ry PD:CD 
S6 Kanehe $30.300 $75.000 Akita bit P 2.48 
multiple times. 
bit 5 other 
people 
S23 Chase $282.750 $440.000 hotel failed to 1.56 
warn guest of 
dangerous 










S (3) Subtotal $1,716,550 $1,115,000 4.47 
60% MN $ 572,183 $ 371,667 1.49 
MD $ 282,750 $ 440,000 1.56 







C (I) Subtotal $ 9,465 $ 9,400 .99 
20% MN $ 9,465 $ 9,400 
MD $ 9,465 $ 9,400 
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Subtotal $9.2m $3m 
MN $9.2m $3m 
MD $9.2m $3m 
Total $10,926,015 $4,124,400 Overall Mean 
MN $ 2,185,203 $ 824,880 Ratio = .38 
MD $ 282,750 $ 440,000 
Table 8: 
Offenses Against Mental and Physical Freedom: 
Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
Defamation, False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution 
(Mean of Ratios calculated from total of all ratios. divided by 8 = 2.22. 
Overall Mean Ratio calculated from Total Pdsrrotal CDs = I 89 ) 
Plaintiff Compens- Punitive Narrative 
Name atory 
Clawson $37,352 $20,000 merchant false 
arrest5C>4 
McCurd $25,000 $50,000 plastic surgeon 





Lessary $181,000 $800,000 attorney coerced 
and defamed 
client 














~<>I Defendant's motion for a new trial was granted: evidence suggested that plaintiff had engaged in 
refund fraud. 
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harassed by 
condo guard and 
president 




S (5) Subtotal $244,352 $906,500 8.46 
62% MN $ 48,870 $181,300 1.69 
MD $ 25,000 $ 35,000 1.5 
C (0) Subtotal - - -
0% MN 
MD 




F6 Carnell $32,000 $65,000 woman assaulted 2.03 
and abused by 
arresting officers, 
denied care 
F7 Pulse $50,000 $350,000 P incarcerated for 7.0 
3 years on 
unlawful 
search/seizure of 
gun, perjury of 
officers 
F (3) Subtotal $509,000 $515,000 9.26 
38% MN $169,667 $171,667 3.09 
MD $ 50,000 $100,000 2.03 
All Total $753,352 $1,421,500 Mean Overall 17.72 
Tabl MN $ 94,169 $ 177,688 Ratio = 1.89 2.22 
e5 MD $ 34,500 $ 57,500 1.75 
N=8 
Table 9: 
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Category 6: Dishonesty: Fraud, Conversion, Breach of Contract 



















Overall Mean Ratio calculated rrom Total Pdsrrotal CDs = ') 40) -. 
Plaintiff Compens- Punitive Narrative 
Name atory 
Critcher $95,000 $10,000 son defrauded 
mother in real 
estate sale 
Rodman $12,943 $250,000 attorney abused 
c\ ient trust 
account 
Subtotal $107,943 $260,000 
MN $ 53,972 $130,000 







Total $107,943 $260,000 Overall Mean 
MN $ 53,972 $130,000 Ratio = 2.40 
MD $ 53,972 $130,000 
Table 10: 
Category 7: Unsafe Products 
(Mean of Ratios caiculah:d Irolll total of all ratios. divided by 2 = 1.15. 
Overall Mean Ratio calculated rrom Total or Pus/Total orCDs = I 96) 
Plaintiff Compens- Punitive Narrative 
Name atory 
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S31 Tabieros $479,400 $52,000 defective dock .11 
straddler 
collided with P's 
car, crushing his 
legs 
S (2) Subtotal $5,763,400 $11,302,000 2.23 
100% MN $2,881,700 $5,651,000 1.15 
MD $2,881,700 $5,651,000 1.15 
C (0) Subtotal 
0% MN 
MD 
F (0) Subtotal 
0% MN 
MD 
All Total $5,763,400 $11,302,000 Mean Overall 2.23 
Table MN $2,881,700 $5,651,000 Ratio = 1.96 1.15 
7 MD $2,881,700 $5,651,000 1.15 
N=2 
Table 11: 
Category 8: Turning the Tables: When Defendants Win Reverse 
Punitive Damages 
(Mean of Ratios calculated from total of all ratios. divided by 3 = 1.00. 
Mean Overall Ratio calculated rrom Total or Pdsffotal of Cds = 18) 
Case Plaintiff Compens Punitive Narrative Ratio 
Code Name -atory PD:CD 
S36 Kikumoto $3.00 $1.00 Corporate officer P .33 
v. HTH (for HTH) (for alleged wrongful 
Corp. HTH) termination; D 
corporation 
countered that P 
stole confidential 
documents to 
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Vidmar v. $300 $750 P alleged sexual 
Kan (for Kan) (for Kan) abuse. assault. 
battery in domestic 
dispute with D; D 
countered for 
assault. battery. 
abuse of process 
Subtotal $303 $751 
MN $151.5 $375.5 




Gretzinger $452,750 $80.000 UH student claimed 
v. Lamb (for (for professor sexually 
Lamb) Lamb) harassed. bribed. 
and raped her; 
Professor countered 
that P was lying. 
sued for defamation. 
liED. abuse of 
process 
Subtotal $452,750 $80,000 
MN $452,750 $80,000 
MD $452,750 $80,000 
Total $453,053 $80,751 Mean Overall 
MN $151,017 $26,917 Ratio = .18 
MD $ 300 $ 750 
Table 12: 
Comparison of Hawaii and Florida Studies 











Types of Defendants in Punitive Damages Cases 
Omitted due to layout constraints; available on author's website: 
www2.hawaii.edu/~antolini 
;1>; This case was also counted in Category I. 
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ApPENDIX A: 
Two SAMPLE PIJH JUDGMENT REPORTS 
COURT ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAM 
Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii © Copyright 1991 Advocates Research Company 
Court: 4 Civil No.: I Arbitrator: Jeanne L. Judgment Date: 5/22/91 
90186 Hughes 
Cause(s) of Action: Constructive Discharge-Age & 
BETTY J. FLOYD, Sex Discrimination- Breach of Employment 
Plaintin~ Agreement- Intentional Intliction of Emotional Distress 
vs. Plaintitl: a Seventh-Day Adventist, hired by defendant 
on or about 5/17/89, contended that when she was 
WAKENHUTOF HAWAII, hired she had an agreement with her supervisor not to 
et.al., schedule her to work during her sabbath from dusk 
friday night to dusk saturday night, that in late March 
1990, a new supervisor approached her and told her she 
Defendants. would have to work that weekend which included her 
sabbath and for the following weekends, that she was 
forced to quit, that defendant's constructive discharge 
was in violation of public policy, state law (§ 378-2 
HRS) and the Constitution of the State of Hawaii ... 
Case Caption: 
Case Summary/Court Annexed Arbitration Program: 
Plaintiff(s) Atty: William Fenton Sink 
Defendant(s) Atty: Kari A. Wilhelm (Roeca Louie & Hiraoka, of counsel) 
Date Complaint Filed: 7/23/90 Prayer: SD, GO, Pun.D. & Prejudgment Interest 
TBDATOT 
Plaintitrs age: Sex: F Occupation: Pre- Marital Status: M 




Medical None claimed 
Lost Earnings $3,113.89* 
Emotional Distress 
Total $3,113.89 
Spouse Claiming Loss of Consortium? N/A If so, Amount: 
Offer of Judgment'? I Ifso, Amount: Defendant(s) Carrier: 
None 
Plaintiff(s) Last Demand: $100,000 No. Arbitration Hearing Days: I 
Defendant(s) Last Offer: None Bifurcated Hearings? No 
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Plaintiff(s) Expert(s): None 
Defendant(s) Expert(s): None 
Prejudgment Interest Award? N/A I Judgment For: Plaintiff 
Defendant denied plaintiffs allegations, General None 
contending that its personnel at the Kona Airport Damages 
were short-handed, that the new supervisor only Special $3,113.89 
asked plaintitTifshe would be willing to work Damages 
on her sabbath, that defendants' employees, with Punitive $5,000 
the exception of plaintitT, all worked 6 days a Damages 
week (plaintitTworked 4 days a week), that 
plaintiff indicated she had an agreement to work Total $8,113.89 
4 days a week with her sabbath off, that 
defendant denied any agreement limiting * Plaintiff had a stroke in November 
plaintiffs work to 4 days a week, that the hiring 1990 and claimed the difference in 
supervisor had a scheduling agreement with pay between her jobs after the alleged 
plaintiff (not to schedule her to work during her constructive discharge and the date of 
sabbath), that plaintiff quit on or about 3/29/90. the stroke. 
The intentional infliction of emotional distress Note: Defendant offered plaintiffre-
count was dismissed on defendant's motion on employment which was refused. 
exclusive remedy grounds. 
ARBITRATION AWARD: The arbitrator 
found liability for plaintiff, awarding damages 
as shown. Judgment entered for plaintitTafter 
appeal period ran. 
Case Summary Cont'd/Mlsc. 
Abbreviations: 
COURTS: #1= U.S. District; #2= lSI Circuit; #3= 2"~ Circuit; #4= 3,d Circuit; #5= 51h 
Circuit 
J/JW: J= Jury Trial, JW= Jury Waived MARITAL STATUS: M= Married, S= Single, 
W= Widow 
DAMAGES: SD= Special Damages, GD= General Damages, PunD= Punitive Damages 
OTHER: TBDATOT= To be determined at time of trial, M&C= Maintenance and Cure, 
D/A= Date of Accident 
NOTICE: Copyright is reserved on all parts of this publication. No p3l1may be 
reproduced in any form or by any means without the express pel1l1ission of ADVOC ATES 
RESEARCH COMPANY. 
PAGE 5-9-91 (a) 
COURT ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAM 
Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii © Copyright 1994 Advocates Research Company 
Court: 3 I Civil No.: Arbitrator: Douglas J. I Judgment Date: 10114/94 
900567 Sameshima 
Cause(s) of Action: Negligence-Sexual Assault 
DEBBIE HART, (Malpractice) 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff is a licensed massage therapist. She was 
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under contract with the defendant to provide massage 
vs. therapy in his office. On January II, 1990 she was in 
an accident while driving; she had served to the right 
DR. MICHAEL C. PIERNER, to avoid some wood that fell from a truck. She hit the 
D.C., wood which punctured her tire. On the shoulder her 
vehicle ran into a large hole and stopped. On January 
15, 1990, defendant asked her if she wanted an 
Defendant. adjustment. Plaintiff agreed and went into the 
defendant's oflice and while on the adjustment table, 
fully clothed, she contended that defendant 
negligently adjusted her cervical spine causing her a 
cervical injury and that the defendant who had been 
Case Caption: drinking, touched her inappropriately. She 
subsequently saw a psychiatrist who diagnosed a 
Case Summary/Court Annexed Arbitration Program: 
Plaintitlls) Atty: Kevin H.S. Yuen 
Defendant(s) Atty: Stephen B. Songs tad 
Date Complaint Filed: 10/4/90 Prayer: SO, GO, & Pun.D. TBDATOT 
Plaintiffs age: 1 Sex: F Occupation: Licensed 1 Marital Status: S 




Cervical strain; post traumatic stress disorder. Lost Earnin~s None 
Treated by a chiropractor and psychiatrist. No 
temporary total disability or lost earnings claim. 
Total $8,209.93 
Spouse Claiming Loss of Consortium? N/A Ifso, Amount: 
Offer of Judgment? Ilfso, Amount: Defendant(s) Carrier: None* 
None 
Plaintiff(s) Last Demand: Confidential No. Arbitration Hearing Days: 2 
Defendant(s) Last Offer: Confidential Bifurcated Hearings? No 
PlaintitT(s) Expert(s): Gary Tanksley, Chiropractor 
Defendant(s) Exp~rt(s): Martin Blinder, Psychiatrist 
Prejudgment Interest Award? N/A Judgment For: Plaintiff 
P.T.S.D. She came under the care of a General $9,400 
chiropractor on February 6, 1990 for her cervical Damages 
injury and asserted a no-fault claim arising out of Special $65.00 
the prior accident. On October 29,1991, she was Damages 
involved in a subsequent motor vehicle accident. Punitive $9,400 
Dr. Tanksley perforn1ed an l.M.E. in connection Dama~es 
with the second accident and apportioned her 
cervical injuries 75% to the (second) motor Total $18,865 
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vehicle accident and 25% to the defendant's 
adjustment. 
Defendant denied plaintiffs allegations of 
negligent adjustment and sexual assault, 
contending that he gave her a standard adjustment 
and in connection with the procedure may have 
accidentally brushed her body. He denied 
drinking was involved. He contended plaintilrs 
credibility was in issue, that she gave 
contradictory statements to her no-fault carrier's 
adjustor (first accident) atter the alleged sexual 
assault and gave inconsistent statements about the 
alleged assault. 
Case Summary Cont'd/Misc. 
Abbreviations: 
ARBITRATION AWARD: 
Comparative negligence was not in 
issue; liability for plaintiff. Award: 
$65.00 special damages; $9,400 
general damages and $9,400 punitive 
damages. A judgment was entered 
as shown after the 20 day period to 
appeal ran. 
COURTS: #1= U.S. District; #2= lSI Circuit; #3= 2nd Circuit; #4=)'<1 Circuit; #5= 5th 
Circuit 
J/JW: J= Jury Trial, JW= Jury Waived MARITAL STATUS: M= Married, S= Single, 
W=Widow 
DAMAGES: SD= Special Damages, GD= General Damages, PunD= Punitive Damages 
OTHER: TBDATOT= To be detemlined at time of trial, M&C= Maintenance and Cure, 
D/A= Date of Accident 
* National Chiropractic Mutual Insurance Company filed a declaratory relief action in US 
District Court on the duty to defend, contending plaintiffs allegations were specifically 
excluded (E&O policy); the carrier prevailed. 
PAGE 10-19-94(a) 
ApPENDIX B: 
NARRATIVES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE JUDGMENTS 
IN HAWAII 1985 - 2001 
Case Codes: S = State, C = CAAP, F = Federal 
(numbered in chronological order within S, C & F categories5(6) 
Parenthetical code following summary indicates type of defendant (e.g., I 
= individual, B = business) 
I. Violent Aggressors: Assault, Battery, and Arsoll 
Case S3: Kum Sun Ojisa v. Rolalldo Navarette (judgment 8/6/85). In 
Ojisa, the plaintiff, a single waitress, alleged that the defendant, a professional 
;66 Two cases arc numbered out of order: C 16 (Floyd) and C 17 (Hart). 
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boxer, abducted, brutally beat, assaulted, raped, and sodomized her. Ofisa's 
injuries included multiple contusions and abrasions, lacerations of the lip, 
neck, back, right elbow and forearm, severe abdominal bruises, severe 
depression, anxiety and emotional distress, and temporary work disability. 
The defendant (who proceeded pro se after his counsel withdrew) had already 
been convicted of sodomy, attempted sodomy, sexual abuse, rape in the first 
degree, and kidnapping. Circuit Court Judge Takao granted plaintiffs motion 
for summary judgment on liability and held a one-day jury-waived trial only 
on the issues of damages.s67 Judge Takao awarded $40,000 in general 
damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. (I) 
Case S4: Lynda L. Caris v. Arthur K. Ludloff (judgment 8/29/85). In 
Caris, the plaintiff, a single 39-year-old female TV executive, alleged that the 
defendant wilfully, maliciously, and negligently assaulted and battered her by 
striking her in the face and body, and choking her in an attempt to kill her. 
After two days of jury-waived trial, Circuit Court Judge Richard Lum 
rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding general damages of $15,000, 
special damages (lost wages and psychologist's bills) of $1,370.50, and 
punitive damages of $10,000. (I) 
Case S8: Stephen R. Batungbacal v. Carlton Young & City and County of 
Honolulu (judgment 2/27/86). In Batungbacal, the plaintiff, a 23-year-old 
married auto-body repair worker, alleged that the pro se defendant Carlton 
Young, a police officer with a prior assault conviction, committed assault and 
battery on the plaintiff without provocation. After losing a parking space to 
plaintiff in the Waimalu Shopping Plaza, Young became angry and scuffied 
with plaintiff, who suffered a broken nose requiring surgery, cervical strain, 
trauma, and contusions. Circuit Court Judge Ronald T.Y. Moon dismissed 
co-defendant City, which contended that Young was driving his own car on a 
personal errand; that Young's uniform was not visible under his raincoat; that 
he did not identify himself as a police officer; and therefore the City was not 
liable under respondeat superior. After a three-day bench trial, the Judge 
Moon found that Young committed assault and battery, awarding general 
damages of$60,000, special damages of$38,269.15 (medical and lost wages), 
and punitive damages of $3,000. (I) & (City) 
567 The court also rejected defendant's counterclaim for abuse of process and property damage to his 
car, as well as for punitive damages. 
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Case S9: Michael Niesl, individually and as Guardian Procheim Amifor 
Joseph Niesl, a minor v. Max Stanton, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem 
for Willie Stanton, a minor, and Margaret Stanton v. Ronald Reid Uudgment 
5/20/86). Plaintiff 9-year-old Joseph Niesl was playing on a footpath over a 
drainage ditch when defendant Willie Stanton, also a minor, pushed him, 
causing him to lose his balance and fall into the ditch, fracturing his left arm. 
Circuit Court Judge Tany Hong held, on the motion in limine of Willie's 
parents, that although they could be held liable for their son's torts, any 
punitive damages award must be based on their son's financial condition and 
not theirs. After dismissing the other defendants (owners of the adjacent 
properties and footpath) and granting a directed verdict for defendants on 
plaintiffs' claim of negligence supervision, Judge Tong held a five-day jury 
trial on the remaining counts of assault and battery, negligence, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. The jury found for the Niesls, awarding 
general damages of $1,400, special damages of $1,093.23, and punitive 
damages (against minor defendant Willie) of $40. (The Court apparently 
did not enter the jury's free-standing $39 punitive damages award in favor of 
Willie against Michael Niesl, the father of Joseph, who allegedly dragged 
Willie from the scene and threw him onto the ground after the incident.) (I) 
Case S 1 0: Douglas N. Sigler v. City and County of Honolulu; Charles W. 
Ingram; Albert Chong Uudgment 2117/87). Plaintiff Sigler, a 24-year-old 
single Catamaran crewmember, alleged that, while walking in Waikiki with a 
closed bottle of Schnapps, he was improperly arrested and then beaten while 
handcuffed by Honolulu police officers. Plaintiff suffered abrasions and 
lacerations to his face that required 45 stitches and left a residual scar. 
(Plaintiff was acquitted of charges of criminal littering, for allegedly throwing 
the bottle in a bush, and resisting arrest.) Circuit Court Judge Melvin Soong 
dismissed co-defendant officer Chong, the claims of outrage and defamation, 
the claims against the City for negligent training/supervision and violation of 
plaintiffs constitutional rights, and then held an eight-day jury trial on the 
assault and battery and related remaining claims against Ingram and the City. 
The jury returned a special verdict finding Ingram liable for assault and 
battery and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
violating plaintiff's constitutional rights. (The jury also held the City liable 
on the same claims under respondeat superior.) The jury awarded the 
plaintiff $ 10,000 in general damages, $950 in special damages, and $50,000 
in punitive damages ($25,000 for violating plaintiffs constitutional rights 
and $25,000 for plaintiffs other claims). (City) & (Is) 
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Case S12: Armando Oakes, Delores Oakes, Michael Oakes, and Peter 
Oakes v. Colburn Ohia, individually as a police officer of the City and County 
of Honolulu, and City and County of Honolulu Uudgment 9/2/87). In Oakes, 
Armando Oakes, a 45-year-old married sales manager, alleged that, on 
Father's Day 1983, he was driving home on Kamehameha Highway to 
Mililani when he cut in front of defendant Ohia where the highway lanes 
narrowed from four to two. Ohia, an off-duty police officer, followed Oakes 
to his home and beat him in front of his wife and children, causing plaintiff to 
suffer a black eye, lacerations on the nose, and contusions. Defendant Ohia 
claimed that Oakes collided into him while changing lanes, stumbled and fell 
after parking his car at home, and was convicted of driving under the 
influence. Circuit Court Judge Titcomb excluded the conviction from trial 
and dismissed the civil rights claim, limiting the trial issues to assault and 
battery, negligence, and negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
After eight days of trial, the jury found for plaintiff Armando Oakes on all 
remaining counts and, after reducing the judgment for 25% comparative 
negligence, Judge Titcomb awarding general damages of $6,056.25 and 
punitive damages of $5,000 (solely against Ohia). General damages of 
$250 were also awarded to the son, Michael Oakes, who witnessed the 
beating, but the jury found defendants not liable for the claims ofthe wife and 
other son. (I) & (City) 
Case C2: Reginald DeGuiar v. Gordon Logan (CAAP judgment entered 
2/4/88). Plaintiff, a private security guard for a condominium, alleged that 
defendant assaulted him (throwing a punch that missed by 12") after plaintiff 
confronted defendant about parking his motor vehicle in an unauthorized area, 
despite several warnings, and was in the process of having defendant's 
vehicle towed away. CAAP Arbitrator Michael McCarthy found defendant 
liable, awarding no general or special damages, but $100 in punitive 
damages. (I) 
Case S19: Ronald Rod v. Steven Fanell and Don E. Fanell Uudgment 
7/22/88). Plaintiff, a 19-year-old gas station attendant, alleged that he and his 
brother accompanied their sister to Kaiser High School to confront defendant 
Steven Fanell (who was also a student at Kaiser High School) because Fanell 
was spreading false rumors about plaintiffs sister. A confrontation ensured, 
and Steven struck plaintiff on the face with a torque wrench, reSUlting in 
-injuries to plaintiff s face and trauma. Steven claimed self-defense against the 
larger plaintiff and brother, who were wearing military fatigues. Circuit Court 
Judge Ronald Moon admitted evidence of Steven's 5-6 prior aggressive 
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incidents and violent disposition. Judge Moon also ruled that any award for 
punitive damages would be limited to the financial status of Steven, and not 
that of his father Don. After plaintiff withdrew his negligence count against 
Steven during trial, the jury issues were limited to assault and battery. After 
an eight-day trial, the jury awarded plaintiff general damages of $47,000, 
special damages of$8,893, and punitive damages of$4,000 (against Steven 
only). (I) & (I1father) 
Case C5: Ginger Harper v. Alfred Freitas (CAAP judgment entered 
10/4/89). Plaintiff Harper, an I8-year-old fast food employee, alleged assault 
and battery, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress and gross 
negligence, from an incident in which defendant Freitas mistakenly believed 
that Harper had been involved in a graffiti incident adjacent to his home. 
Freitas had followed a pick up truck from the scene to the Fast Stop, where 
Harper was parked. Plaintiff alleged that defendant reached into her vehicle, 
grabbed her head to tum her around, and struck her with a closed fist, 
resulting in contusion and edema of her left cheek for one week and 
discoloration of her teeth. CAAP Arbitrator William Matsui found for the 
plaintiff, awarding her $2,500 in general damages, $279 in special damages, 
and $3,000 in punitive damages. (I) 
Case S24: Sherry Vidmar v. Paul Kan (judgment 6/18/90). Vidmar 
involved a violent domestic dispute between plaintiff, a single female sales 
clerk, and defendant, an engineer. Plaintiff claimed that defendant sexually 
abused her and committed assault and battery for a 1-112 year period, 
resulting in physical and psychological injuries. Defendant denied the 
allegations and counterclaimed also seeking damages for assault and battery, 
deceit, and abuse of process. After seven days oftrial, the jury found partially 
in favor of both parties: that defendant struck plaintiff without her consent, 
that plaintiff struck defendant without consent, that plaintiff s suit was not an 
abuse of process, and that plaintiff held defendant's property without consent. 
The jury awarded general damages to plaintiff of$I 000, no special damages, 
and punitive damages of $7,500. The jury also awarded special damages of 
$300 to defendant and punitive damages of $750. (I) 
Case C6: Anthony H Gregory, Jr. v. Mervin Ah Loy, Jr. (CAAP Judgment 
entered 3/30/92). In this assault and battery case, defendant (the "new 
boyfriend") admitted that, without provocation, he shot Gregory, who had 
come to his former girlfriend's home to pick up some personal property. 
Gregory suffered a gunshot wound to his groin, with the bullet entering the 
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base of the penis and traveling to the right femur. CAAP Arbitrator Kenneth 
Fukunaga noted that defendant had been convicted of assault and did not 
dispute liability. He awarded plaintiff$250,000 in general damages, $67,316 
in special damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. (I) 
Case S27: Kyle Kfentzis and Mark Kafentziz [sic} v. Azubu US.A., dba 
Rumors, Wayne Fumio Pemberton, Richard 0. Reb 'Il (and Sean Kafentziz 
and Kurt Kafentziz, third-party defendants) Uudgment 7117/92). This case 
involved a brawl between the four Kafentziz brothers and defendant minors 
Pemberton and Reb'll at Rumors nightclub in Honolulu. (The jury ultimately 
found defendant Azubu, the owner of Rumors, was not negligent.) When the 
four brother and two defendants were ejected for brawling in the club, another 
scuffle ensued, in which Pemberton stabbed both plaintiffs. Kyle, a 22-year-
old single professional football player, suffered stab wounds to his left arm, a 
severed artery, and scarring that allegedly ended his career. Mark, a 29-year-
old married professional football player, suffered a stab wound to the hip, 
right thumb, resulting in scarring and allegedly precluding his football career. 
After ten days of trial, the jury apportioned fault: 15% Kyle, 0% Mark, 75% 
Pemberton, and 10% Reb'll, awarding damages as follows: 1) Kyle: general 
damages of$170,850; special damages of$5,712; and punitive damages of 
$50,000; 2) Mark: general damages of$85,000, special damages of$51 0, and 
punitive damages of $20,000. (B) & (Is) 
Case C7: Dale H. Armstrong and Anna Marie E. Armstrong v. Jerrold H. 
Childress (CAAP Judgment entered 1112/92). Plaintiffs, husband and wife, 
contended that Mr. Armstrong and defendant, both enlisted men, were playing 
flag football at Wheeler Field when, without provocation, defendant struck 
Mr. Armstrong on the face and nose. Plaintiff suffered a fractured nose, 
chronic sinus infection, and headaches. Defendant denied he intended to 
injure plaintiff, proceeded pro se, and failed to show up at the hearing. CAAP 
Arbitrator Michael A. Lilly found that plaintiff was not comparatively at fault, 
and awarded plaintiff Mr. Armstrong $25,000 in general damages, $2,559 in 
special damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages; he also awarded Mrs. 
Armstrong $10,000 in general damages. (I) 
Case C8: Dennis Du Pont and Tammy Lin Du Pont v. Wendell A. Pichay 
and Rosemary A. Kubo (CAAP Award entered 11/4/92). Plaintiff Dennis Du 
Pont, a Honolulu Police Officer, received bullet wounds in his cheek and legs 
when defendant Wendell Pichay, whom Du Pont suspected had committed a 
burglary at the Waimalu Shopping Center, returned to the scene (where Du 
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Pont had apprehended Pichay's accomplice) and sprayed the area with an 
automatic weapon, seriously injuring Du Pont. Plaintiffs claimed assault and 
battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. CAAP 
Arbitrator Phillip Uesato found Pichay 100% "negligent," awarding plaintiffs 
$50,000 in general damages, $2,190 in special damages, and $100,000 in 
punitive damages. (Is) 
Case S28: Donald Santiago v. Cleveland King. Stateo/Hawaii (judgment 
12/3/92). Plaintiff Santiago, a 47-year-old former construction worker, and 
defendant Cleveland King were both inmates at Halawa High Security 
Facility. Plaintiff was classified as medium security, and King was one step 
short of the highest security level (with a history of convictions of rape, and 
assault and attacks on guards). Because of overcrowding, plaintiffwas moved 
to the high security facility. At lunchtime, the inmates' cell doors were 
opened to permit them to eat in a common area. Plaintiff, handicapped by a 
back condition, was making his way down the stairs when King, unprovoked, 
"suddenly drove a sharp pencil into plaintiffs left eye causing him to fall 
eight feet to the concrete floor." Plaintiff suffered a ruptured globe, requiring 
enucleation (removal), aggravation of his pre-existing back injury, and 
emotional distress. King defaulted. After seven days of jury-waived trial, 
Circuit Court Judge Wendell Huddy found King and the State equally at fault 
and jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's injuries, rejecting the State's 
discretionary function exception defense. Judge Huddy entered judgment for 
plaintiff of $250,000 in general damages, no special damages, and $250,000 
in punitive damages (against King only). (The Court also found King liable 
to the State on its cross-claim for $250,000 because King defaulted.) (I) & 
(State) 
Case C9: Ednalyn Panganiban v. Mark Faulise (CAAP Judgment entered 
3/22/95). In this assault and battery case, defendant admitted that he induced 
plaintiff, his former girlfriend, to take a ride with him, drove her to a 
pineapple field, committed assault and battery on her, and then left her in the 
field late at night. Defendant subsequently continued to pressure and 
intimidate plaintiff. (Criminal charges were later filed against defendant, and 
plaintiff received some compensation from the criminal compensation 
program.) CAAP Arbitrator William Bordner found that plaintiff was not 
comparatively negligent, and awarded her $3,000 in general damages, $561 in 
special damages, $3,000 in punitive damages, and $1000 in costs. (I) 
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Case CI0: Alfred Ching v. Martin John fan-To Wong and Hawaii 
Newspaper Agency, Liberty Newspaper Limited dba Star Bulletin (CAAP 
Judgment entered 1119/95). Plaintiff alleged that he was injured when 
defendant Wong, a 30-year-old Honolulu Star Bulletin newspaper delivery 
employee, tackled him to the ground after Wong and Ching's wife had a 
heated conversation. Plaintiff, who had an amputated foot from vascular 
disorders, suffered serious injuries, including back strain, lacerations, stroke 
symptoms, and blurred vision. CAAP Arbitrator Carolyn Wilson apportioned 
liability 0% to plaintiff, 95% to Wong, and 5% to the employing newspaper. 
She awarded plaintiff $10,000 in general damages, $10,849 in special 
damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages. (I) & (B) 
Case S32: Raymond H. Kim and James K. Fong v. Nova International 
Hawaii Co., Ltd., d/b/a Maharaja (judgment 114/96). Plaintiffs Kim and 
Fong were business visitors during the early morning hours of January 29, 
1992 at defendant Maharaja nightclub, which had a strict dress code for hosts 
(tuxedos) and guests (sports coats for males). Defendant permitted Dean 
Chung, a host, and his friends to enter the premises wearing shorts and t-
shirts, and served him alcohol. Without provocation, Chung challenged Kim 
to a fight, and when plaintiffs and their girlfriends attempted to leave the 
premises to avoid Chung, Chung and his friends choked Kim and hit him on 
the head with a beer bottle. When plaintiff Fong came to Kim's aid, Fong 
was also assaulted. Defendant's hosts failed to intervene or stop the assault. 
Plaintiff Fong, a 34-year-old married sales manager, suffered multiple 
contusions, abrasions, and hematomas. Plaintiff Kim, a 27-year-old single 
account executive, suffered lacerations to his scalp, cervical strain, and 
multiple contusions. Circuit Court Judge Marie Milks denied defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages, finding that defendant 
ratified the acts and omissions of its employees, and that the evidence 
presented clear and convincing evidence upon which the jury could render a 
verdict of punitive damages. After a seven-day trial, the jury entered a verdict 
for the plaintiffs, finding: 1) for Fong, general damages of $3,750, special 
damages of $750, and punitive damages of $15,000; 2) for Kim, general 
damages of $1000, special damages of $1,900, and punitive damages of 
$10,000. (B) 
Case C 11: Keone N Rosette v. Lino Caling and State of Hawaii 
Department of Education (CAAP Judgment entered 11118/96). Plaintiff 
Rosette, a 15-year-old student at Aiea High School admitted that he had told a 
high school security guard that Caling was a (expletive deleted) after Caling 
348 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XX:143 
had cited plaintifffor leaving campus without authorization. The other guard 
relayed the insult to Caling, who then assaulted plaintiff while allegedly 
escorting him to the Vice-Principal's office regarding the earlier incident. 
Plaintiff alleged that Caling choked him, pushed him up against the wall, and 
struck him in the face with the antenna of his walkie-talkie. Default judgment 
was entered against Caling, and the issue focused on the State's liability for 
negligent hiring and training of Caling. CAAP Arbitrator Jeffrey Sia 
apportioned negligence 5% to plaintiff, 70% to Caling, and 25% to the State. 
He awarded plaintiff$13,300 in general damages, $7,640 in special damages, 
and $23,750 in punitive damages (against Caling only).568 (Ultimately, the 
State settled with the plaintiff, but the judgment was still entered.) (I) & 
(State) 
Case C12: Blair A. Hubert v. Spotts Cleaning, Victor Young, Compadres 
dba Mexican Bar and Grill (CAAP Judgment entered 4/10/97). Plaintiff 
Hubert, a 32-year-old bartender at Compadres Mexican Bar and Grill in 
Lahaina, Maui, alleged that, while he was waiting for a mainland flight, he 
stopped by the Sunset Grill in Honolulu, where he had previously worked as a 
bartender, to kill some time. He then visited the night club Studebakers, had a 
few drinks, and returned to Sunset Grill to pick up his luggage early in the 
morning. While he was there, defendant Victor Young of Spotts Cleaning 
was cleaning the premises. Hubert claimed he sat down at a table, observed 
that Young was drinking at the bar, fell asleep and then was awakened when 
Young was touching him sexually. Hubert claimed he tried to push Young 
away, but Young bit him on the back, smashed a bottle on his head, and left 
him in a pool of blood, where he was found by the police. Young denied 
liability, claiming plaintiff was the aggressor. CAAP Arbitrator John Roney 
found plaintiff 0% negligent, Spotts 0% negligent, and Young 100% at fault. 
Roney entered an award for plaintiff against Young of $15,000 in general 
damages, $11,658 for special damages, punitive damages of $5,000, and 
costs of$3,730. (Bs) &(1) 
Case S34: Kerry Mcauley V., Robert Sonke, Outrigger Hotels USA, Inc., 
and John Pederson, Ltd., dba Shorebird Bar and Restaurant Uudgment 
entered 7/23/97). Plaintiff Kerry Mcauley, a 30-year-old single advertising 
manager visiting Waikiki, alleged claims of assault and battery, 
negligent/intentional infliction of emotional distress, and public 
accommodation discrimination based on sex. The incident occurred when 
S68 Note that the description of the award and the listed award do not match on the verdict sheet. 
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plaintiff was walking past defendant Shorebird's bar. Three men were rating 
females as they walked by, assigning numbers of napkins and holding them 
up to view. Plaintiff was insulted by the demeaning activity ("she rated 8 out 
of 10"), and jokingly tossed her shoe at the men. When she went to retrieve 
her shoe(s), defendant Sonke punched her and pushed her to the ground, 
continuing to abuse her until some men from the beach came up to her aid. 
Plaintiff alleged that defendants Outrigger and Shorebird were negligent for 
failing to provide security and come to her aid, and that Shorebird had notice 
of the men's offensive behavior prior to the incident. Plaintiff suffered back 
injuries, trauma, depression, septal injury, contusions, abrasions, and black 
and blue eyes. After a ten-day trial, Circuit Court Judge Gail C. Nakatani 
granted a directed verdict to defendant Outrigger. The jury found for 
plaintiff, apportioning her 20% fault, 55% to Sonke, and 25% to Shorebird, 
awarding general damages of $49,600, special damages of $16,000, and 
punitive damages of $62,000 (against Sonke only). (I) & (Bs) 
Case C 14: Jane Doe and John Doe v. Harrison Mew and Arcade Terrado 
(CAAP Judgment entered 9/28/00). Plaintiffs husband and wife, a military 
couple who had transferred to Hawaii, visited defendant Mew's Island Auto 
Air condition business, where he also operated a jet ski business. Plaintiffs 
contended that Mew had a modus operandi in which he induced pretty women 
to model for him on ajet ski and then took advantage of them when they were 
under the influence of alcohol. Mew allegedly induced Mrs. Doe to return to 
the business, purportedly to employ her as a model. He invited defendant 
Terrado to be present the evening when he unlawfully touched and engaged in 
bodily contact with Mrs. Doe against her will and without her consent. Both 
defendants later pled guilty to felony and misdemeanor charges of sexual 
assault. CAAP Arbitrator Gary Yokoyama apportioned fault 0% plaintiffs, 
70% Mew, and 30% Terrado. He awarded plaintiffs $10,000 in general 
damages, no special damages, and a total of $32,000 in punitive damages 
($30,000 against Mew and $2,000 against Terrado). Mr. Doe received 
general damages of $2,000 and no punitive damages. (Is) 
Case S39: William K. Takaki, Janina Takaki, and Billie K. Takaki v. 
Joseph P. Tavares, George E. Cambra, George L. Cambra, Virginia N. 
Cambra, George Cambra's Movie Production Trucks, Inc., Shafter Pawn, 
Inc. Gudgment entered 8/29/01). This case involved a notorious dispute over 
control over Hawaii's lucrative movie production business between two 
competitors, primary plaintiff William Takaki and primary defendant George 
L. Camba. Mr. Takaki owned a truck tractor and trailer used for movie 
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production for movies such as "Jake and the Fatman." In June 1991, Mr. 
Takaki's truck burned to the ground, as did the truck of another competitor of 
Mr. Cambra. In March 1999, Cambra and co-defendant Tavares (later 
dismissed from the civil case) pled guilty to conspiracy to commit arson in 
burning Takaki's truck. Plaintiffs then filed this civil action contending that 
Cambra, to prevent his assets from seizure, conspired with his parents, George 
and Virginia Cambra, to hide assets, and that defendants' actions caused 
plaintiffs emotional distress, destroyed plaintiffs financially, and forced 
plaintiffs to file for bankruptcy, resulting in the loss of their home. First 
Circuit Judge R. Mark Browning dismissed all defendants except for Mr. 
Cambra. After a six-day trial, the jury found 1) that Cambra engaged in lIED, 
awarding Mr. Takaki $250,000 in general damages, Mrs. Takaki $100,000, 
and Billie Takaki $50,000, 2) that Cambra should pay Mr. Takaki $350,000 in 
general damages and $20,794 for damage to the truck; 3) $450,000 general 
damages and $60,000 special damages for RICO violations; 4) $1 million 
general damages and $2.5 million in special damages for intentional 
interference with plaintiffs' prospective economic advantage; and 5) by clear 
and convincing evidence, punitive damages of $4,630,794 to Mr. Takaki, 
$130,000 to Mrs. Takaki, and $25,000 to Billie Takaki. The Court confirmed 
only the awards for lIED (totalling $400,000) and punitive damages 
(totalling $4,785,974). (Is) & (Bs) 
2. Abuses of Power: Sexual Harassment, Wrongful Termination, Relatiatory 
Discharge 
Case S5: Ruth 1 Sorrell v. Earl Lynn and State of Hawaii (judgment 
9/13/85). In Sorrell, the plaintiff, a widowed, self-employed woman, alleged 
that the defendant Earl Lynn improperly represented himself as a psychiatrist 
and falsely advised a family court judge about plaintiffs mental status, which 
resulted in the forcible removal of pi aintiff and her 3-year-old grandson from 
her residence by police. A psychiatric examination at Queen's Medical 
Center found plaintiffs condition to be "normal." Lynn also harassed Sorrell 
by attempting to purchase her home and causing property damage. (The court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss based on discretionary function 
immunity.) After two days of jury-waived trial, at which defendant failed to 
appear, Circuit Court Judge Norman Lewis rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, 
awarding $10,000 in general damages, $691 in special damages, and $30,000 
in punitive damages. (I1Dr.) & (State) 
Case S 11: Eugenie Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., Flagship 
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International, Inc., and Mark Liquori (judgment entered 5/26/87). Plaintiff, a 
36-year-old single woman who was secretary to the controller (defendant 
Liquori) of the Ala Moana Hotel alleged that she was fired by Liquori to 
prevent her from testifying before a grand jury about her awareness of price-
fixing activities of defendants and other Hawaii hotels. When he fired 
plaintiff, Liquori also allegedly suggested that plaintiff move to the mainland 
and offered her money to do so. Plaintiff alleged severe emotional distress, 
humiliation, and loss of reputation. Plaintiff appealed the court's order 
granting summary judgment to defendants, resulting in the Hawaii Supreme 
Court's decision in Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370 (1982), 
which recognized a new public policy exception to the employment at will 
doctrine. On remand, the jury was instructed that if they found Parnar's 
discharge was for the purpose of preventing her from testifying in the anti-
trust investigation, it was a violation of public policy. After a nine-day trial, 
the jury returned a special verdict for plaintiff, awarding past/future wage loss 
of$300,000, emotional distress damages of$275,000, and punitive damages 
of $1.5 million (23% Americana, 67% Flagship, 10% Liquori). (ERs) & (I) 
Case Cl: Charleen S. Laronal v. Donald K. Hopper, Beki Catham dba 
Paradise Personnel, and Susan Greene (CAAP judgment entered 12/1/88). 
In this CAAP case, plaintiffLaronal alleged that defendant Paradise Personnel 
negligently referred her for an employment contract to Nutri-Metics 
International Corporation, managed by Dennis Hopper. After a few months 
on the job, Hopper began sexually harassing Laronal, hitting her on the 
"rump," grabbing her breast, and scratching her chest during a struggle. 
Hopper was convicted of first degree sexual abuse in February 1987, and 
plaintiff alleged in her lawsuit that Greene knew or should have known of 
Hopper's abusive nature and failed to warn her about his deviant behavior. 
CAAP Arbitrator James T. Estes found that although Paradise and Green 
breached their duty to warn, their breach was not a substantial factor in 
plaintiff's injuries because, at the time of the assaults, plaintiff was herself 
aware of Hopper's deviant sexual behavior. Estes found Hopper was the 
cause and awarded plaintiff $5,000 in general damages, $8,318 in special 
damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages against Hopper. (Ultimately, 
however, plaintiff collected no damages because Hopper's estate had 
previously settled with plaintiff for $5,000, remaining as a nominal defendant 
in the case for purposes of apportioning negligence.) {Is) & (B) 
Case C16: Betty J Floyd v. Wakenhut of Hawaii (judgment entered 
5/22/91). Plaintiff Betty J. Floyd, a married 63-year-old woman, employed as 
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an airport security screener at the Kona Airport, was a Seventh-Day 
Adventist. She contended that when she was hired in 1989, she had an 
agreement with her supervisor not to schedule her to work during her sabbath 
(from Friday night to Saturday night), but in 1990, a new supervisor told her 
she should have to work the weekends, including her sabbath, and that she 
was forced to quit. She alleged constructive discharge in violation of public 
policy, HAW. REv. ST. § 378-2, and the Hawaii Constitution. Defendant 
denied that there was any special agreement and contended that all other 
screeners worked six days a week. After a one-day hearing, CAAP arbitrator 
Jeanne L. Hughes found defendant liable and awarded special damages of 
$3113.89 (difference in pay) and punitive damages of$5,000. (Plaintiff had 
a stroke after her termination and refused defendant's offer of re-
employment.) (B/ER) 
Case S25: Francis R. Calleon v. Hiroo "Woody" Miyagi and MTL, Inc. 
Gudgment entered 5/6/92). Plaintiff Francis Calleon, a single 42-year-old 
General Superintendent of Maintenance ofMTL (the Honolulu bus company), 
alleged that he was wrongfully fired by Miyage, MTL's Chief Executive, 
after four years of employment after Calleon complained about three 
violations of public policy and other violations by MTL (such as preferential 
treatment to supplies who contributed to Mayor Fasi's campaign, improper 
overtime and training, and improper inventory practices that could hide 
thefts). Calleon alleged retaliatory discharge, violations of the state whistle 
blower statute, breach of contract, defamation, negligent/intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and fraud/misrepresentation. After a 20-day trial, the 
jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $450,000, attorneys 
fees/costs and prejudgment interest of $194,510, and punitive damages of 
$150,000 ($100,000 against MTL and $50,000 against Miyage). (I) & (B) 
Case S33: Karen Sullivan v. South Seas Motors, Inc. Gudgment entered 
3/29/96). Plaintiff Sullivan, a 49-year-old single sales manager for defendant 
South Seas Motors, claimed that defendant demoted and then fired her 
because of her age and sex. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's vice president 
Steve Robin told plaintiff, who had an excellent performance rating and had 
been promoted during six years of employment with South Seas Motors to 
general sales manager in charge of three dealerships, that he was demoting her 
(to the Kaneohe dealership, which was due to close) to recruit new superstar 
sales managers who would be unwilling to work for a woman. Plaintiff, who 
was replaced by two younger men, filed the complaint after receiving a right 
to sue letter from the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission. Plaintiff alleged that 
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she suffered major depression, attempted suicide by ingesting rat poison and 
turpentine, cutting her neck and wrist, and tying a plastic bag over her head. 
After a ten-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict for plaintiff, finding 
sex or age was a substantial factor in the discharge of plaintiff and that she 
suffered emotional damages as a result. Thejury awarded plaintiff$362,000 
in general damages, $150,000 in past wage losses, $800,000 in future wage 
losses, and $500,000 in punitive damages. (Circuit Court Judge Herbert 
Shimabukuro also awarded plaintiff $ 143,000 in attorneys fees and costs and 
$26,000 in pre-judgment interest.) (BIER) 
Case F4: Maria Arceneaux v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees 
Local 5 Union; Larry Kaneshiro, and Elwood Mott (Federal Judgement 
entered 11125/96). Plaintiff, a 39-year-old female labor organizer, sued her 
employer, Local 5, for a myriad offederal and state tort and statutory claims 
stemming from sexual harassment by defendant Kaneshiro and defendant 
Mott on the job, which she claimed created a hostile work environment. She 
also alleged wrongful termination when she and four other females were 
terminated, allegedly under a pretext of a reduction in force. Although many 
claims were dropped before trial, ajury still held in favor of plaintiff, finding 
Local 5 and Kaneshiro liable for sexual harassment, assault and battery, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded plaintiff 
$12,000 in general damages, no special damages, and $60,000 in punitive 
damages ($50,000 against Local 5 and $10,000 against Kaneshiro). 
Federal Court Judge Helen Gillmore entered the jury's award as judgment in 
favor of plaintiff. (Union) & (Is) 
Case S35: Charles Schejke v. Reliable Collection Agency Ltd., Pacific 
Medical Collections, Inc., Jonathan Kirschner, Fred Kirschner Gudgment 
entered 1011 0/97). Plaintiff, a 63-year-old married man was hired by 
defendants (Reliable in 1986; Pacific in 1988) as a collections agent on a 
salary and commission basis. After plaintiff filed an age discrimination 
complaint with the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission and received a right to 
sue letter, he was locked out of his office, did not receive a bonus that was 
given to all other employees, was otherwise retaliated against by defendants, 
and was wrongfully terminated. Although Circuit Court Judge Dan Kochi 
granted a directed verdict to defendants on the age discrimination claim, after 
a seven-day trial, the jury found that Reliable and Pacific had failed to pay 
plaintiff wages, and found that Pacific had retaliated against plaintiff for filing 
the civil rights complaint, awarding a total of $32,256.50 against Reliable, 
and $472,635.67 against Pacific, which included a punitive damages award 
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of $300,000 against Pacific only. (Bs) & (Is) 
Case F5: Sylvia Mano v. Hawaii Teamsters and Allied Workers Union, 
Local 996, Mel Kahele, Ronan Kozuma, and Hawaii Teamsters Staff 
Organization (Federal Court judgment entered 12/21/98). Plaintiff, a 58-
year-old female employed as a union senior business agent, alleged that she 
was wrongfully terminated by her union's President, defendant Kahele, 
because of her political and/or union affiliation and failing to support his bid 
for re-election. She also alleged the Kahele fired her under a pretext and 
defamed her by spreading false stories about her acts of dishonesty in 
accounting for the distribution of t-shirts to union members. After an eight-
day trial, the federal court jury found for plaintiff. The jury awarded her 
$45,000 in back pay and benefits, $118,750 in compensatory damages, and 
$100,000 in punitive damages ($25,000 for wrongful termination and 
$75,000 for defamation, allocated 90% to Kahele 90% and 10% to 
Kozuma). (Union) & IslER) 
Case S37: Nancy Lelia Wilder v. Paul Brown International Ltd., Paul 
Brown, individually (judgment entered 7/21/99). Plaintiff, a 38-year-old 
single woman who was the Cosmetics Director for Paul Brown, alleged that 
she was subjected to sexual harassment (touching, exposing, and verbal 
comments on and off salon premises), intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and assault and battery by Paul Brown, which created a hostile work 
environment resulting in her constructive discharge and caused her clinical 
depression. After a six-day trial, the jury found for plaintiff on the assault 
count and for defendant on the sexual harassment, battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress counts. The jury awarded plaintiff$3,262.34 
in general damages, $632.68 in special damages, reduced the award by 
$994.25 for failure to mitigate, and awarded punitive damages of $100,000 
(reduced by Circuit Court Judge Kevin S.c. Chang to $50,000). (8) & (I) 
Case S38: Chad K. and Jamie Awai v. Interstate Cleaning Corp., William 
Cariaga (judgment entered 8/30/99). Plaintiffs 22-year-old part-time night 
janitor Chad K. Awai alleged that his supervisor defendant William Cariaga, a 
homosexual, sexually harassed him on the job, causing severe emotional 
distress. Mrs. Awai also claimed severe emotional distress from outrageous 
remarks Cariaga directed at her in person and over the phone. Mr. Awai 
claimed the unwelcome advances by Cariaga created a hostile work 
environment and forced him to quit his job. After eight days of trial, the jury 
found for plaintiffs, and awarded Mr. Awai $607.50 in lost wages, $125,000 
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in compensatory damages (against Interstate) (reduced by Circuit Court Judge 
Rhonda Nishimura to $40,000) and $15,000 in punitive damages; Mrs. Awai 
$10,000 in compensatory damages. (B) & (I1ER) 
3. Reckless and Intoxicated Drivers: DUIs and Speeders 
Case S 1: Charles H. Nakagawa, and Carolyn Nakagawa, Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Scott R. Nakagawa v. Wayne Chevas and Grace 
Chevas (judgment entered 5/2/85). In the early morning hours of May 15, 
1985, decedent Scott Nakagawa, a 28-year-old single self-employed attorney, 
was a passenger in his Porsche 924, hearing mauka on Kaohi Street, entering 
the intersection ofMoanalua Road, when his vehicle was struck broadside on 
the passenger's side by a 1970 Gremlin heading 'ewa on Moanalua Road, 
driven by Wayne Chevas. Scott died at the scene. The parties disputed who 
had the green light. (Third-party defendant Dean Kakazu, the driver of 
Scott's Porsche settled with the third-party plaintiffs for $125,000 on the 
second day oftrial on the contribution claim and was dismissed.) Defendants 
admitted liability and the only issue tried was damages. After a five-day trial, 
the jury rendered a verdict for Scott's estate of special damages of 
$12,810.99, excess earnings of$1 ,200,000, and punitive damages 0($2,500. 
(Is) 
Case S2: Thong Sananikone, as guardian ad litem for Nang Boun My v. 
Darrell R. Large (judgment entered 511 0/85). On July 26, 1983, Nang Boun 
My was a passenger in her nephew's Honda Civic stopped at a red light on 
Kalanianaole Highway when their vehicle was rear-ended by defendant's 
Mercedes Benz. Plaintiff alleged the cervical strain caused general health, 
walking, and mentaVstress problems and that, previous to the accident, she 
was active and vigorous. A guardian was appointed for My, a widowed 
retired housewife, approximately 93 years old, who could not speak or read 
English. Plaintiff alleged that defendant, who had two prior DUI convictions, 
was intoxicated. Defendant admitted liability. After a six day trial, the jury 
awarded plaintiff$47,020.12 in general and special damages, and $75,000 in 
punitive damages. (I) 
Case S 13: Raynette M. Cuson and Bernadette Gonzales v. Edward Agag 
(judgment entered 11/5/87). In this hit and run DUI case, plaintiffs alleged 
. that, at 11 :50 a.m., Agag drove a friend's black 1974 Toyota onto the 
sidewalk and lawn at Farrington High School, where he ran down the 
plaintiffs who were walking on the lawn. Defendant then fled the scene, 
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traveling through the hallway, the lawn, and back onto the roadway, where 
about 20 minutes later, he crashed the car into a fence/pole. Defendant was 
later found to have a BAC of .271. Plaintiff Cuson, an 18-year-old single 
female student, suffered several physical injuries resulting in permanent 
partial disability. A default judgment was entered against defendant and 
Circuit Court Judge Ronald Moon then held a non-jury trial on the issue of 
damages. Plaintiff Gonzales settled before trial and plaintiffCuson withdrew 
her special damages request. After a one-day trial, Judge Moon awarded 
plaintiff Cuson $275,000 in general damages and punitive damages of 
$7,500. (I) 
Case S 15: Keith E. Reder, individually and as next friend for Christina 
Ann Reder, Donna Lyn Reder v. Daniel Seyler, MarionWong Gudgrnent 
entered 2/18/88). In this hit and run DUI case, plaintiff, a 28-year-old married 
nurse, Donna Reder was driving her car with her 2-year-old her infant 
daughter in a car seat. As Reder entered Kahekili Highway, defendant Seyler, 
in a rented vehicle, failed to stop at the red signal, swerved into the right-tum 
only lane, ran the red signal, attempted to cross the intersection, collided with 
the right side of plaintiffs' vehicle, then he and his passenger (defendant 
Wong) fled the scene after retrieving beer from the vehicle. Plaintiff Donna 
Reder suffered back pain and cervical strain. Her daughter suffered a double 
hernia, requiring surgery, and inflicting emotional distress. Plaintiff Keith 
Reder, a 28-year-old manager, who was the husband/father, arrived at the 
scene immediately after the accident and claimed emotional distress and loss 
of consortium. Seyler was later apprehended by police, speeding and 
drinking alcohol; he had previous convictions for DUI and was driving on the 
date of the accident with a suspended license. (Wong, who was also the rental 
agent who rented the vehicle to Seyler a few days earlier, was granted a 
directed verdict on the count of negligent entrustment.) Seyler admitted 
liability before trial and never appeared at this deposition or trial. After an 
eight-day trial, the jury awarded: 1) to the father, general damages of $100, 
special damages of$1 ,650 (auto), and punitive damages 0($2,000; 2) to the 
daughter, general damages of $3,000, special damages of $2,663.08, and 
punitive damages of $7,500; 3) to the mother, general damages of $7,500, 
special damages of$62.04, and punitive damages of $5,500. (Is) 
Case S 17: Annette Tilton, individually and as Prochein Ami of Geraldine 
Tilton, a minor; Patricia Tilton, individually and as Prochein Ami of Kelii 
Tilton, a minor; Louis K. C. Tilton, individually and as Prochein Ami of Billie 
Jo Tilton, a minor (consolidated) v. Raymond 1. Rivera, Jr., Gudgment 
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entered 4/25/88). In this motor vehicle accident case, the three minor 
plaintiffs (ages 14, 11, and 11) were injured when the van in which they were 
passengers was rear-ended by defendant, whom plaintiffs alleged was 
speeding and had a BLOH of .17. Defendant admitted liability before trial. 
After six days of trial, the jury awarded: 1) to Annette/Geraldine, general 
damages of $1 ,500, special damages of $627.91, and punitive damages of 
$1.00; 2) to PatricialKelii, general damages of $650, special damages of 
$106.08, and punitive damages of $1.00; and 3) to LouislBillie Jo, general 
damages of $1,000, special damages of $227.78, and punitive damages of 
$1.00. Plaintiffs argued that their claim came under the "punitive damages 
exception" to the abolition of tort liability for automobile accidents (HAW. 
REv. STAT. § 294-6(b)(3), superseded by HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:10C-306), 
and Circuit Court Judge Ronald Moon instructed the jury that plaintiffs had to 
prove and be awarded punitive damages in order to recover any damages 
against the defendant. (I) 
Case S 18: Mildred H. Uyeoka, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for 
Jon H. Oshiro v. William E. Kinkaid (judgment entered 6/30/88). At 11: 15 
p.m. on October 25, 1985, plaintiff Jon Oshiro, a 23-year-old single man, was 
driving a car west on Kalanianaole Highway in the land next to the double 
solid center lines, when defendant, driving east, attempted to pass east-bound 
traffic by crossing the center lines into the lane Oshiro was occupying. 
Oshiro attempted to avoid the accident, but Kinkaid crashed into him head-on. 
Plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries, including severe brain damage, 
pennanent paralysis on his left side, severe speech and memory defects, 
confinement to a wheelchair, lack of bowel and bladder control, mental 
incompetence, and various fractures. Plaintiff contended defendant was drunk 
(.241 BLOH), was speeding, in the wrong lane, and was fleeing from the 
scene of another vehicle collision that he caused when he collided with 
Oshiro. Defendant, who claimed he had no insurance and minimal assets, 
stipulated before trial to the fact that he had ignored a friend's warning not to 
drive while drunk, that his BLOH was .241, and that he was the sole and 
proximate cause of the accident. After a one-day jury waived trial, Circuit 
Court Judge Marie N. Milks awarded: 1) to plaintiff Oshiro (son) general 
damages of $2.97 million, special damages of $990,000, and punitive 
damages of $25,000; and 2) to plaintiff Mildred (mother), $322,000 general 
damages. (I) 
Case C3: Mark D. Searles v. Perry P. Sweeny (CAAP Judgment entered 
10/6/88). Defendant Sweeny admitted that he rear-ended plaintiffs vehicle 
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on Kalanianaole Highway in Kailua and that he fled the scene after the 
accident. Defendant contested only the issues of apportionment of damages 
because plaintiff had suffered another vehicle accident one week later, 
aggravating his back injuries. CAAP Arbitrator Michael O'Connor found 
after a one-day hearing that defendant was 100% at fault and attributed 60% 
of plaintiff's injuries to the rear-end accident, awarding $15,000 in general 
damages, $12,000 in special damages, and $2,000 in punitive damages. (I) 
Case C4: Garret K. Ito and Ross A. Keliikipi v. Dwight Daniel Esias 
(CAAP Judgment entered 5/17/89). In this CAAP case, plaintiffs contended 
that they suffered cervical strain after they were rear-ended by defendant late 
one nightwhen they were heading toward Kailua on the Pali Highway. Police 
cars had stopped all traffic because a tree had fallen on the road in a storm. 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was holding two jobs, had not slept the 
previous night, had been out drinking before the accident, saw the police cars, 
but then closed his eyes and fell asleep. CAAP Arbitrator Richard Chun 
found defendant liable, awarding plaintiffs $14,000 in general damages, 
$5,252 in special damages, and $1.00 in punitive damages. (Plaintiffs had 
argued that their claims fell under the punitive damages exception to the no-
fault law.) (I) 
Case C13: Margarat Yuson v. Huong Thi Bui and Linh Hi Bui, individually 
and as Guardians for David L. Bui, minor, Inja N Choi and Henry Kyo Sik 
Choi, individuall and as Guardians for Rex Choi, minor (CAAP Judgment 
entered 11115199). PlaintiffYuson, a 58-year-old woman was driving east on 
the H-l Freeway one evening, when her vehicle was violently rear-ended by 
minor David L. Bui, who was racing his vehicle with Rex Choi at speeds up 
to 80 mph, on their way back from Hawaii Raceway Park. In trying to change 
lanes, Bui struck plaintiffs car and Bui's vehicle burst into flames. Plaintiff 
suffered aggravation of post-traumatic stress disorder, panic attacks, soft 
tissue injuries, and aggravation of a pre-existing back injury, as well as 
cervical strain. Bui denied racing, but admitted liability; Choi denied both. 
CAAP Arbitrator William Wynhoffapportioned fault 50% to Bui and 50% to 
Choi.569 Wynhoffawarded plaintiff $60,000 in general damages, $19,180 in 
special damages, and $15,000 in punitive damages. (Is) 
569 Apparently, no finding was entered with respect to the obvious joint and several liability of the 
defendants based on concert of action. 
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Case C15: Herminia Subia v. Stanley Batula (CAAP Judgment entered 
9/13/01). Plaintiff, a 37-year-old hotel worker, was driving her car on 
Likelike Highway in the early evening, when she stopped at a red light. 
When the light turned green, before she had a chance to accelerate, defendant 
rear-ended her vehicle. Plaintiff suffered cervical and shoulder strain, and 
temporary work disability. Defendant later admitted he had drank 2-3 beers 
earlier that afternoon. The police report indicated that he failed the field 
sobriety test and had a .13 BLOH shortly after the accident. Defendant 
admitted liability, disputing only the amount of damages. CAAP Arbitrator 
Harrison P. Chung found no comparative negligence and awarded plaintiff 
$13,000 in general damages, $10,000 in special damages, and $12,000 in 
punitive damages. (I) 
4. Gross Negligence: Dog Bites, Shorebreak Accidents, Medical Fraud, 
Workplace Injury 
Case S6: Howard P. Kanehe and Nannie V. Kanehe v. Jeff Brisebois, Mary 
Brisebois, Waihina Valley Farms (judgment entered 1122/86). In this Kauai 
case, the plaintiffs alleged that, while Mr. Kanehe was walking near 
defendants' property, he was attacked and bitten by defendants' Akita. Mr. 
Kanehe suffered a puncture wound to his left testicle; puncture wounds to his 
left thigh; lacerations on his wrist; two puncture wounds to his palm; and 
residual neurological problems with his left hand. Plaintiffs contended that 
the dog (or defendants' four Akitas) had previously bitten five people, 
including Mr. Kanehe's grandson. Defendant Mr. Brisebois contended he had 
released the dog on the corporation's own property for exercise, with no 
notice that Mr. Kanehe, whom defendant claimed was trespassing, has entered 
the property. After a three-day trial, the jury found that defendants were 
negligent and that plaintiff was not. The jury awarded general damages of 
$30,000, special damages of $300, and punitive damages of $75,000 
($52,500 against Mr. Brisebois, $15,000 against Mrs. Brisebois, and 
$7,500 against the corporation). (Is) & (8) 
Case S23: Charles William Chase, Jr., and Carla Marshall Chase v. State 
of Hawaii, County of Maui, Association of Apartment Owners of the Whaler 
on Kaanapali Beach (judgment entered 1101190). In this shorebreak liability 
case, plaintiff Charles Chase, a 34-year-old electrician and his wife Carla, 
. both residents of Nevada, were visiting Kaanapali Beach on Maui for an 
outing and chose to stop on the beach in front of defendant Whaler's 
condominium. Body-surfing alone in chest-high water with two to four foot 
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waves, Charles was catapulted by a wave and suffered severe back and spinal 
injuries, resulting in permanent pain and partial disability. Plaintiffs 
dismissed their claims against the State and County, and the case proceeded to 
nine days trial against Whaler, based on plaintiff's claims of inadequate notice 
and warning. Second Circuit Court Judge Richard Komo admitted evidence 
of a prior lawsuit against Whaler for a similar injury to a guest, as well as 
evidence of 86 prior ocean accidents in the area, including 20-22 that 
occurred in front of the Whaler property. The jury awarded Charles general 
damages of $260,000, special damages of $22,750, punitive damages of 
$440,000, and Carla loss of consortium of$71,500. (State) & (County) & 
(B/AOAO) 
Case F2: Norman L. Mitchell and Miriam Mitchell v. Physicians Health 
Plan o/Minnesota and Westin Hotels dba Mauna Kea Beach Hotel (Federal 
Court Judgment entered 8/7/90). Plaintiff and his wife were guests at 
defendant Mauna Kea Beach Hotel, when Mr. Mitchell went for a swim in the 
ocean fronting the hotel. As a result of a wave throwing him to the bottom, he 
suffered total permanent quadriplegia. He alleged the hotel failed to warn of 
the deceptively dangerous ocean conditions and that the hotel knew of 137 
prior accidents, including 3 quadriplegic accidents, at the same site in front of 
the hotel. After a I3-day trial, the jury found him 47% negligent and the hotel 
53% negligent, awarding $3.7 million in special damages, $2 million in 
general damages, and $3 million in punitive damages. Mrs. Mitchell was 
awarded $1 million for loss of consortium and $2.5 million for NIED (witness 
to the accident). (Bs) 
CaseS26: Janie Ditto v. John A. McCurdy, Jr., MD., and Karla Scarpiova 
(judgment entered 7/7/92; on remand, punitive damages judgment modified to 
$676,700, July 1999; the original and not the modified judgment is included 
in the quantitative portion of the study; in 2002, the Supreme Court vacated 
this second judgment as well). Plaintiff Janie Ditto, a 32-year-old married bar 
hostess, brought a lawsuit against defedant Dr. McCurdy, a surgeon who 
performed breast augmentation surgery on Ditto, and against McCurdy's 
nurse Scarpiova. Because of complications that plaintiff alleged resulted from 
defendant McCurdy'S inadequate care, plaintiff underwent three surgeries 
under general anesthesia on the initial day of surgery because of 
complications; she contracted an infection in the right breast; underwent a 
closed capsulotomy (manual breast manipulation to break up scar tissue), a 
bilateral open capsulotomy (surgical procedure to break up scar tissue around 
implants); had her surgical incision re-sutured by Scarpiova, an unlicensed 
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medical assistant; underwent two more capsulotomies; developed a hematoma 
that was aspirated; and ultimately had the implants removed by other 
physicians. Plaintiff alleged that McCurdy (a surgeon who had performed 
several hundred of such operations but whose board certification was not 
recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties) lacked the 
requisite expertise to perform breast augmentation, failed to obtain plaintiffs 
complete medical history, and failed to warn plaintiff of the risks of the 
procedure. After a fourteen-day trial, the jury awarded plaintiff $1.0 million 
in general damages, $3,500 in special damages, $400,000 for fraud, and 
punitive damages of $600,000. (Dr) & (I) 
Post-Trial History. The case history after this 1992 judgment is very 
convoluted, involving four Hawaii Supreme Court opinions, one ICA opinion, 
bankruptcy proceedings, and numerous circuit court proceedings on remand. 
As explained below, the amount of plaintiff's punitive damages award is still 
unsettled and awaiting retrial on a second remand. 
After entry of the jury's verdict as judgment, the trial judge awarded 
plaintiff Ditto $743,381.92 in prejudgment interest (order of September 9, 
1992), and $42,106.39 in costs (order of September 17, 1992).570 
On October 20, 1992, McCurdy filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 
which was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, automatically staying 
the judgment against him.571 
On August 9, 1993, McCurdy's subsequent motions for new trial, JNOV, 
and reconsideration in the circuit court were denied, and the trial court entered 
its amended judgment (reflecting the award of prejudgment interest and 
costS).572 
Defendant McCurdy then appealed on several grounds. The appeal was 
assigned to the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA"). As to punitive 
damages, the ICA held, in an opinion issued in June 1997, that the punitive 
damage award was supported by evidence and was not excessive, and the 
evidence of the surgeon's financial condition (which he failed to introduce) 
was not required to support the award.573 
Accordingly, the ICA affirmed the amended August 9, 1993 judgment that 
awarded special, general, and punitive damages for negligence, and reversed 
the portion of the amended judgment that awarded prejUdgment interest 
S70 For a discussion of the case history, see Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 961, 968 n.l (Haw. 1997) 
(Ditto I). 
m For a discussion of the case history, see Ditto v. McCurdy, 978 P.2d 783 (Haw. 1999) (Ditto //1). 
m Ditto I, 947 P.2d at 971. 
m Ditto I, 947 P.2d at 972-75. 
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damages on punitive damages.574 
In 1997, Ditto also obtained partial relief from the bankruptcy stay in order 
to garnish Dr. McCurdy's pension plans (which became the subject of the 
garnishee action appealed to the Supreme Court, described below).575 
Defendant sought and obtained review of the ICA' s 1993 opinion in the 
Hawaii Supreme Court. On November 6, 1997, the Court held, as to punitive 
damages, that the trial court's fraud instruction was harmless with respect to 
the jury's findings as to negligence and gross negligence and strongly 
endorsed the merits of the award: "we determine that there was, indeed, an 
abundance of clear and convincing evidence upon which the jury could rely to 
find that Dr. McCurdy's care of Ditto, from the outset, was grossly negligent 
and therefore reckless and consciously indifferent to the consequences that 
could arise," and "the evidence of Dr. McCurdy's gross negligence was so 
overwhelming and of such an egregious nature that the jury certainly could 
have found that punitive damage was warranted. ,,576 However, the Court held 
that the fraud instruction had prejudicially influenced the jury's calculation of 
punitive damages. 577 
Accordingly, the Court vacated the jury's 1992 award of punitive damages 
and remanded with instructions to the trial court to dismiss the fraud count 
and conduct a new trial solely on the issue of the amount of punitive damages 
owed.578 
On January 7, 1998, the Supreme Court entered a notice and judgment on 
appeal, stating in pertinent part that interest at ten percent per year, pursuant 
to HAW. REv. STAT § 478-3 (1993), should be applied to the affirmed portion 
of the verdict, $1,045,606.30 (i.e. $1,003,500 in general and special damages 
for negligence and $42,106.39 in costs not appealed) from the date ofthe July 
1992 judgment. 579 
In 1998, plaintiff Ditto attempted to recover the valid portions of her 
judgment from the defendant. In August and September 1998, the circuit 
court partially granted plaintiff s motion for issuance of a garnishee summons, 
entered a garnishee order, and denied McCurdy's motion for stay on appeal 
and for interlocutory appea1.580 McCurdy appealed. 
On May 12, 1999, the Hawaii Supreme Court found that ERISA protected 
m [d. at 995. 
m Ditto Ill, 978 P.2d at 785. 
576 [d. at 960. 
m Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 959-61 (Haw. 1 997), recons. denied (1997) (Dillo /1). 
m [d. at 961. 
579 See Ditto v. McCurdy, 80 P.3d 974, 976 (Haw. 2003) (Ditto VI). 
580 Ditto Ill, 978 P.2d at 785. 
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Dr. McCurdy's two pension plans from garnishment and therefore reversed 
the circuit court's 1998 garnishee orders.581 
On June 3, 1999, the retrial of the punitive damage awards commenced in 
the circuit court.582 Ditto's counsel argued that the favorable language of the 
Supreme Court's 1997 decision, essentially pre-determined the jury's 
reconsideration of the punitive damages award; McCurdy's counsel argued 
that the circuit court gave it too much credence in instructing the jury and 
allowed plaintiff's counsel to over-emphasize it during closing argument.583 
In July 1999, the jury returned a punitive damages verdict for $676,700.584 
Final judgment for this amount was entered on July 14, 1999.585 Following 
the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, McCurdy timely 
appealed.586 
On November 19, 1999, the circuit court judge issued a writ of execution 
in connection with the judgments allowing Ditto to seize McCurdy's personal 
property on Maui and in Honolulu.587 McCurdy moved to quash the writ. On 
June 19,2000, the circuit court judge denied in part and granted in part the 
motion to quash.588 McCurdy appealed. 
On March 24, 2000, the circuit court issued an order granting in part and 
denying in part McCurdy and his pension plan's motion for return of 
garnished funds and for attorneys fees and costs, and entered a September 28, 
2000 "final" judgment.589 On November 20, 2000, the circuit court also 
denied Ditto's motion to set aside and/or to alter the judgment, from which 
Ditto appealed.590 
In an April 8, 2002 decision on McCurdy's appeal of the retrial of the 
punitive damages award, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the trial court 
erred in taking judicial notice of the Supreme Court's discussion in the prior 
appeal concerning sufficiency of evidence necessary to affirm McCurdy's 
liability for punitive damages, and that the error was harmfu1.591 The Court, 
once again, vacated in part and remanded for another retrial on the amount of 
punitive damages.592 
581 Ditto 111,978 P.2d at 797. 
582 See Ditto v. McCurdy, 44 P.3d 274, 276 (Haw. 2002) (Ditto IV). 
5&J Id. at 276-78. 
S84 ld. at 278. 
mId. 
586 ld. at 279. 
587 See Ditto v. McCurdy, 78 P.3d at 331, 332 (Haw. 2003) (Ditto V). 
588 ld. at 333. 
589 Ditto VI, 80 P.3d at 976. 
590 ld. 
59' Ditto IV, 44 P.3d at 275. 
592 ld. at 283. 
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On October 30,2003, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed McCurdy's 
appeal regarding the writs of execution issued by the circuit court in 2000.593 
The Court held for McCurdy that the writ of execution was invalid for 
vagueness and untimeliness, and reversed the circuit court's order denying 
McCurdy's motion to quash.594 
In December 2003, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed the parties' 
appeal regarding the March 2000 and September 2000 orders regarding 
garnishment of Dr. McCurdy's pension plans, and Ditto's appeal of the 
November 2002 order, dismissing all of the appeals on jurisdictional grounds 
and upholding the circuit court's orders.595 
In short, as of the last reported decision, plaintiff Ditto's entitlement to 
punitive damages is well established but the amount of that award has yet to 
be retried for the third time in the circuit court. Her other damages, including 
post-judgment interest are around $2 million, of which it appears she has 
collected only $66,000 since the judgment over ten years ago.596 
Case C17: Debbie Hart v. Dr. Michael C. Pierner, D.C. Gudgmententered 
10114/94). Plaintiff Debbie Hart, a 33-year-old single female, was a licensed 
massage therapist under contract to provide services in the office of the 
defendant. In early January 1990, she had a car accident. Four days later, 
defendant Pierner asked plaintiff if she wanted an adjustment, Hart agreed, 
and then went into defendant's office fully clothed. Plaintiff contended that 
defendant negligently adjusted her cervical spine, that defendant had been 
drinking, and touched her inappropriately. She then saw a psychiatrist who 
diagnosed here with PTSD, and commenced treatment for her cervical injury. 
In early 1991, she was involved in another car accident. Her injuries were 
apportioned 75% to the second accident and 25% to the defendant's 
adjustment. Defendant denied the allegations and challenged plaintiffs 
credibility. Arbitrator Douglas J. Sameshima found no comparative 
negligence and awarded plaintiff general and special damages of$9,465 and 
punitive damages of$9,400. [This case is also potentially a Category 2 case, 
but the claim focused more on the negligence resulting in the physical injury 
than the other claims.] (Dr.) 
5. Offenses Against Mental and Physical Freedom: Intentional/Negligent, 
Defamation, False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution 
S9) Ditto V, 78 P.3d 331. 
S94 Id. at 338. 
S9S Ditto VI, 80 P.3d at 976. 
S96 See Ditto V, 78 P.3d at 334. 
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Case Fl: Anthony P. Locricchio v. Legal Services Corporation of Hawaii, 
Rita Geier, Rita Bender, Clinton Bamberger, Charles Jones, and Fabio de la 
Torres (Federal Court judgment entered 12117/85). Plaintiff Locricchio, the 
Executive Director of Legal Services of Hawaii (a non-profit corporation 
providing services to low-income residents), alleged that, following a dispute 
over attorney caseloads, certain LASH employees defamed him through 
written allegations of misuse of LASH funds, interfered with his contractual 
relations with LASH, and caused him to be wrongfully terminated, and to 
suffer emotional distress. After a thirteen-day trial, a federal court jury found 
for Locriccho, finding three instances of defamation and actual malice. The 
jury awarded plaintiff $125,000 in general damages and $25,000 in special 
damages; $87,000 for interference with contract; $200,000 for interference 
with prospective business advantage; and $100,000 in punitive damages. 
Judge Harold M. Fong upheld the jury's verdict. (8INonprofit) & (Is) 
Case S 14: James D. Clawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Michael French, 
Mark Johnson, City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu Police Department 
(judgment entered 12/1/87). Plaintiff, a 40-year-old self-employed man, 
contended that he was assaultedlbattered, falsely arrested, and maliciously 
prosecuted as a result of defendant Sears' claim that he sought a refund on a 
paint roller that he did not actually purchase, resulting in emotional distress. 
Despite evidence that plaintiff had engaged in "refund fraud," the jury found 
after nine days of trial that defendants' detention of plaintiff was not 
reasonable, awarding damages of$5,500 for false imprisonment, $12,000 for 
defamation, $1000 for assault, $1,032 for malicious prosecution, and $18,000 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In a separate verdict, the jury 
then found Sears' acts were wilful with conscious indifference to the 
consequences, awarding $20,000 in punitive damages. Sears' motion for a 
new trial was granted by Circuit Court Judge Marie Milks. (8) & (Is) & (City) 
Case S20: John A. McCurdy Jr. v. Stephen L. Schlesinger, Maui Plastic 
Surgery Corp. (judgment entered 8111/88). Plaintiff McCurdy, a 38-year-old 
single Maui ENT surgeon who was then the only surgeon on Maui performing 
plastic surgery, claimed that defendant Schlesinger, a plastic surgeon who had 
arrived on Maui in 1980, defamed him by telling patients and others that 
plaintiff was not qualified to perform plastic surgery and caused a patient to 
bring a baseless malpractice action against plaintiff. (A nationwide dispute 
existed between plastic surgeons and other physicians who performed plastic 
surgery about the requisite qualifications.) Plaintiff claimed injury to his 
366 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XX:143 
reputation and practice, emotional distress, and alleged that he was forced to 
relocate to Honolulu and lost earnings. After nine days of trial, the jury found 
defendant had defamed plaintiff, awarding general damages of $25,000 and 
punitive damages of $350,000, reduced after defendants' motion for new 
trial/remittitur was granted by Circuit Court Judge Boyd Mossman to 
$50,000. (Dr.) & (Dr./B) 
Case S22: Patrick Lessary v. Esther Lessary; Esther Lessary v. Leonard 
Appell, dba Appell Affordable Legal Services Uudgment entered 9/7/88). 
Plaintiff Esther Lessary, whose minor daughter had been raped by her brother 
Patrick Lessary, claimed that Patrick's criminal attorney third-party defendant 
Appell, an attorney with a prior felony conviction record that he failed to 
disclose while seeking admission to the Hawaii bar (see Case S21), caused her 
severe emotional distress during the rape trial, attempted to coerce her into 
withdrawing charges against the plaintiff, and send a defamatory letter to her 
employer. (In an appeal of Patrick's criminal conviction, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court found that Appell had not provided adequate counsel to Patrick.) The 
only claim remaining for trial was Esther's third-party complaint against 
Appell. After a stay in Appell's bankruptcy proceeding was lifted, an eight-
day trial was held and the jury awarded to Esther $31 ,000 in general damages, 
$150,000 in special damages, and punitive damages of $800,000. (Is/LP) 
Case S29: Thomas F. Schmidt and Lorinna 1. Schmidt v. Association of 
Apartment Owners of Marco Polo Condominium Uudgment entered 1/02/93). 
Plaintiffs owned residential units and a commercial unit (Mr. Schmidt's 
realty office) at the Marco Polo Condominiums. After overhearing a 
conversation between the security director and the AOAO's president in 
which they referred to getting rid of Schmidt with a "bang bang" (making a 
gun gesture) and hiring a big Samoan to kill him, Schmidt filed the action 
alleging multiple counts, including defamation and negligent/intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. (This case was one of several actions filed by 
plaintiff against the AOAO and Board of Directors of the Marco Polo; PIJH 
noted there were over 50 court files in the case and the jury verdict was 63-
pages long.) Plaintiffs sought admission of over 200 statements made by 
defendants, including calling plaintiffs "crooks ... liars ... Nazis," and 25 of 
these statements were submitted to the jury. After a 22-day trial, the jury 
found for defendants on all substantive counts, except it found that the 
security director and president has negligently inflicted emotional distress on 
Schmidt, but the jury awarded no general or specific damages for this claim. 
Nonetheless, the jury awarded punitive damages of $35,000 against 
2004] Hawaii Punitive Damages 367 
defendants ($5,000 against the security director and $30,000 against the 
president). Defendants' motion for JNOV on the grounds that punitive 
damages were not allowable for mere negligence was denied and Circuit 
Court Judge Virginia Crandall entered judgment for plaintiffs. (B/ AOAO) 
Case S30: Reinhard Mohr v. Alexandra Kaan, aka Alexandra Gabrielle 
Gudgment entered 6/2/93). Plaintiff Mohr, a 50-year-old married attorney, 
sued defendant Kaan, a female attorney, for defamation arising out of a series 
ofletters that Kaan wrote to Mohr. (Mohr was retained by a client who was 
dissatisfied with Kaan's representation of him in a criminal proceeding and 
was seeking an accounting ofKaan's services and fees). In letters that Kaan 
knew or should have known would be turned over to the client, Kaan wrote 
that Mohr was "offensive, overzealous, incorrect and unscrupulous in your 
attempt to generate a fee for yourself or support your own drug habit," 
described plaintiff as an "idiot," and made her statements about Mohr's drug 
use on the basis of rumor and hearsay. In the jury-waived proceeding, Circuit 
Court Judge Kevin S.C. Chang found after a one-day trial that Kaan had 
published the statements with actual malice and that Mohr had suffered 
emotional distress, awarding Mohr $1,000 in general damages and $1,500 in 
punitive damages. (IILP) 
Case F6: Brenda Lynne Carnell v. Cheryl Grimm, and other named police 
officers, City and County of Honolulu (Federal Court judgment entered 
10117/96). Plaintiff, a 32-year-old female nurse, contended that she was 
kidnapped, raped, and then escaped. She alleged that the two Honolulu police 
officers who then found her tried to force a statement from her, assaulted her 
during arresting her, falsely arrested her, refused her appropriate medical 
attention, and violated her civil rights. The police officers contended that 
plaintiff was upset, uncooperative, intoxicated, and never told them or others 
she had been raped, and that her credibility was in issue. Trial was narrowed 
to only the two arresting officers Flynn and Noguchi. After five-day trial, the 
federal court jury found for plaintiff, concluding that both officers had 
ignored her serious medical needs, were deliberately indifferent, and acted 
recklessly and callously toward plaintiff, awarding $32,000 in compensatory 
damages and $65,000 in punitive damages against the officers 
(apportioned equally). Judge David A. Ezra entered judgment accordingly. 
(Is/officers, City) 
Case F7: Emil R. Pulse v. City and County of Honolulu, Michael S. 
Nakamura, Timothy Mariani, and William Lurbe (Federal Court judgment 
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entered 1130/01). Plaintiff, a carpenter apprentice who lived on a 24-foot-
long sailboat tied to a pier in Keehi Lagoon Harbor, alleged that two Honolulu 
police officers violated civil rights laws and maliciously prosecuted him. The 
defendants had arrested him in the early morning hours after being called to 
the scene by a complaint about plaintiff being intoxicated and threatening a 
neighbor with a loaded gun. Pulse, who was incarcerated for three years for 
the incident, filed this action on the basis that the police had perfonned a 
warrantless search and seizure and committed perjury. Trial was limited to 
the Section 1983 count and pendent state civil rights violations, and the false 
imprisonment claim against the two officers. After six days oftrial, a federal 
court jury found for plaintiff that the search and seizure had been unlawful 
and plaintiff had been wrongfully incarcerated. The jury awarded $50,000 
(80% Marianil20% Lurbe) in general damages and $350,000 for punitive 
damages (same allocation). Judge Susan Oki Mollway entered judgment 
accordingly. (Is/officers/City) 
6. Dishonesty: Fraud, Conversion, Breach of Contract 
Case S7: Mary Lou Critcher v. Jeffrey Mitchell Critcher aka Jeff M 
Critcher, Pacific Coast Savings and Loan Association (judgment entered 
2/5/86). In this lawsuit, a mother sued her son for breach of contract, fraud, 
emotional distress, breach of confidential trust, constructive trust, and wanton 
and reckless acts resulting from the sale of real property. Defendant filed a 
counterclaim and separate lawsuit against his mother and her initial law finn, 
alleging malicious prosecution, libeVslander, and abuse of process. (The 
second lawsuit was dismissed as frivolous, and attorneys fees were granted 
under HAW. REv. STAT § 607-14.5. Pacific Coast was voluntarily dismissed 
from the first lawsuit.) After eight days oftrial, the j ury found for the mother, 
awarding her $85,000 in compensatory damages, $10,000 for emotional 
distress, and punitive damages of $10,000. (I/LP) & (B) 
Case S21: Robert L. Rodman v. Leonard Appell and State of Hawaii 
(judgment entered 9/2/88). Plaintiff Rodman brought this action for legal 
malpractice, breach of contract, conversion, and emotional distress against 
defendant Appell, an attorney, whom Rodman had retained in a separate legal 
malpractice action, because Appell had removed all or a significant portion of 
Rodman's $10,000 retainer from the attorney trust account without his 
pennission. Appell had been denied a license to practice law in New 
Hampshire for lack of moral integrity. (Plaintiffs claim against the State of 
Hawaii;for negligently licensing Appell, was denied by. Circuit Court Judge 
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Ronald Moon on summary judgment, a ruling which was upheld by the 
Hawaii Supreme Court.) Defendant's counterclaims were dismissed, he failed 
to answer an amended complaint, resulting in a default judgment, and he filed 
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy stay was lifted, the case 
proceeded to seven days' trial on damages (defendant did not attend trial after 
day 4). The jury awarded plaintiff no general damages, special damages of 
$12,943, and punitive damages of $250,000. (IILP) & (State) 
7. Unsafe Products 
Case S 16: Stephen Masaki, Frank Masaki, and Sumiye Masaki v. General 
Motors Corp., Servco Pacific, Inc. (judgment entered 3/15/88). Plaintiff 
Stephen Masaki, a 28-year-old single part-time mechanic, was rendered a 
quadriplegic as a result of being run over by an allegedly defective 
transmission in a 1976 Chevy Van he was attempting to restart as part of his 
mechanic duties. His parents Frank and Sumiye Masaki claimed negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium related to seeing 
Stephen in the hospital after his accident. Stephen lost all memory of the 
accident, but his co-worker who was sitting in a vehicle adjacent to the van as 
Stephen was working on it testified that Stephen attached a remote starter 
cable and was attempting to remove the cable when the van's transmission 
shifted into reverse, running over Stephen. Plaintiffs alleged numerous 
defects in the van transmission system, that GM was aware of hundreds of 
deaths and injuries arising from the defect for over ten years, and that GM had 
failed to warn or remedy the problem. After 49 days of trial, the jury found 
defendants 60% at fault and plaintiff Stephen 40% at fault, awarding (as 
reduced by comparative negligence): 1) for Stephen, $1.8 million on general 
damages, $2.26 million in special damages, and (unreduced)* punitive 
damages against GM of $11.25 million; 2) for Frank, $336,000 for loss of 
consortium, and $276,000 for emotional distress; and 3) for Sumiye, $336,000 
for loss of consortium, and $276,000 for emotional distress. (*Circuit Court 
Judge Leland Spencer ruled that punitive damages could not be reduced by 
plaintiff's contributory negligence.) Defendant appealed and, in 1989, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed that punitive damages could be awarded in 
products liability cases, but reversed the punitive damages award because the 
Court adopted a new "clear and convincing" standard for punitive damages 
awards.597 On remand, the case settled for a confidential amount. (Bs) 
597 See Masaki, 780 P.2d at 566. 
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Case S31: Sosimo B. Tabieros and Mitsuko H. Wilson v. Matson 
Navigation Co., Inc. and Clark Equipment Co. Uudgment entered 7/9/93). 
Plaintiff Tabieros, a single 50-year-old maintenance worker at Matson 
Terminals, was sitting in a tow vehicle next to a crane at the container yard at 
Sand Island when Howard Diaz, an employee on loan to Matson, operating a 
straddler manufactured by defendant Clark in 1963, caused the straddle to 
collide with plaintiff's vehicle, crushing both of Tabieros' legs and causing 
other severe injuries, eventual scarring and deformity, and 12% permanent 
disability. 
The first trial in this case was held in 1990. The circuit court entered 
summary judgment in favor ofDiaz and Matson and dismissed the plaintiff 
and his common-law wife's claims against MH&R. In June 1990, a jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Clark, the only remaining defendant. 
On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the jury verdict and 
remanded for new trial, finding, inter alia, that the court erred in granting 
summary judgment to defendant Clark on the punitive damages claim. The 
plaintiffs appealed, and, in a memorandum opinion, the Supreme Court: (1) 
vacated the judgments that had been entered in favor of Matson Navigation 
and Clark; and (2) affirmed the favorable judgments as to Diaz and MH & 
R.598 
In March 1993, a second jury trial (reported in PUff) commenced between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants Clark and Matson Navigation. During the 
trial, the circuit court granted directed verdicts in favor of Clark on the 
plaintiffs' claims of breach of implied warranties of merchantability and/or 
fitness for a particular purpose, negligent manufacture, and negligent failure 
to retrofit. Circuit Court Judge Wendell Huddy dismissed the emotional 
distress claim ofMitsuko Wilson, Tabieros' common-law wife. After 23 days 
of trial, the jury found that the straddler had a dangerous defect present at the 
time of sale, and found Clark 34% at fault, Matson 55% at fault, and plaintiff 
Tabieros 15% at fault. The jury awarded plaintiff $279,000 in general 
damages, $200,400 in special damages, and punitive damages of $52,000 
(against Clark only). (Bs) 
After the verdict was returned, but before entry of judgment, the plaintiffs 
settled with Matson Navigation by way of a joint tortfeasor release agreement 
pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, HAW. REv. 
STAT., §§ 663-11 through 663-17 (1993). Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a 
dismissal of all of their claims against Matson Navigation. Judgment against 
Clark was entered on July 9, 1993 for its pro rata share of the jury's award. 
598 Tabieros v. Diaz, 827 P.2d 1148 (Haw. 1992) (mem.) (Tabieros I). 
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The circuit court denied Clark's motion for a reduction of the judgment in the 
amount paid by Matson Navigation to the plaintiffs pursuant to the joint 
tortfeasor release agreement. Clark again appealed to the Hawaii Supreme 
Court. 
In a lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court, Levinson, 1., held that: (1) a 
manufacturer does not have duty to retrofit its products with post-manufacture 
safety devices unavailable at time of sale; (2) the manufacturer had not 
assumed a duty to retrofit the carrier; (3) the worker's girlfriend did not suffer 
severe emotional distress; (4) the danger created by the "blind zone" in the 
carrier's cab was open and obvious, so that no duty to warn of danger existed; 
(5) the carrier was not defective under the consumer expectations or latent 
danger tests; (6) any failure to warn of danger was not a legal cause of 
accident; (7) the evidence supported instruction on specific claims of 
plaintiff's failure to mitigate; (8) the instructional errors required reversal; and 
(9) the manufacturer was entitled to credit for sums paid by owner in excess 
of its share of verdict. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.599 
8. Turning the Tables: When Defendants Win Reverse Punitive Damages 
Case S24: Sherry Vidmar v. Paul Kan (judgment 6/18/90). Vidmar 
involved a violent domestic dispute between plaintiff, a single female sales 
clerk, and defendant, an engineer. Plaintiff claimed that defendant sexually 
abused her and committed assault and battery for a 1-1/2 year period, 
resulting in physical and psychological injuries. Defendant denied the 
allegations and counterclaimed also seeking damages for assault and battery, 
deceit, and abuse of process. After seven days of trial, the jury found partially 
in favor of both parties: that defendant struck plaintiff without her consent, 
that plaintiff struck defendant without consent, that plaintiff s suit was not an 
. abuse of process, and that plaintiffheld defendant's property without consent. 
The jury awarded general damages to plaintiff on 1 000, no special damages, 
and punitive damages 0($7,500. Thejury also awarded special damages of 
$300 to defendant and punitive damages of $750. 
(I) [This Case also reported in Category I] 
Case F3: Michelle M Gretzinger v. University of Hawaii Professional 
Assembly, University of Hawaii, and Ramdas Lamb (Federal Judgment 
entered 9/17/96). Plaintiff, a University of Hawaii student, claimed that for 
three years she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, including 
599 Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 944 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1997) (Tabieros II). 
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sixteen rapes, by her professor Ramdas Lamb, who used his position as an 
undergraduate advisor to bribe students into sexual relationships. Plaintiff 
alleged violations of Title IX, Section 1983, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Lamb counterclaimed for sexual harassment and 
retaliation, alleging that the allegations were lies. Before trial, the University 
settled with plaintiff; the union was dismissed by motion; and the federal 
claims against Lamb were dismissed. After fourteen days of trial, the federal 
court jury found that Lamb did not intentionally inflict emotional distress on 
plaintiff. The jury found in favor of Lamb on his claims of defamation, false 
light, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wanton 
and willful misconduct, awarding him $40,000 in general damages, $12,750 
in special damages, and $80,000 in punitive damages. The jury verdict was 
upheld on appeal. 6OO (Union) & (I) 
Case S36: Ronald T. Kikumoto v. HTH Corporation et al. Gudgment 
entered 4/1/98). In this whistleblower case, plaintiffKikumoto, a 43-year-old 
former Vice-President/Director of defendant HTH Corporation, claimed he 
was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for opposing the defendant's 
directives on race and color discrimination, defendant's pattern of building 
code violations, and defendant's worker safety violations. In a letter 
complaining about the violations, plaintiff emphasized that he was 
substantially undercompensated. Defendants counterclaimed, contending that 
plaintiff obtained confidential records and information in order to extract a 
salary increase, a breach of his fiduciary duty, which justified termination. 
After a nine-day trial, the jury found that defendants did not violate the 
whistleblower or employment law, and that his termination did not violate 
public policy. The jury found that plaintiff breached his fiduciary duty and 
awarded defendants $3.00 for the breach and $1.00 in punitive damages. (B) 
600 Gretzinger v. University of Hawaii Professional Assembly and Ramdas Lamb, 156 F.3d 1236 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (affirming jury verdict in favor of Lamb and court's denial ofplaintifrs 
motion for a new trial). 
